


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OF THE
ORIGIN AND PROGRESS
OF
LANGUAGE.

*Mutum ac turpe pecus —————
Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,
Nominaque invenêre.*

HOR.

by Lord Monboddo.

V O L. I.

Burnet

*Origin and
Progress of
Language*

EDINBURGH:


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MDCCLXXIII.

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OF THE
THE CONTINENTAL
ORIGIN AND PROGRESS



That I should have been able to
procure the original of the
manuscript, which was deposited
in the library of the
Bishop of

V O L I

Deformation of the body - which
is a very common disease in
the human body.

Of education - which is a
very important part of the
human mind.

Printed for A. Kincaid & W. Carson,
of the printers and publishers of
the Standard, London.

MDCCCLXII

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OF THE
ORIGIN AND PROGRESS
OF
LANGUAGE.

INTRODUCTION.

AS the use of speech is supposed to be that which chiefly distinguishes us from the brute creation; and is truly so, if by *speech* we understand, not only the mere words or sounds of a language, but the conceptions of the mind that are signified by those sounds; it is a matter of curious inquiry, from whence we have derived this distinguishing prerogative of our nature; how it first began; and by what degrees it arrived to that state of perfection to which it has been brought, if not among us, at least in other ages and nations of the world. This inquiry becomes the more
VOL. I. A interesting,

interesting, as well as of greater curiosity, when we consider, that it leads us back to what may be called the *origin* of the *human race*; since without the use of reason and speech we have no pretensions to *humanity*, nor can with any propriety be called *men*; but must be contented to rank with the other animals here below, over whom we assume so much superiority, and exercise dominion chiefly by means of the advantages that the use of language gives us. From this *birth* of human nature, as it may be called, we will endeavour to trace its progress to its state of *maturity*. This progress, in the individual, is very well known; but we propose here to exhibit the species itself in its *infancy*,—first mute; then lisping and stammering; next by slow degrees learning to speak, very lamely and imperfectly at first; but at last, from such rude essays, forming an art the most curious, as well as most useful among men. The subject is, so far as I know, entirely new; no author, antient or modern, that has fallen into my hands, having professedly treated of it. And though I have met with hints concerning it in the course of my reading, they are such as
have

have rather excited than satisfied my curiosity.

These reasons have induced me to set down, and give to the public, my thoughts upon this subject, which are the fruit of much study and inquiry, continued with some interruptions for several years, and of many materials collected during that time. But if, notwithstanding, in this undiscovered country, where I am guided by no light or track, I have lost my way, I hope to be forgiven by every reader of sense and candour, who will allow at least this merit to my work, that I have opened a new field of speculation, in which even my errors may be of use, by serving as beacons to direct into the right course men of greater learning and abilities.

The work will be divided into *three* parts. The *first* will treat of the *origin* of language; and of the nature of the *first* languages; or, as they may be more properly called, rude essays towards language, which were practised before the *art* was invented.—The *second* will explain the nature of the *art*, shewing in what it chiefly consists, and how it differs from those first untaught attempts to speak. In

this part of my work, I will give an account of those parts of language which appear to me the most artificial, and of most difficult invention. I will also treat of *style*, or composition in words, as belonging to the art of language; and I think it will not appear foreign to my subject to say something likewise of *poetry* and *rhétoric*, being arts of which language furnishes the materials. — The subject of the *third* and *last* part will be the *corruption* of language; of which I shall endeavour to assign the causes, and trace the progress. — The first part will be chiefly philosophical, mixed however with a good deal of history, and facts, by which I shall endeavour to support my theories, and philosophical speculations. The two last parts will be grammatical and critical. The style will be plain and didactic, such as is suitable to a subject that is to be treated as a matter of science. It will not therefore have that mixture of the *rhétorical* and *poetical*, that is so common in the fashionable writings of this age, upon whatever subject, and which pleases the vulgar so much: for as I do not write for the vulgar, I will not adapt my style, any more than my matter, to their taste.

P A R T I.

B O O K I.

C H A P T E R I.

Definition of the subject.—Whether language be from nature, or acquired habit.

BY language I mean *the expression of* Ch. I.
the conceptions of the mind by articulate
sounds. These conceptions are either of
particulars, i. e. individual things, or of *ge-*
nerals. No language ever existed, or can
 be conceived, consisting only of the ex-
 pression of individuals, or what is com-
 monly called *proper names*: and the truth
 is, that these make but a very inconsider-
 able part of every language. What there-
 fore constitutes the essential part of lan-
 guage, and makes it truly deserve that
 name, is the expression of *generals*, or *ideas*,
 according to the language of the philoso-
 phy that I have learned. For as to the
 name of *general ideas*, by which they are
 commonly

Ch. I. commonly known, it supposes, that the
conceptions of individuals, that is, the
perceptions of sense, are likewise ideas ;
from which it is necessary to distinguish
the conceptions of generals by the name
of *general ideas*. But I cannot approve of
introducing into philosophy a language
which confounds under one name two
things so different in their natures, as the
operations of *sense* and of *intellect* ; a con-
fusion which, in my apprehension, has gi-
ven rise to very great errors in philosophy,
and to some extravagant paradoxes, that
have been advanced of late years, as re-
pugnant to the common sense of mankind
as to sound philosophy. The definition so
understood I hold to be what is properly
called *language*. For though we say, *the*
language of looks, and of *gestures*, or signs,
such as our dumb persons use ; also *the*
language of inarticulate cries, by which the
brutes signify their appetites and desires ;
yet in all those senses the word is used
metaphorically, and not as it ought to be
used in the style of science. And thus
much may suffice at present for the defini-
tion of our subject. We shall endeavour,
in the sequel, to make it fuller ; and par-
ticularly

particularly we shall explain in what way Ch. i.
 language *expresses*, whether by signs *natural* or *artificial* *.

From

* In this sense which I have given to *language* the Greek word *λογος* is commonly used, denoting both the ideas, and the sounds used to express them; that is, *sounds significant*. But it may be observed, that it is often used to denote only the principal part of speech; namely, the *ideas*, and that combination of them we call *reason*, which must necessarily precede the use of speech. This ambiguous signification of the word has given occasion to the distinction made in the Peripatetick school betwixt *λογος ενδιεχθεις*, and *λογος προφορικος*; that is, the inward operations of the mind, and those operations enunciated by speech. The not attending to this distinction has led translators into great mistakes, and even the translators of our sacred writings. For in that famous passage in the beginning of St John's gospel, which contains one of the sublimest mysteries of the Christian theology, the Latin translator has rendered *λογος* by *verbum*. And, in like manner, our English translators have rendered it by *word*, and have made St John say, that *the word* was *God*, which, to me at least, does not convey any meaning at all: For how can I understand, that *word*, that is to say, *speech*, or ideas expressed by articulate voice, is *God*? But *λογος*, in this passage, is not *λογος προφορικος*, or *reason enunciated*; but it is *λογος ενδιεχθεις*, i. e. *reason in the mind of the Deity*, according to which every thing was made. This *reason* is the second person of the Christian Trinity, by whom we are told the visible world was created, and answers to the *θεος δημιουργος* of Plato, who is also the second person of his Trinity. For that Plato knew the doctrine of the Trinity (however he came by that knowledge) is evident: but he kept it

Ch. I. From this definition it appears, that language consists of two things; namely, sounds, and the conceptions of the mind signified by those sounds. The first is, in the truly philosophical language of my worthy and learned friend Mr Harris *, called the *material* part of language, and the other the *formal* part; a manner of speaking taken from the antient philosophy; according to which, every corpo-

ἐν ἀπορρητοῖς, not to be revealed but to those who were initiated in his philosophy. And the other two persons in his Trinity correspond likewise with the same persons in the Christian Trinity: for he has the supreme God, or God the Father, and also the ψυχὴ τῷ κόσμῳ, which answers to the Holy Ghost. See *Eusebii Præpar. Evangel. lib. 11. cap. 14. — 20.*: from which passage it appears, that *Eusebius* understands λόγος in this passage of St John as I do; and he quotes a *Platonic* writer, one *Amelius*, who understands it so also, and wonders where that *Barbarian* (so he calls the Evangelist) had learned so sublime a theology, not knowing that this was the theology of the Jews many hundred years before his master *Plato* was born.

This error in the Latin and English translations of St John's gospel has, I doubt not, been taken notice of by some of our learned divines. But as I am not so much conversant in their writings as I would wish to be, I cannot with certainty say that it is so.

* The Author of *Hermes*, a work that will be read and admired as long as there is any taste for philosophy and fine writing in Britain.

real

real substance is composed of *matter* and *form*. The *matter* is supposed to be common to all bodies; but the *form* is peculiar to each, making it that which it is, in contradistinction to every thing else: as in this case, the human voice, which makes the material part of language, is a matter common to other things, as, *e. g.* to music, and to inarticulate cries of different kinds; whereas the formal part, that is, the significancy of ideas, is peculiar to language, constituting what we call a *word*; which, though it had the matter, that is, the voice, and modified too by articulation, yet if it signified nothing, would not deserve that name. Of these two parts of language, it is evident, that the formal is by far the more excellent, by how much the thing signified is more excellent than the sign, and the mind than the body: for this part of language belongs altogether to the mind; whereas the other is no more than the operation of certain organs of the body.

The first thing to be considered in this matter is, whether language be at all a work of *art*, or *acquired habit*? or whether, according to the opinion of some,


Ch. 1. we do not speak by *nature*, without use or instruction, in the same manner as we perform many functions of the animal nature? If this last be the case, it is in vain to inquire concerning the origin of language, which, according to this hypothesis, must be coeval with the animal. This, therefore, is a preliminary question that must be decided before we go farther; but in order to decide it, we must fairly state it.

And, in the *first* place, Those who hold this opinion, will not, I suppose, carry it so far as to maintain, that men, without use or custom, without imitation or instruction, would speak a *formed regular* language, such as is spoken by civilized nations; and which, it is well known to every one that has the least knowledge of grammar, is an *art*, and a very great art too. But their opinion, when fairly stated, is, as I conceive, this, That men do naturally use articulate sounds to express the conceptions of their mind; very rudely and imperfectly, no doubt, at first, till by art they are improved, and acquire the form of a regular language.

But

But even such a language, they certainly do not maintain, that men speak from the time of their birth, in the same manner that they perform the natural operations of breathing, digesting, or the action of sucking, by which an infant takes in the nourishment that is necessary to it. But they will say, that a man, when he comes to be of perfect age, will use articulate sounds to express his conceptions, without art or institution, and as naturally as he will perform many other actions, for the preservation of the individual, or the propagation of the kind. And some, perhaps, of those who hold this opinion, may require further, in order to produce a language, some society and mutual intercourse, not conceiving how a solitary savage should invent a method of communication for which he has no use. And this last, I find, is the opinion of a late French writer upon the *mechanism* of language *, and who pretends to have considered the subject philosophi-

Ch. 1.



* This book is intitled, *Traité de la formation mécanique de langues, et des principes physiques de l'étymologie*, printed at Paris 1765, in 2 vols 12mo.

Ch. 1. cally ; for he requires, that men should have lived some time together: but he is persuaded, that a parcel of children living so, would, by the time they came to be of age, have formed some kind of language. On the other hand, I maintain, that the faculty of speech is not the gift of nature to man, but, like many others, is acquired by him ; that not only there must have been society before language was invented, but that it must have subsisted a considerable time, and other arts have been invented, before this most difficult one was found out ; which appears to me of so difficult invention, that it is not easy to account how it could at all have been invented.

C H A P. II.

Of Capacities, — Powers, — Habits, — and Faculties in general.

THE question stated in the preceding chapter never has been fully considered, so far as I know, though it appears to me curious and interesting. I will

will therefore endeavour to examine it to Ch. 2.
the bottom; and as it concerns powers and
faculties, before I come to speak of the
faculty of speech in particular, I think it
will be necessary, for the better under-
standing the argument, to premise some
observations concerning powers and facul-
ties in general.

With respect to which, there are four
things that deserve to be distinctly confi-
dered: 1st, The *energies*, or operations of
such *faculties*. With these I begin; be-
cause they are first in the order of our
conceptions, being perceived by the sense;
whereas powers and faculties are latent
things, and an object of *intellect*, not of
sense. 2^{dly}, There is the *faculty* which is
the immediate cause of those *energies*, and
without which we cannot conceive them
to be produced. 3^{dly}, The *habit* * or dis-
position which is productive of the *faculty*;
for every faculty is the result of a previous
habit or disposition, without which it can-

* The word *habit* I use in the sense of the Greek word
ἔθος. This I think proper to observe; because the word
in English is frequently used to denote that custom or use
by which any habit is formed, by a metonymy, not unusual
in language, from the *effect* to the *cause*.

Ch. 2. not exist. And, *lastly*, The *mere power*, or capacity of acquiring such *habit*. These two last are both, in the language of ancient philosophy, called by the name of *power* *: but the distinction is made betwixt that *power* which immediately produces the *act*, and that which is remoter, and may be said to be only the *power of power* †. And I would chuse to distinguish them by different names, calling the one *faculty*, and the other *capacity*. And as *faculty* and *habit*, though in their natures distinct, are so necessarily conjoined, that the one can never exist without the other, however necessary it may be in other ar-

* Δυναμις.

† See this distinction made by *Aristotle*, in his 8th book, *De Phys. Auditione*, and explained at length by his commentator *Simplicius*, fol. 281. The example *Aristotle* gives, is that of a man who has not learned any art, but has the capacity to learn; and one who has learned it, but is not actually performing its energies. Both are said to be artists *δυναμει*, but in different senses; which therefore I have chosen to distinguish by different appellations. *Simplicius* very well observes, that this second kind of power, or faculty, as I chuse to call it, lies in the middle betwixt *mere power*, or capacity alone, and *energy*, participating of each; that is, betwixt what is most imperfect in nature, and what is most perfect; for mere capacity is most imperfect, pure energy most perfect. — See the following note.

guments

guments to distinguish them, I do not think it is so in this; and therefore I shall, for the greater part, speak of them indiscriminately, under the name of either *faculty* or *habit* as it happens. But as there is no such necessary connection betwixt the *faculty* and the *energy*, or betwixt the *capacity* and the *faculty*, (for the *faculty* may not operate, nor the *capacity* be carried the length of *faculty*), these two must be considered and treated of as distinct from *energy*, and from one another. Ch. 2.

It will be necessary, for the sake of those who are unacquainted with the antient philosophy, to illustrate my meaning by some examples, both from *nature* and from *art*. Every animal, and vegetable too, when it is first produced, has no more than the *mere capacity* of generating, or producing its like; but in process of time, this capacity grows into *habit*, and the consequential *faculty*; and when opportunity offers, the faculty is exercised, and produces *acts and energies*. And with respect to *art*, a man when he is born, has, from nature, the *capacity* of being a *musician*, *e. g.*; afterwards he forms the *habit*, and acquires the *faculty*; and then he *actually performs* when

Ch. 2. when he thinks it proper. These examples will be sufficient to shew what I mean by the terms I have used; and these differences may be observed betwixt art and nature in this matter. In the 1st place, Capacity merely is all from nature; for even in matters of art, the capacity that any man has to become an artist, or that any subject has to be operated upon by art, is from nature singly. 2^{dly}, Habit or faculty is, in matters of art, acquired by use, imitation, or instruction; whereas in natural things, it is the production of nature singly, without any preceding use, exercise, or instruction. And, lastly, The energies in natural things proceed either from certain laws of nature, which is the case with respect to inanimate things, or from a certain inward principle, commonly known by the name of *instinct*, as in the case of brute animals: but in matters of art, they proceed from that impulse, moving the rational mind to action, which we call *will* *.

C H A P.

* What is said here of *powers* and *capacities*, is, I think, sufficient for the present purpose. Who would know more of this matter, may read what follows, taken from the abstruse or *esoteric* philosophy, as *Aristotle* calls it,

C H A P. III.

Of the Powers and Faculties of Human Nature.

Thus far of powers and faculties in general. But before we come to speak of the faculty of speech in particular, it may

Ch. 3.

it, contained in his books of *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. All things in nature exist either in capacity merely, or actually and really; that is, as it is expressed by Aristotle, either *δυναμις*, or *ἐνέργεια*. Betwixt these two there is a *progression* both in *nature* and in *art*, and which is the cause of all the productions of either; for every thing that is generated, or produced, proceeds from a state of nothing more than capacity, to a state of actual existence. Thus plants and animals are produced from seeds and embryos, which are no more than plants and animals in capacity: and with respect to works of art, the statue is in the block of marble *δυναμις*, but it does not actually exist till it gets its form from the artist; and the artist himself was at first only an artist in capacity. This progress, by which every thing in nature or art is produced, is what is commonly called *motion*: which is therefore something more than mere capacity, but less than energy or actual existence; for it cannot be said to have any fixed or permanent existence of any kind, nor to be in any state, being truly a passage betwixt two states; so that it exists only in succession, and not any two parts of it together. This so shadowy being, and so difficult to be apprehended, Aristotle has, with wonderful acuteness and

Vol. I. C subtlety,

Ch. 3. may not be improper, first, to take a general view of the *powers of human nature*, beginning with those that are from *nature immediately*, and next considering such as

subtlety, defined and made an object of *intellect*: and as it lies betwixt two extremities, *capacity*, and *energy*, or actual existence, he has given us a twofold definition of it, the one taken from the one extreme, and the other from the other. The first is taken from the state of *capacity*, from which it proceeds: and in this way it is defined to be, ἐντελεχεια τῷ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν δυνάμει; which may be translated thus, *the perfection of what is in capacity, considered merely as in capacity*. The meaning of the last words is, that nothing is considered in the thing that is moved, but merely its capacity: so that motion is the perfection of that capacity, but not of the thing itself. This definition he makes more explicit and determinate, by ascertaining of what nature the capacity is, and expressing it to be the capacity of motion; which is done by the Greek word κίνητον. In this way conceived, the definition runs thus: ἐντελεχεια τοῦ κινήτου ἢ περ κινήτου, i. e. *the perfection of what is capable of being moved, considered merely as having that capacity*. The reason why it is said to be the perfection of this capacity is already hinted at, namely, that it is something more than mere capacity; for it is capacity exerted, which, when it has attained its end, so that the thing has arrived at that state to which it is destined by nature or art, ceases, and the thing begins to exist ἐνεργεια: And therefore Aristotle has very properly called this exertion *the perfection of capacity*, since capacity can go no further. — The other definition is taken, as I have said, from the other extreme, namely, the state to which the progression is, that is, *energy*, or actual existence. And in

as are *acquired*. The first operate without Ch. 3.
any previous use, exercise, or instruction:
the other are the fruit of our own indu-
stry; and before they can be exercised,
the

in this way it is defined to be *ἐνέργεια ἀτελής*, or *imperfect energy*; for as it is the perfection of capacity, so it is the imperfection of energy. It is capacity carried its utmost length, but it stops on this side energy.

This is the account given by *Aristotle*, in his books of *General Physics*, (commonly intitled *De Physica Auditione*), of the nature of motion, taken, as we see, from a comprehensive view of nature and art, and of every kind of generation and production. None of our modern philosophers, so far as I know, have given a general definition of it that is in the least satisfactory, though they must all confess, that it is the grand agent in all natural operations; and therefore the knowledge of its nature must be the foundation of all natural knowledge. Mr *Locke* has saved himself the trouble of seeking for a definition of it, by telling us, that it is undefineable, because it is a sensation, or perception of sense; and he has endeavoured to ridicule *Aristotle's* definition of it in a barbarous translation, not understanding, as I suppose, *Aristotle* in his own language. The reason that he gives for its being undefineable, will apply equally to every perception of sense of whatever kind: And to be sure it is true, that no individual sensation, or perception of sense, can be defined; for this very reason, that it is a perception of sense, and not an object of intellect. But Mr *Locke* ought to have considered, that from those *perceptions of sense*, the mind forms *ideas*, which are the proper objects of *intellect*; and therefore capable of definition; and of science, which cannot be without definition. And all those perceptions of sense which he calls *simple ideas of*
C 2 sensation,

Ch. 3. the *habit* must be first formed, by art, experience, or custom. Of the first kind, most certainly, are those with which we

sensation, might, when generalised by the intellect, be defined, as well as the perception of motion, by a genius as acute as Aristotle's, assisted by proper observations and experiments. But the great defect of Mr Locke's philosophy is, that having, in the very outset, confounded the operations of *sense* and *intellect*, under the common name of *ideas*, he never afterwards sufficiently distinguishes them. Other modern philosophers have attempted to define motion by *change of place* or *situation*. But that is no more than the *effect* of *motion*; and it still remains to be inquired, what sort of thing it is that produces this effect. Besides, if it were a good definition, it is not general enough, comprehending only one kind of motion, viz. that from place to place; whereas Aristotle's definition comprehends every kind of change or alteration in body, whether with respect to place, magnitude, or quality.

This is the general doctrine of *capacities* and *energies*, and the *transition* from the one to the other, according to the notions of the Peripatetick school: but there is still a *higher* philosophy upon this subject, which teaches us, that this distinction betwixt *capacity* and *energy* takes place only in *inferior* beings; and that there is a *higher order* of being, in which there is no *progress*, *motion*, or *change* of any kind, and in which there is not the imperfection of *mere capacity*, but all is *habit* and *faculty*, not productive of *energies occasionally*, as with us, but *constantly energising*. See *Arist. Metaph. lib. 9. cap. 8*. But this belongs to a philosophy far beyond *sense* and *nature*; and which, for that reason, is very properly described to be μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, that is, with respect to our capacities, and the order of teaching, *after physics*; but with respect to the nature of things, *the first philosophy*.

are

are born ; and with them therefore we shall begin. Ch. 3.

They are but few in number: one of the most remarkable of them is the power of *motion*, and that natural impulse above mentioned, well known by the name of *instinct*, which directs an infant to apply that power of motion to the drawing its nourishment from the breast of the mother by the action of sucking. Besides this, we have that habit of body which makes us susceptible of nourishment, of growth, and all the vital functions. Whether we have distinct perceptions of sense, such as of seeing and hearing, I think may justly be doubted ; and I will endeavour to shew, in the following part of this book, that we have them not in any the least degree of perfection, till in process of time the organs have acquired a certain degree of firmness, and we by experience have learned the proper use of them.

These seem to be all the *faculties* which we are *actually* in possession of when we first come into the world. The rest of our nature at that time is made up of *capacities merely*, or, to use the fashionable word, which

Ch. 3. which I think not improper, of *capabilities*; for it is with us, as with other animals, at the time of our birth, almost all the powers of our nature lie concealed, and, as it were, folded up, till time and opportunity display them, and bring them into exertion: and indeed in that state, I cannot discover, that with respect to actual powers, either of mind or body, there is any difference betwixt us and those other animals; or if there be any, the advantage seems to be on the side of the brute; for his body then is commonly more vigorous, and his instincts stronger and more active.

But with respect to latent *powers* and *capabilities*, there appears to be a wonderful difference, infomuch that it is difficult to say, even at this day, after so much observation and experience, what the capabilities of a nature so various and so excellent as ours are. Only this we know certainly, that men have actually exerted wonderful powers both of body and mind; nor is it possible to determine how much farther they might have been carried by constant exercise and instruction, carried on through the course of a long life. It is

is even difficult to determine, how far the natural capacities of the brutes might go with proper culture; but man, we know, may, by education and culture continued for many years, be transformed almost into an animal of another species. Thus, with respect to his body, though he is undoubtedly by nature a terrestrial animal, yet he may be so accustomed to the water, as to become as perfectly amphibious as a seal or an otter.—And with respect to the mind, it is impossible to say what science and philosophy may bring it to. The Stoics pretended, in that way, to make a *god* of a *man*; and there is no doubt but the human nature may, by such culture, be so exalted, as to come near to what we conceive of superior natures, and perhaps even to possess the rank of such as are immediately above us in the chain of being. Ch. 3.

The next thing to be considered is, what natural powers we are possessed of when we have attained to perfect age. And these I think may be reduced to the following heads: 1st, The perfect use of all the five senses; 2^{dly}, Greater strength of body, and power of bodily motion; 3^{dly}, The faculty

Ch. 3. faculty of propagating the kind ; and, *lastly*, with respect to the mind, *Instinct*, at that time of life, is more perfect, and less liable to error, directing us not only to the preservation of the individual, but to the continuation of the species. This last instinct still remains ; and also another, which makes us abhor destruction, and fly from danger and pain : but I am persuaded, that before we were so much under the guidance of reason, or rather that bastard kind of reason commonly called *opinion*, we had many more instincts, directing us to the means of preserving and providing for both the individual and the offspring ; for I cannot suppose that nature left us unprovided in this respect, more than other animals ; especially if it be true, as I shall endeavour to shew, that instinct was as needful to us at first as to other animals, as we had not then the exercise of reason, but only in process of time : but after we had formed opinions concerning what was good or ill, profitable or otherwise, in human life, and forsaking the guidance of nature and instinct, had resigned ourselves to the government of those opinions, and become the artificial creatures

tures we now are, we lost those instincts by degrees, and nature yielded to artificial habit. Ch. 3.

These are the *natural* powers belonging to our species at present ; and we are next to speak of the *acquired* or adventitious powers, which we have added to our natures by our own industry and sagacity. Of this kind are all the sciences, all the arts liberal and mechanic, all the commodities and pleasures of life, even civil society itself, and almost every thing belonging to it : and if we rightly consider the matter, we shall find, that our nature is chiefly constituted of acquired habits, and that we are much more creatures of custom and art than of nature. It is a common saying, that habit (meaning custom) is a second nature. I add, that it is more powerful than the first, and in a great measure destroys and absorbs the original nature : for it is the capital and distinguishing characteristic of our species, that we can *make* ourselves, as it were, over again, so that the *original* nature in us can hardly be seen ; and it is with the greatest difficulty that we can distinguish it from the *acquired*.

Ch. 3.

What chiefly makes this difficulty, is the facility with which we perform the operations that proceed from those acquired habits, and which makes us think them natural. Then many of them are acquired by such insensible degrees, and in our earliest years, that we do not perceive the progress that has been from *capacity* to *habit*; and finding ourselves possessed of them, without knowing how, we rashly conclude them to be the gift of nature.

Before I come to apply this observation to language, I will give some other instances of our mistaking acquired habits for natural; and for the same reason, namely, the facility of their operations. The perceptions of sense are undoubtedly natural; but from these we learn by observation and experience, to draw conclusions of reasoning so readily and easily, that we mistake them for the original perceptions of sense; *e. g.* by the sense of seeing, we perceive nothing but the colour, figure, magnitude, and motion of the object*.

* Colour is the primary perception of this sense; the others are only consequential. Figure, *e. g.* and magnitude, are nothing else but colour of a certain extent, or terminated in a certain manner.

These

These are all that are painted upon the *re-* Ch. 3.
tina of the eye ; and it is only through the
medium of the pictures there that we per-
ceive any thing by this sense* : yet the
vulgar all believe, and even such philoso-
phers as have not studied optics, that by
this sense we also perceive distances ; and
it is common language to say, that we see
a thing at such or such a distance : but the
truth is, that we see all objects at the same
distance, that is, very near, and almost
in contact with the eye ; and it is only by
observation and experience that we learn
to judge of the different distances of ob-
jects, either from their magnitude, as
painted upon the *retina* of the eye, from
the clearness and distinctness of the pic-

* It is worth observing, though I think it has not been observed, that, in this sense, the progress from the impression made by the external object upon the organ to the mind, is better marked than in any other sense : for with respect to the other senses, all we know of the matter is, that the impulse upon the organ is propagated to the brain by certain nerves, and so perceived by the mind. But here there is a stage of the progression distinctly marked, and now well known to all opticians, namely, the picture upon the *retina* of the eye, which was first discovered by *Kepler*, and is, I think, the greatest discovery in the matter of *sensation* that ever was made.

Ch. 3. ture there, or from its dimness and obscurity, from the intervening objects betwixt us and the object we look at, or from certain other causes that have been observed by opticians. So that whatever we know of distance, is not from sense, but an inference of reason from the premisses just now mentioned. Thus, *e. g.* if I have been accustomed to see any known object at different distances, and consequently of different magnitudes, upon the *retina* of my eye, if the picture there is small, I from thence infer, that the object is at a distance; and I make the same inference if the picture of it in my eye be dim and obscure, as the picture of objects at a great distance must be; or if I see betwixt it and me intervening objects, of the size of which, and the space they occupy, I have some notion.

Of the magnitude of objects, we have no doubt a perception by the sense of sight; but it is so various and undetermined, that without the judgement of the mind, it would be impossible to say positively what the magnitude of any object is: for the perception of the sense depends entirely upon the angle of vision, that is,
the

the angle under which we see the object; Ch. 3.
and that is greater when the object is nearer, and less when it is at a distance: so that the same object appears ten times bigger when seen at the distance of a yard than at the distance of ten yards; and yet we think a man no bigger at the distance of one yard than at the distance of ten. And even when I see a man, or any other known object, through a telescope, which magnifies perhaps twenty times beyond the appearance to the naked eye, he does not seem bigger, but only nearer. How is it then that we fix and ascertain the magnitude of objects, which otherwise would be so various and uncertain, and in that way make a sense of so great use, which would else be of very little? My answer is, That it is, 1st, by the use of another sense, viz. that of touch, by which we learn to know the true dimensions of things; and, 2^{dly}, by two acquired habits of judging: the first, the habit of judging of distances above mentioned; the second, another habit of judging founded upon this, by which we correct the perception of sense, and, notwithstanding the greater image upon the *retina*, conclude the object not
to

Ch. 3. to be greater, or perhaps less, and *vice versa*.

That this last judgement is founded upon the first, is evident from this, that though the object be a known object, yet if I have not been accustomed to see it at different distances, or, what is the same thing, at different *perceptible* distances, as, *e.g.* the sun, moon, or stars, it appears to me according to the *natural* perception I have of magnitude by the image upon the *retina*: and if it be seen through a telescope, it appears so much bigger, not so much nearer, as in the former case; because not having seen it at greater or lesser distances, I can from thence infer nothing to contradict the appearance in my eye; which cannot here, as in other cases, be only a sign of the distance, but must be, as it truly is by nature, an indication of the magnitude.

Another proof of this is what happens when we are deceived with respect to the distance, as when we see things through a fog: for from the dimness of the image upon the *retina*, we infer, that the object is at a considerable distance; and from this supposed

supposed distance, compared with the greatness of the image upon the *retina*, we conclude, that the object is much greater than it truly is. And in this way, a dog seen through a mist appears as big as a horse, and an ordinary man looks like a giant. And thus we have here likewise two judgements of the mind; one a false judgement concerning the distance, the other a true judgement founded upon the first: which is truly an error of the understanding, not a fallacy of the sense, as is commonly believed; for the sense does not deceive us, but truly represents the object to us as by the laws of nature it ought to appear, being seen through so thick a medium. But it is we that deceive ourselves, by not attending to the uncommon state of the air, which would have accounted to us for the distant appearance of the object; and that illusion being at an end, and the object being acknowledged to be near, the greatness of the image on the eye could no longer deceive us.

There are other fallacies of this sense, as they are commonly called, that I shall but just mention; such as a stick seeming crooked in the water, and a square tower appearing

Ch. 3. appearing round at a distance. These are true representations of the sense, but apt to mislead the mind in judging of the real figure of such objects, if we are not learned enough to know the causes of such appearances, or have not been taught by experience not to regard them. But there are, if I am not mistaken, other appearances of this sense, which we have learned to correct so early, that we have lost all knowledge and memory of them; and the true appearances, which we learn by the sense of touch, are substituted in place of the false. What I mean is, *1st*, The *double* picture of every object, one in each eye; from which I think it must necessarily follow by the laws of vision; that we see every object double; but, by constant experience from our infancy having learned that the object is truly single, we acquire the habit of seeing it only in that manner. *2dly*, The *inverted* picture upon the *retina*; from which I infer, that at first we truly see objects inverted: for as we undoubtedly perceive the colour, figure, and magnitude of the objects by the picture in the eye, I do not see how we can otherwise perceive their position. But this representation

tion of the sense we have learned also, by Ch. 3.
the most early experience, to correct, and
to set the object upon its right end. And
we have been so long in the constant cu-
stom of seeing them in that way, and the
habit thereby is so formed, that we see
them no longer any other way. I know
there are learned opticians who differ from
me in both these particulars: but there is
one thing in which I think there can be
no difference of opinion, though I do not
know that it ever was before observed;
and it is this, that at first we see things
only of the magnitude of the picture up-
on the *retina* of our eye: for the angle
which that picture subtends, is demonstra-
tively equal to the angle of vision, that is,
the angle which the object subtends; ac-
cording to the size of which, as we have
already said, we see things of a greater or
less magnitude: And the object appearing
close to the eye, which it does according
to the natural perception of the sense, and
consequently at the same, or nearly the
same, distance from the angle at the centre
of the eye with the picture upon the *retina*,
it is evident, that the object and the pic-
ture, subtending equal angles at the same

Ch. 3. distance, must be equal. And the only way we can account for things appearing to us so very much bigger is, that by experience and observation, arising from the evidence of our other senses, and particularly of our sense of touch, which makes a truer report, both of figure and magnitude, than our sight, we learn to see things in their true dimensions; after which, we judge of their magnitude, not *absolutely* by the size of the picture in the eye, but *relatively*; so that what forms the greatest picture there, appears to us *cæteris paribus* the greatest object. And this acquired habit of judging, becomes so familiar to us by constant practice, that we overlook entirely, as in the instances just now mentioned, the original perception, and imagine we really *see* things of the magnitude we only *judge* them to be of.

But enough, and perhaps too much, has been said, to shew, that with respect to this sense of seeing, we mistake habits of judging, acquired by experience and observation, for the natural perceptions of sense; and that we have formed the habit so early, and by such insensible degrees, and perform the energies of it with

so much readinefs and ease, that it requires all the attention and accuracy of a philosopher to distinguish those energies from the operations of nature; and this was all that I intended by the example. Ch. 3.

I will only say further upon the subject of our senses, that if some others of them, such as that of hearing and feeling, were to be as accurately analysed and examined as the sense of seeing has been, I believe it might be found, that we learn to hear and feel as well as to see, and that a great part of our infancy is spent in acquiring habits of sensation *.

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* This is an observation of Dr Reid's, in his ingenious work, intitled, *An Inquiry into the Human Mind*. I agree very much with this author in most things, and particularly in the distinction he has made betwixt *natural* and *acquired* habits; which he has illustrated by examples that I have likewise made use of: but I do not like the name which he gives to the last-mentioned habits, when he calls them *acquired habits of perception*; for as by the word *perception*, is commonly understood perception by the senses, one should imagine the author meant, that these acquired habits were truly perceptions of sense. This, however, is not his meaning, though it be the opinion of the vulgar. But I think it is too much complaisance to vulgar opinion in a philosopher, to speak vulgar language, when it is apt to mislead. I have therefore chosen to call such habits *acquired habits of judging*; in contradistinction to *natural* habits of *sensation*, or percep-

Ch. 3.

I will give one instance more of our confounding the natural perceptions of sense with the judgements of the mind: and it is a remarkable instance, for this reason, that

tion by sense. And by this way of speaking, I mean always to keep in view the distinction betwixt *mind* and *body*, and betwixt those operations which the mind performs only *with the assistance of the body*, and those which it performs *by itself*; a distinction which I hold to be the foundation of the whole philosophy of mind, and which I shall take occasion to explain more fully afterwards.

In what I have said above, concerning some optical theorems, I have presumed to differ from the Doctor in a general proposition, which he lays down, p. 459. That a telescope, though it magnifies the visible figure of the object ten times in diameter, yet makes it seem no bigger, but only ten times nearer: for this is true only of known objects that we are accustomed to see at different distances; but it is not true of objects that we are not accustomed to see in that manner, though they be known. He says also of a single microscope what I confess I do not understand, namely, that it does not magnify the visible appearance of the object, but only makes it appear at a greater distance: And in the very same place, he says, that the object appears to the eye twelve or fourteen times larger in diameter than it really is. How to reconcile these two assertions, I do not know. But the fact I take to be, that a microscope, whether single or double, does magnify the visible figure; because it makes the object appear very much bigger than it does to the naked eye, for a reason that is very well known to those who are learned in optics; at the same time it makes the object appear at a greater distance than it really is. And this

that it is the error, not of the vulgar, as Ch. 3. in the cases above mentioned, but of a philosopher, I mean Mr Locke. According to his division of ideas, the *idea*, as he calls it, of any particular man, or other animal, is *an idea of sensation*, that is, a perception of the sense: whereas the fact truly is, however paradoxical it may seem, that no person *sees* (that is, perceives by the sense) either man or horse; for the sense of sight perceives no more than what is pictured in the bottom of the eye, viz. the figure, colour, and size of a certain mass of matter. But before the mind can pronounce that mass to be a *man*, it must have performed no less than two operations of the intellect; one previous to the perception of sense, the other subsequent. The first is that by which we form the idea of that species of animal we call *man*; and whoever sees a man must have that idea ready formed in his mind: by the

too can be accounted for, if it were here a proper place for such discussions. I take notice of those things only with an intention that the Doctor may correct such inaccuracies of expression in any after edition he may give of his book; which, upon the whole, I think is a very valuable work.

second,

Ch. 3. second, we compare with that idea the object which the sense presents; and from that comparison conclude, that the object is *man* or *horse*, or belonging to any other species of things. That this last operation is truly a *discursus mentis*, and a conclusion of reason, as I call it, not a perception of sense, is evident from this, that we often make an erroneous conclusion, and mistake one thing for another, as when we see things at a great distance, or through a fog, as in the instance above mentioned. In such cases, every man must acknowledge, that there is a judgement of the mind: but in other instances, when there is no error, the process of reasoning is so very short, and the conclusion so instantaneous, that a vulgar man may be forgiven to overlook it, and ascribe all to the sense; but I can hardly have the same indulgence for the philosopher, especially one who pretended, like Mr Locke, to be so attentive an observer of what passed in his own mind, and has written a whole book upon the subject *.

Having

* If Mr Locke would have taken the trouble to study what had been discovered in this matter by the antients, and

Having thus considered in general the *natural* and *acquired* faculties of man, and shewn, that in some instances they are apt to be confounded, we are now to inquire to

Ch. 3.

and had not resolved to have the merit of inventing himself a whole system of philosophy, he would have known, what I mentioned before, that every material object is composed of *matter* and *form*. Of these two, the *form* is by far the more excellent, being that which constitutes the *essence* of every thing, and makes it what it is, in contradistinction to every thing else. This only is the *idea* of the thing, as we very properly express it in common language; and this is an object of *intellect* alone, which can no more be perceived by the *sense*, than the object of *one* sense can be perceived by *another*; so that it is as improper to speak of an *idea* of sensation, as it would be to speak of *visible sound* or *audible colour*. The *matter*, on the other hand, is only that which excites the sense; by which indeed the mind, in this state of its existence, is roused, and, as it were, awakened to the perception of ideas; but of which by itself there is no distinct idea, knowledge, or comprehension, nothing but an obscure notion; for it is only by the species that we know even the individual. See *Philoponus in Analytica poster. lib. 1. in fine*. And this is true, not only of *substances*, such as a man or a horse, but of *accidents*, (and every thing that exists is either *substance* or *accident*); for when I say, that any substance is white or round, sweet or sour, that quality which I ascribe to it is not a perception of the sense, but the idea of the *general quality*, which I apply to this *particular substance*. For though this idea arise from the perceptions of sense, which furnishes the materials for it, it is impossible it can be the *object* of sense, which

Ch. 3.

to which of them the *faculty of speech* belongs; and whether in this, as in other cases, we may not fall into error, by not distinguishing sufficiently what we have by *nature* from what is of *our own* acquisition. The facility with which we perform the operations in this case, as well as in the other above mentioned, is apt to make a man believe, who has not thought much upon the subject, that we do it naturally; and that though it costs us a good deal of pains and trouble in our infancy to learn the language that we speak, yet without that trouble, as soon as we came to riper years, we should have spoken some kind of language, that is, we should have expressed the conceptions of our mind by articulate sounds of one kind or another. On the other hand, I maintain, that this faculty is one of the many acquired facul-

which perceives only what is *particular*, not what is *general*, as shall be shewn more clearly afterwards. Till, therefore, the idea of any quality, such as *white* or *round*, be formed by the mind, and become an object of the intellect, the perceptions of the sense, with respect to such qualities, have no name or denomination, neither is there any knowledge or comprehension of them; so that it is impossible they can be affirmed or denied of any thing.

ties

ties belonging to our nature ; that though Ch. 3.
the *capacity* is no doubt given us by nature, the *habit* was very long of being formed. But as we now perform it with so much facility, we overlook the steps and the progress that were necessary to form the habit, as in the instances above mentioned, and rashly conclude that to be the work of nature, which is the result of long experience and observation, and perhaps the greatest effort of human sagacity.

The reader, I am persuaded, will be the more inclined to adopt this hypothesis, as from what is said above, it is evident, that even the perception by sight, which one should think is as much the gift of nature as any thing belonging to us, is truly, for the greater part, the effect of acquired habit, inasmuch that without such habit it would be of little or no use to us. The same, I am persuaded, may be said of all the rest of our senses : and I have no doubt, but that when we first come into the world, we hear, smell, touch, and taste, as imperfectly as we see. The reason of which I take to be, partly the weakness of the organs of sense, that

Ch. 3. have not yet acquired the proper tone, and partly the infirmity of the mind itself, unaccustomed to such impressions from external objects, and therefore not knowing what to make of them; and the memory, or retentive faculty, being at that time of life as weak as the sensitive, the impressions are not retained by it, but are immediately effaced, like traces in water. So that it is highly probable, that by nature merely, and setting aside all use and experience, we can hardly be said, at the time of our birth, to have sensations, or even to deserve the name of *animal*. If therefore we have not the use of our senses from nature, but from acquired habit, it would be really extraordinary, if the faculty of speech was the gift of nature, and not of our own acquisition.

CHAP.

C H A P. IV.

That Man does not by Nature form Ideas.—

Division of the Conceptions of the Mind.—

Nature of Ideas.

BUT in order to get at the bottom of this Ch. 4.
question, we must return to the division that I have made of language into the *material* and *formal* part, and consider each of these by itself; beginning with that which is most excellent, namely, the *formal* part. This part, as we have shewn, consists principally, and indeed it may be said only, of *ideas*; for as we have just now seen, even *individuals* are known only by *ideas*. Now, if I can shew, that even the ideas are not from nature, but from acquired habit, there will be an end of the question, though I should not make out that the formation of articulate sounds is likewise by acquired faculty; which, however, I trust I shall be able to do.

To begin then with *ideas*, the nature and origin of which must be explained be-

Ch. 4. fore we can truly judge whether they are the work of nature, or of habit acquired: The best division that I think ever was made of the conceptions of the human mind, is that which *Plato* has given us in the *Theætetus* *, into those which the mind forms *with the assistance of the senses*, and those which it forms *by itself* without such assistance. This division I prefer to all others; because it makes the proper distinction betwixt *body* and *mind*, which never ought to be out of the view of a philosopher who treats of such a compound as man;—a compound that never can be properly analysed, without making that distinction with the greatest accuracy. Of the first kind are the *perceptions of sense*; which undoubtedly are the act of the mind as well as the other; for it is not the *sense* that *perceives*, but the *mind* through the medium of sense †. The other are what I call *ideas* ‡: and these I subdivide into

* P. 135. Ed. Ficini.

† Νῦς ὁρα, νῦς ἀναίστηται, is the saying of a very antient philosopher; I think it was *Thales*; and it is adopted by *Aristotle*.

‡ This word is commonly supposed, and, if I am not mistaken, is said by *Diogenes Laertius* to have been first used

into two kinds ; the first such as are di- Ch. 4.
rectly and immediately formed from the
perceptions of sense. Of this kind are our
ideas of all natural and artificial substan-
ces and their qualities, and in short of e-
very thing without us. The other are i-
deas which we form from the operations
of our own mind. In this way we come
by the ideas of *thinking*, *believing*, *doubting* ;
in short, of every operation of the mind,
and of *mind* itself. The first class of ideas
is produced from materials furnished by
the sense ; the second arises from the ope-
rations of the mind upon those materials :
for I do not deny, that in this our present
state of existence, all our ideas, and all
our knowledge, are ultimately to be deri-
ved from sense and matter. But with

used by *Plato* : but the fact is otherwise ; for it is used by
Timæus the Locrian, in his treatise *De Anima Mundi* ;
and it is likely was a word used in the Pythagorean
school, from which *Plato* took his doctrine of ideas, as
well as most other things in his philosophy, even his doc-
trine of morals, though that is not commonly believed ;
and the contrary is said by the same *Diogenes Laertius*
in his life of *Plato*, where he tells us, that he took that
part of his philosophy from *Socrates*. But the truth is,
that he took nothing from *Socrates* but the *manner* of phi-
losophising, and the art of *dialogue*.

these,

Ch. 4. these, the ideas of the first class are more nearly connected; whereas those of the other kind are more congenial to mind, and may be said to be of *its own growth*, being produced from materials which itself furnishes. They may therefore be called *natural-born* subjects of the state, not *naturalized only*, as the others are; but the *sensations* are altogether *foreigners* *.

The faculty by which the mind operates in conjunction with the body, is very well known by the name of *sense*; the faculty by which it operates singly, and without

* This is an observation of a late author, very little known, *Eugenius Diaconus*, a Greek by nation, and a professor in the Patriarch's university at Constantinople; from whence the reader would not expect to hear of any book of science coming at this time of the day. It is a system of *logic*, written in pure Attic Greek, printed at *Leipswick* 1766. The learned reader, I am persuaded, will be glad to see some specimen of this *living* monument of *antient Greece*; I shall therefore give his words, which I think are elegant. Speaking of the first class he had mentioned, viz. the ideas of reflection, he says, "Οικοθέν τε, καὶ ἄνευ τῆς παρὰ τῷ σώματος συνδρομῆς ἡ ψυχὴ καρπύεται ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τῶν δευτέρων ἰδεοποιίας, (he means what I call the first class of ideas, viz. those formed from external objects), καὶ αἱ παρὰ τῶν ἐκτὸς αἰσθητικαὶ ἀλλοιώσεις τὸ παρ' ἑαυτῶν συνεισφέρουσιν. Ἐποιοὶ δ' ἂν τις εἰκάσας ἰθαγενεῖς ἐκεῖνας εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ ἐννοίας, ταύτας δὲ οἷον πολιτογραφημένας· αἱ γὰρ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἀνεπιστάτως διεγείρονται ἀπλῶς ἐπὶ λυδῆς. p. 159.

participation

participation of the body, I call *intellect* *. Ch. 4.
 In the perceptions by sense, the mind is
 to be considered as merely passive, recei-
 ving like wax the impressions of external
 objects: but in the other way of opera-
 ting, it exerts that active and *self-moving*
 power which I hold to be the distinguish-
 ing characteristic of mind, and the speci-
 fic difference betwixt it and body †. When
 therefore the mind operates in this last
 way, it asserts its native power, and acts
 in a manner more worthy of its divine o-
 riginal; whereas when it acts in the other
 way, it is to be considered as degraded
 and debased by its necessary connection
 with flesh and blood. Whether it was al-
 ways obliged to act so, and to receive its
 ideas from sense and matter, or whether
 there was not a former period of its exist-
 ence, when it derived its ideas from a
 nobler source, to the recollection of which
 ideas it is now only excited, and as it
 were roused, by the impulse of sense, so
 that all our knowledge is no more than

* It is called by the Greek philosophers *νῦς*.

† This is the opinion of Plato, who makes the *τὸ αὐτό-
 κινητόν* to be the distinguishing attribute of mind.

reminiscence,

Ch. 4. *reminiscence*, is a speculation not belonging to our present subject.

C H A P. V.

Of Mr Locke's division of Ideas into those of Sensation and Reflection.


AS this division of Mr Locke is that which is commonly received among us, it is proper to consider how far it differs from, or coincides with, the division I have given. And, in the first place, It is obvious, that what Mr Locke calls ideas of sensation, comprehends the first member of Plato's division, namely, the conceptions which the mind forms by the assistance of the body, or, in other words, the perceptions of sense. But further, it likewise comprehends the first class of those conceptions which the mind forms by itself, viz. the ideas that arise immediately from the perceptions of sense: for as his division was intended to be general, and to comprehend all the conceptions in the human mind of whatever kind, and as it is evident they are not ideas of *reflection*, it

it follows of consequence, that they are what he calls ideas of sensation. And further still, as Mr Locke tells us, he means to include in his division every thing that passes in the human mind, I doubt we must class under the first member of it the inward feelings of pleasure and pain, as well as the perceptions of external objects ; and in common language, such feelings are called by the name of *sensations*. As to those ideas which he calls, not improperly, *ideas of reflection*, being produced by a reflex act of the mind upon itself, they coincide perfectly with what I call the second class of ideas, viz. those formed by the mind from its own operations.

But what apology can the admirers of Mr Locke make for his not only giving the same general name of ideas to things of so different a nature as the perceptions of sense, and the ideas from thence formed, but making them to be of the same species of ideas ? Is it not plainly confounding the materials with what is made out of those materials, as if we should express by one word, the brass, and the statue that is made of it ? Does not such a confusion of *language* naturally lead to confusion of

Ch. 5. *thought?* Will a man who has only learned the philosophy of Mr Locke, readily make the distinction that Plato has made, betwixt the conceptions of the mind produced by the assistance of the body, and those which it forms by itself without the intervention of the body? And will he not, on the contrary, be disposed to believe, that the mind is entirely dependent upon the body, and that it cannot act at all without impulses from the body? What consequences this opinion leads to, I shall afterwards consider; but, in the mean time, I must observe, that I cannot carry my censure of Mr Locke so far as a late ingenious author, whom I mentioned before, Dr Reid, does; who, in the conclusion of his work, charges Mr Locke's division of ideas with the greatest fault that any division can have: for his accusation comes to this, that it is no division at all; because, says he, ideas of reflection comprehend ideas of sensation; for it is only by reflecting upon what passes in our own mind that we come by the idea of sensation, as well as of doubting or believing; where, it is manifest, the Doctor confounds the abstract idea of sensation, with the i-
dea

dea of the external object which that sensation presents to the mind. The first is most certainly an idea of reflection, being produced by the mind's reflecting upon what passes within itself; but the last is as certainly, in the language of Mr Locke, an idea of sensation. If it be true what the Doctor adds, that a certain later writer, whom he mentions, has made this hypothesis the foundation of his system of scepticism, it is not the Doctor only that has fallen into this error. And I must own, Mr Locke has talked so confusedly upon the subject, and has been at so little pains to explain this grand division of his, upon which he has built his whole system, that I do not much wonder that Dr Reid and others have fallen into this error. For as Mr Locke has expressed himself, it may be doubted, whether, by ideas of sensation, he means all, or only one or other, of the following things: *1st*, Perceptions of particular objects of sense; *2dly*, Abstract ideas of those objects; *3dly*, Abstract ideas of the perceptions or sensations themselves, such as we form of the sensation of seeing or hearing; *4thly*, Particular sensations of pleasure or pain; and,

Ch. 5. *lastly*, Abstract ideas of those sensations.  The not distinguishing betwixt such different significations of the same term, has thrown a very great obscurity over his whole work, though I know it is admired by many as a perfect pattern of perspicuity.

It may be said in defence of Mr Locke, though I do not know that it has been said, that his division of ideas does not respect their nature, or what they are simply considered in themselves, but only their source or origin : so that his meaning is no more, than that all our ideas are either from sensation or reflection. But, in the *first* place, this is not a meaning to be gathered from his words, but rather the contrary; for he every where speaks of ideas of sensation as the *immediate* perceptions of sense, not derived from it only; though he ought not to have left it even ambiguous in what respect this division was, which he has made the foundation of his whole system. And, *secondly*, If this was his meaning, there should have been no division at first, but he should have laid it down simply, that all ideas are from sense; and then he should have distinguished betwixt those that were directly

rectly and immediately from the sense, Ch. 5.
 and those that were mediately by the
 intervention of the reflex act of the mind
 upon its own operations. If he had done
 this, he would not only have proceeded
 methodically and distinctly, but I think
 it is highly probable, he would have a-
 voided the capital error which he has fal-
 len into, of confounding the perceptions
 of sense, which are the source of our i-
 deas, with the ideas themselves *.

C H A P.

* Mr Locke wrote at a time when the old philosophy, I mean the scholastic philosophy, was generally run down and despised, but no other come in its place. In that situation, being naturally an acute man, and not a bad writer, it was no wonder that his essay met with great applause, and was thought to contain wonderful discoveries. And I must allow, that I think it was difficult for any man, without the assistance of books, or of the conversation of men more learned than himself, to go farther in the philosophy of mind than he has done. But now that Mr *Harris* has opened to us the treasures of Greek philosophy, to consider Mr Locke still as a standard book of philosophy, would be, to use an antient comparison, continuing to feed on *acorns* after corn was discovered. I believe there have been many, since the restoration of letters, that understood Greek as well, or perhaps better, than Mr *Harris* : but this praise I may give to my friend, without suspicion of partiality, that he has applied his knowledge in that language more to the study of the Greek philosophy, than any man that has lived since

C H A P. VI.

Of the Formation of Ideas.

Ch. 6.

THE nature of ideas cannot be understood, without knowing accurately the manner in which they are formed; and

since that period. It was the misfortune of us in the western parts of Europe, that after we had learned Greek from the Greeks that took shelter in Italy, upon the taking of Constantinople, and had got some taste of the Greek philosophy, enough to know, that what was taught in the schools was a bastard kind of it, we immediately set up as masters ourselves, and would needs be inventors in philosophy, instead of humble scholars of the antient masters. In this way *Des Cartes* philosophised in France, Mr *Hobbes* and Mr *Locke* in England, and many since their time of less note. I would fain hope, if the indolence and dissipation that prevail so generally in this age would allow me to think so well of it, that Mr *Harris* would put a stop to this method of philosophising without the assistance of the antients, and revive the genuine Greek philosophy among us. For this purpose, he has taken uncommon pains, leading us, as it were, by the hand to the sources, and even taking the trouble to give most accurate, as well as elegant translations, of the passages he quotes, for the sake of those that are not sufficiently masters of the Greek language. He has, besides, discovered, to me at least, a new set of writers upon philosophy, of whom I was before entirely ignorant; I mean the later commentators upon *Aristotle* of the Alexandrian school;

and from the account I am to give of their Ch. 6.
formation, I hope it will be evident, that
they are, as I have said, the production
of *mind*, genuine and pure, without any
mixture

school; without whose assistance, the *Esoteric* works of Aristotle, that is, the more abstruse parts of his philosophy, appear to me altogether unintelligible: for it is certain, that Aristotle did not compose those works with the design that they should be understood by the vulgar, or by any body that had not been taught by him, as he himself says in his famous letter to his pupil Alexander, upon occasion of his publishing his books of metaphysics; which he there says he had *published* and *not published*. In short, his philosophical writings are, for the greatest part, to be considered as no more than a text-book, to be explained and enlarged by his lectures. See *Simplicius* in the beginning of his commentary upon the *Predicaments*. Besides, these commentators, particularly *Simplicius*, whom I just now quoted, have preserved to us many valuable passages from antient books of philosophy which are now lost; for they had the use of many more books of that kind than we have. And further, it appears to me, that there was a *traditional* knowledge of *Aristotle's* philosophy preserved in this school of Alexandria, which, in the second century of the Christian æra, came to be, what Athens was before, the seat of philosophy and learning of all kinds. Of some of those commentators that have not been printed, Mr Harris has been so lucky as to procure MS. copies: but there are many more of them to be found in the *Escurial* library in Spain, that have not yet been printed, and I doubt never will, unless the love of Greek philosophy prevails more in Europe than it is likely to do. And indeed my surprise is that so many of them have been printed; for which I can
account

Ch. 6. mixture of *body*, and its operations. In this way the *origin* of our ideas will appear; without the knowledge of which, it is impossible to give any philosophical account, such as we propose to give, of the *origin* of language. After we have done this, we hope it will not be difficult to solve the question now in hand, and to shew, that *ideas*, being the workmanship of mind, are not a *natural* production, but that there is a progress here, as in other things belonging to mind, from *capacity* to *habit*; and that the faculty of forming ideas is, like other faculties of the mind, *acquired* by use and exercise.

Much has been said, and excellently well said, by Mr Harris * upon this subject of the formation of ideas. I do not differ from him materially in any thing he has said on the subject; but as the nature and design of my work requires that some things relating to ideas should be


accounted no otherwise, but that there was a passion for Greek learning and philosophy soon after the restoration of letters, (for about that time they were all printed), which I doubt is not now to be found, except among a very few.

* *Hermes*, lib. 3. cap. 4.

more fully, and a little differently explained, I hope I shall be excused by the public, as I am sure I shall be by Mr Harris, for coming over again a subject that has been already so well handled by so eminent an author. Ch. 6.

I will begin with my first class of ideas, those which arise immediately and directly from the perceptions of sense. If we account well for the origin of them, the formation of those of the other class, arising from the mind's own operations, will be easily explained.

The materials of the ideas which we form from the perceptions of sense, are all furnished by *sensation*; with which therefore we must begin in our account of those ideas. A certain impulse made by external objects upon the body, or certain parts of the body, known by the name of the *organs of sense*, if propagated to the mind (for that does not always happen) by a conveyance which we cannot explain, produces what we call a *sensation*, or perception of the sense; which is different according to the difference of the senses; but they all agree in the description I have now given. To analyse or describe more particularly this operation

Ch. 6.  peration of external objects upon the mind, is not necessary for the purpose of this work ; and besides, it is done to my hand in the ingenious work I quoted before, I mean Dr Reid's treatise upon the Human Mind.

According to this account of sensation, it is by its nature fleeting and transitory ; and if there were no way of preserving those impressions upon the mind, but if they should vanish and disappear like traces in water, there would be no comprehension or knowledge of any kind : but nature has contrived a way of giving a permanency and stability to those fleeting *impressions*, by the means of what we call *memory* ; in which the perceptions of sense are fixed in such a manner as to become the objects of knowledge.

If we could suppose but one object of sense thus recorded in the memory, there could be no idea, nor any kind of knowledge, such as we have at present : for, as was said above, it is by the kind or species that in this state of our existence we know any thing. Now, to what species or class of things could this single perception be referred ?

Next, let us suppose the most simple case,

case, that the same object presents itself a- Ch. 6.
gain to the sense; then will the trace of
the former perception be renewed; or, to
speak without a metaphor, we shall have
another perception of the same object,
knowing it to be the same. And here for
the first time the mind begins to act by
itself, and to exert a little of its intellec-
tual powers: for it is clear, that this
knowledge of the identity of the object
goes beyond the power of sense; which
can do no more than give another percep-
tion of the object, but cannot, by com-
paring the object with itself, determine
that it is the same.

And thus far the brute goes alongst with
us: for he has sense and memory as well
as we, and, like us, he can distinguish
the same from a different object; for who
will deny that a dog knows his master,
or a horse his keeper?

The next case we shall suppose is, that
not the same individual object, but one of
the same species, presents itself to the sense:
I say, the mind there, too, exerts its intel-
lectual faculty, and discovers that there is
a likeness betwixt the two, though they
are not the same.

Ch. 6. Hitherto likewise, but no farther, the brutes accompany us : for it is manifest, that these animals have some notion of likeness as well as of sameness ; for a dog will distinguish a man, or any other animal, from one of his own species ; and when a creature of an uncommon species, that he never saw before, is presented to him, we see manifest tokens of surprise in him.

The next step, one should imagine, after distinguishing the species in the individual, was to form the idea of the species, and so to perceive *the one in the many*, as Plato has expressed it. But before we come so far, there is another step necessary, though I think it has not been observed ; for before we can see *the one in the many*, we must see the *one* by itself. For understanding this, it is necessary to observe, that our senses present to us the objects as they exist in nature, that is, mixed and compounded ; for in that way, every thing in the material world appears to the sense : so that in perceiving even a single object, the sense perceives only so many different qualities united in some *matter* or *substratum*, of which the sense has no perception.

ception. Thus, when we perceive a man, Ch. 6.
 or any other animal, the sense takes in at
 the same time the figure, the colour, the
 size, and other sensible qualities; and the
 combination of these qualities in one com-
 mon subject, is the first rude notion, and,
 as it were, confused sketch, which not
 only we, but also the brutes, as I have ob-
 served, have of the species. But in order
 to form the *idea*, a *separation* or *discrimina-
 tion* is necessary of these qualities one from
 another: and this kind of *abstraction* I hold
 to be the first act of human intellect, and
 that it is here the road parts betwixt us
 and the brute; for the brute perceives the
 thing, and preserves the perception in his
 memory, just as the object is presented by
 nature, that is, with all its several sensible
 qualities united; whereas the human in-
 tellect separates and discriminates, and
 considers by itself, the colour, *e. g.* without
 the figure, and the size without either *.

The

* By what is here said, I would not be understood to deny the truth of Aristotle's maxim, that *Nῦς ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν ποιεῖν*, i. e. it is *mind* that makes *one*: for though *separation* be the first operation of the human intellect, *uniting* is the *principal*; and *that* for the sake of which the other is performed;

Ch. 6. The next step after this, is undoubtedly *the idea*, or *the general*: for perceiving that this *one*, which by our *intellectual* faculty we have separated from the *natural* mass, exists, not only in the individual object from which we have abstracted it, but in many others; then, and not till then, we have the *idea* of a *quality* or property of any substance; and as soon as we perceive a certain combination of them united together in one common subject, then

formed; for it is by *uniting*, or making *one* of the *many*, that *ideas* are formed. By the union of ideas we make propositions; by the union of propositions syllogisms; and by the union of syllogisms systems of science. Plato has considered them both as equally the operation of mind; for, says he, the mind makes *one* of *the many*; and again, *many* of *the one*; that is to say, it forms the *idea* of the *genus*, and then we divide it into the several subaltern species. And there is nothing in science that he recommends more, than never to quit the *general*, or let things go to *infinity*, as he expresses it; that is to say, to *individuals*, till we are sure that we have exhausted all the specific differences. See the *Philebus*. And accordingly he has himself practised this method of *division*, as it is called, very much, particularly in the *Sophista* and *Politicus*. But still I think it is true, that *union* is the principal operation of mind; for it is in order to make new species, or new *ones*, if I may so speak, that we divide the genus, in the same manner as at first we abstract from any object of sense any of its qualities, in order to form the *idea* of the species.

we have the idea of a *substance*; for the intellect first *separates*, and then *unites*. Nor indeed can we conceive several things *united*, without first conceiving them *separated*; for as to the joint perception of several things presented to us by the sense, it is plainly the operation of the sense alone, and has nothing to do with intellect; and accordingly the brute perceives in that way as well as we. Ch. 6.

And thus it appears, that by the mind's abstracting from any individual, one or more sensible qualities, and perceiving these to exist in other individuals, the *idea* is formed, and the *one* is made out of the *many*. And what makes this one, is *that one thing* which is *common* to the *many*; for *that* gives them an union, and, as it were, a band or tie, which bundles them up together. When the idea is perfectly formed, the several *subjects* in which this one common thing exists, are entirely laid out of the view of the mind, and the *one common thing* is only considered; that is to say, in other words, *the likeness*, or, to speak more accurately, *that in which they are like*, is only considered, not the *things* that are like; the *commonness*, if I may so speak, that

Ch. 6. that is, *the thing which is in common*, not the *things* which have it in common *.

The process I have described above, will be easily understood when explained by an example. I have the perception by my senses of any individual animal, as, *e. g. man*; and this perception consists of the perception of several particular qualities, such as figure, colour, size, &c.; which being all perceived by the sense as united together in *one subject*, make up the *general perception*, so I may call it, of a man.

But this union is entirely the operation of sense, not of mind; for the mind does no more than receive the united impression from sense. And accordingly the brute has this perception as well as we.

* It is in this sense that *Simplicius*, in his commentary upon the *Categories*, uses the word *κοινότης*. See the passage quoted by Mr *Harris* in his *Hermes*, p. 381. And it may be observed, that it is from this *κοινότης* that the more general idea is said to comprehend or contain the less general, and the less general to be a part of the more general; for the *κοινότης*, or *common nature*, is said to *contain* every thing that participates of it; and, on the other hand, what participates, is said to be a *part* of the *common nature*. This is the more to be attended to, that upon this notion of *one idea* being *part* of another, depends the whole doctrine of the *syllogism*, as laid down by *Aristotle* in his *First Analytics*.

And

And further, when this united impres- Ch. 6.
sion is again made upon the sense, he
knows it to be the same. So far there is
neither *abstraction* nor *generalization*. But
if I shall go further, and consider in the
individual man, either presented to me
by the sense, or preserved in my memory,
any one particular quality, such as the fi-
gure, separated from the rest, then I per-
form that operation of intellect which I
call *abstraction*. Again, if I go farther
still, and comparing together the several
perceptions presented to the sense, or re-
tained in the memory, of individuals of
the same species, I find that this figure is
common to them all; then, and not till
then, I have the general idea of this fi-
gure, which, either by itself, or joined
with other qualities abstracted in the same
manner, (according as my idea is more or
less complete), forms the idea of *man*;
which is plainly made up of one or more
qualities, first abstracted from *one* indivi-
dual, and then recognised as common to
many.

From this account of the matter, it is
evident, that ideas are formed by the
mind's reviewing and comparing together

Ch. 6. the several perceptions of sense, and perceiving what they have in common with one another. And this faculty of comparison appears to constitute the very essence of intellect. We are not, however, to imagine, that the brute wants it entirely; for a dog certainly *compares*, when he finds out that a man is or is not his master. But the difference appears to me to consist in these two things: 1st, That the brute, not having made the discrimination above mentioned of the several particulars, does not make the comparison so exactly, but only compares things together in the lump. 2^{dly}, The brutes make the comparison only when the sense is excited by the presence of the object, with which they compare another perception of sense preserved in the memory. Thus a dog, when he knows his master, compares the immediate perception which he has of him with the past, which he retains in his memory or imagination *. And I am persuaded, that in our very early years,

* The difference betwixt these two I will afterwards explain; but I did not think it proper to imbarrafs the present argument with such a discussion.

we compare in no other way: but in pro-
cess of time, we attain the faculty of com-
paring together the perceptions of sense,
even when the objects are not present;
and from that comparison, forming no-
tions of their likenesses or unlikenesses.

Ch. 6.

Of the generals thus formed by comparison, logicians distinguish *two* sets or classes. The *first* consists of those of the *lowest species*; so called, because below them there is nothing but *individuals*. These being formed in the manner above described, and recorded in the memory, as the perceptions of sense were before, the mind again exerts its power of comparison upon them; and discovering among them likewise resemblances, forms of those resemblances another set of generals above the first; with respect to which they are, in the language of logic, said to be the *genus*. And thus we arise from *general* to *general*, till we come up to those of the *highest order*, which are distinguished from those of inferior order by the name of *universals*. These, in the antient philosophy, have, by an amazing exertion of the human genius, been reduced to ten classes, and called by the name of *categories*; such

Ch. 6. as *substance, quality, quantity, &c.* * And here we may observe in passing, the very great impropriety of Mr Locke's philosophical language; for these *universals*, or whatever

* This discovery was first made in the *Pythagorean school*, (if it was not brought by Pythagoras from Egypt); and is to be found in the work of *Archytas*, a philosopher of that school; which has been preserved to us by *Simplicius*, the commentator upon *Aristotle*, who has inserted the whole, or by far the greatest part of it, in his commentary upon *Aristotle's Categories*. The title of the work, as *Simplicius* tells us, was, *περὶ τοῦ παντός*, that is, *Of the universe*: for it appears he considered these universals as the principles of all things; which no doubt they are. *Aristotle* has intitled his work upon the same subject, *κατηγορίας*, *Categories*, or *Predicaments*, as we commonly translate the word from the Latin: and the reason of the difference of the title is, that *Aristotle* in his work has considered those universals *logically*, as the *predicates of propositions*; and accordingly has set this book at the head of his logic: whereas *Archytas* has treated of them *metaphysically*, as the *principles of things*. *Simplicius* tells us, that *Aristotle* in his work has followed *Archytas* very closely, differing from him in very few things: and indeed it so appears from the passages he quotes; which clearly shew, that the *Categories* of *Archytas* are the very same in *name*, in *number*, and in *nature*, with those of *Aristotle*; and there is only some difference in the way of arranging them: but as to the method of explaining and illustrating them, it is so very like, that it is plain *Aristotle* must have had before him *Archytas's* book; of which in some places he has copied the words, only translating them from the *Doric* of the original into the *Attic*.
And

whatever we can suppose farther removed Ch. 6.
 from *sense and matter*, must all be ranked
 under his *ideas of sensation*.

From this account of the human mind,
 and

And yet I am sorry to say, that neither in that work, nor in any other, so far as I know, has he ever made mention of an author, to whom he owed a discovery so great, and of which he has made so much use. It is indeed true what Porphyry says in his *life of Pythagoras*, § 53. That Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek philosophers, whom he names, have taken almost their whole philosophy from the Pythagoreans. But there is no other of them, so far as I know, that has transcribed a whole book of that philosophy, without acknowledging to whom he owed it.

As to the utility of the discovery, it is such, that without it we should have had no perfect science: for there can be no science without definition; and there can be no definition, unless we can tell the genus or class to which the thing defined belongs; and the definition is not complete, unless we can tell, not only the *immediate* genus, but the *highest* genus, that is, the *last class* under which the thing is comprehended. Thus, though I know that *man* is an animal, if I do not know what *animal* is, I cannot be said to know what *man* is. But further, suppose I know that *animal* belongs to the genus of the *τὸ ἐμψυχον*, or *animated body*, in order to make the definition complete, I must know likewise to what genus or class of things the *τὸ ἐμψυχον* belongs. But is there no stopping in this ascent? or is there an infinite progress upwards? If there be, it is clear there can be no complete definition, and consequently no perfect science; because there is no science of infinity. Again, suppose there was a limit

Ch. 6. and its progress, compared with that of the brutes, it appears, that the essential difference betwixt them and us consists in this, that the brute still continues as much

mit to this ascent, and that we could determine the *ultimate* genus, beyond which there is no other, that is the *category*, which in the instance I have given is *substance*; yet if we could not define the number of those universals, there would, for the same reason, be no science of the principles of things, which, as I have said, the categories are; and all we could say of them would be, that they were infinite. And thus it appears, that without the knowledge of the categories, there would be no such science as *metaphysics*, which is the science of the principles of things, nor any perfect science of any kind. I say, *perfect science*; for there may be science without such complete definitions as I have supposed. Thus Euclid has not told us *what* a point is; that is to say, what genus it belongs to; but has only said, that *it is that which has no parts*. *Figure* he has defined in the same way, by telling us, *It is that which is inclosed by one or more boundaries*. *Length, breadth, and thickness*, he has not at all defined, though he has made use of the terms in the definitions of *lines, surfaces, and solids*, but has referred to *sense* and common apprehension for the knowledge of them. And though he has made *magnitude* and *number* the subjects of two sciences, viz. *geometry* and *arithmetic*, he has said nothing of the *category* to which they both belong, viz. *quantity*. It is for this reason that Plato has said, that *geometry*, and in general what we call *mathematics*, are not *perfect sciences*; because they do not demonstrate or explain their principles. See *Plato, De Republ. lib 6*. But Aristotle has made an apology for Euclid, and all those that have treated of the *inferior sciences*,

much immerfed in matter as we are in the first ftage of life: fo that his mind never acts but by impulse from material objects, either external or internal; by which laft I mean the natural calls of appetite, produced by certain alterations of the body and its organs: whereas our mind acquires the habit of acting by itfelf, without any fuch impulse from matter, and fo of exerting that *self-moving power*, which, as I obferved before, is the chief characteristic of *mind*, and which is denied to the brutes, at leaft in the ftate in which we fee them.

sciences, by fhewing, that it belongs only to the *first philosophy*, or the *science of sciences*, as it may be called, to demonstrate the principles of the *subaltern sciences*, which *affume* their principles, but do not demonstrate them. And therefore Euclid would have been to blame, becaufe he would have gone out of the bounds of his science, if he had meddled with *space, extension, quantity*, or any fuch universals.

Thus it appears of what univerfal ufe, not only in *logic*, but in the *whole* of philosophy, the doctrine of the *Categories* is; of which I could not help taking notice in paffing, though it has run out into a long note. I fhall only add, that the public will very foon fee a work of Mr *Harris*, in which the nature of the feveral *categories* will be accurately explained; and which, if I am not much mistaken, will be the beft book of *metaphysics* in the Englifh language; for in that way he has chofen to treat the fubject.

This

Ch. 6.

This observation will explain several phenomena of the brute nature; from which some have rashly concluded, that they have the use of intellect and reason as well as we. Thus a horse, by travelling the same road twice or thrice, learns to know it often better than his rider; from whence one might conclude, that he had some idea of a road. But the fact truly is, that although, no doubt, the perception of this particular road is impressed on his memory or imagination, and retained there, yet he has no *idea* of a road; because, not having that active self-moving power above mentioned, his remembrance is only excited by the object being presented again to his sense. At any other time, so far as we can discover, he never thinks of that road, nor is conscious that he has any such perception in his memory: and therefore it is impossible that ever he can form the *idea* of a road, according to the process above described. Again, a horse or a dog remembers his home, or the place where he is fed, and protected from the weather; but, so far as we know, never thinks of that place, except when he is prompted by hunger, cold,

cold, love of society, or any other natural appetite. And it is the same with respect to the operations of the mind of the brute, as with respect to his perceptions of external objects: for not having that self-moving power which we have, he cannot review his own operations, of which he is not conscious; and therefore it is evident that he cannot form *ideas of reflection*. Ch. 6.

From what is here said, the difference betwixt *perceptions of sense* and *ideas* must appear manifold. In the *first* place, Those perceptions are only the *materials* from which *ideas* are formed; and therefore are as distinct from *ideas* as the *matter* of any thing is from its *form*. 2^{do}, Perceptions of sense arise only from objects *present*; whereas ideas may be formed, and are commonly formed, from past sensations, preserved in the memory or imagination. 3^{tio}, The perceptions of sense preserved in the memory or imagination, are no more than the images of objects, such as they were presented to the mind by the senses: but neither sense, memory, nor imagination, makes that comparison which we have shewn to be absolutely necessary in order to form ideas. And hence it is,

Ch. 6. *4to*, that the perceptions of sense, though retained in the memory, are all of *individual* things ; whereas ideas are all of *generals*, being of things common to many individuals. And, *lastly*, In the formation of ideas the mind is altogether active ; whereas in the perceptions of sense it is merely passive. What confusion, therefore, must it not have produced in philosophy, the not distinguishing things so different in their nature, and the operations of faculties so different as *sense* and *intellect* ? — And so much for the ideas that are formed immediately from the perceptions of sense.

As to the ideas which arise from the operations of the mind, and which I shall call with Mr Locke *ideas of reflection*, they are formed in the same manner : for the mind preserving the memory of its own operations, as well as of external objects, and reviewing and comparing together the individual operations thus preserved in the memory, and discovering something *common* to several of them, of that *one common thing* it forms the *idea* ; and in that way we come by the ideas of *doubting*, *deliberating*, *affirming*, and of *thinking* in general.

This,

This, I believe, is agreeable to Mr Locke's Ch. 6,
 notion of such ideas; and, as he has ob-
 served, under the *operations* of the mind
 we ought to include the *passion* as well as
 the *action* of the mind: so that the ideas
 of pleasure and pain, (not the actual feel-
 ing, for that is mere sensation *), and of
 all their various modifications in the dif-
 ferent passions, are all ideas which we get
 from reflection. But we should carefully
 distinguish two things that he has not dis-
 tinguished, viz. the *particular* operations
 of the mind, and the idea or *general notion*

* I call it *mere sensation*, when there is no *perception of any external object*: for it is to be observed, that the word *sensation*, as it is commonly used, is equivocal, denoting either the perception of any external object by the senses, or the inward feeling of pleasure or pain arising from the body; and which is always accompanied with a certain emotion and alteration of the mind. This last kind of sensation is often joined with the former; for often when we feel pain, we perceive at the same time the external object that produces it; as when a man is pricked by a sword, or burnt with a hot iron. At other times we feel pain without the perception of any external object; which is the case where the body labours under any disease. And as thus we have sensation of pain, without the perception of any external object; so, on the other hand, we have very frequently, and indeed most commonly, the perception of external objects without either pain or pleasure.

Ch. 6. thence formed; which he has confounded, in the same manner as he has confounded the *particular perceptions* of sense with the *ideas* formed from them.

From this account of the formation of our ideas, it is evident, that the mind forms them without any assistance from the senses. With respect to the ideas of reflection, there cannot be the least doubt, as the senses do not so much as furnish the materials out of which they are formed: and with respect to the ideas arising from sensation, it is evident, that the sense furnishes only the materials, upon which the mind works by itself, and forms the ideas: for those ideas, as we have shewn, arise from the mind's comparing together the perceptions of sense, and discovering betwixt them certain resemblances and similitudes. Now, it is impossible that the sense can *compare* or perceive relations of any kind; and therefore this *comparing faculty* is the peculiar property of the *rational*, or, as the Greeks call it, the *logical* mind: for the Greek word λογος, which the Latins render by the term *ratio*, properly signifies *a relation*. And accordingly Euclid, who must be supposed

supposed to speak with the greatest propriety, so defines the word applied to magnitude *.

Ch. 6.

If any man, notwithstanding what is said, can have the least doubt of these ideas formed from the perceptions of sense being the act of the mind singly, as well as ideas of reflection, let him consider that

* The definition is, Λόγος ἔστι μεγεθῶν ὁμογένων κατὰ πληκίότητα ποιά σχέσις, *lib. 5. def. 3.* And the learned in the Greek language may observe, that this is the proper *etymological* sense of the word λογος; for it is derived from λεγω; of which the antient signification was, to *gather* or *collect*; in which sense it is used by Homer, and in the most antient dialect of Greek extant, I mean the Latin language; and in the later Greek it is still used in that sense in composition, as in the word συλλογος. From this original signification λογος, by a very natural *metonymy*, came to signify *relation*, or *comparison*; which cannot be made without collecting the things together, and setting them, as it were, beside one another. And accordingly this very word *comparison*, from the Latin *comparo*, and likewise *confero*, *compono*, all denote *setting together*, or *juxtaposition*.

It may here be observed, that in this sense the word λογικον is used with peculiar propriety in the Peripatetic definition of a man; which is, ζῶον λογικον, ἢ καὶ ἐπισήμης δεκτικον. For here λογικον denotes the being possessed of that *comparative faculty* which is the foundation of rationality among men; and therefore the possession of it is very properly set at the head of the *specific differences* which distinguish man from other animals. — The rest of the definition will be afterwards explained.

class

Ch. 6. clafs of them which are called ideas of *relation*, fuch as *likeness*, *diversity*, *double*, *half*, and the like. These ideas are certainly formed from sensible objects, as much as the idea of a *man* or a *horse*; yet no body, I think, will say, that the senses have any concern in the formation of them; and the reason is plain, namely, because they are comparisons which the mind makes of two or more things. Now the other ideas derived from the same source, though they are not actual comparisons made by the mind at the time we speak or think of them, and therefore are not ideas of *relation*; yet they are the result of comparisons formerly made; from which we collect that *common nature* which makes *the idea* of any object of sense.

And thus it appears, that the division of the conceptions of the mind made by Plato is well founded; and that there are truly conceptions, which are the act of the mind operating by itself, without any assistance from the senses. And thus I would fain hope, that I have distinguished the *perceptions of sense* from *ideas* in such a manner, that they will not again be confounded, and that we shall hear no more
so

so strange a language in philosophy, as Ch. 6.
that which speaks of *visible* and *tangible*
ideas *.

C H A P. VII.

*Of Abstract Ideas.—That there are Ideas
which are not abstract.—Of the three ways
in which Ideas exist.*

IN the language of our modern philosophy, *general ideas*, and *abstract ideas*, are understood to be synonymous terms; and every notion of the mind that is *abstracted* is understood to be *general*; and, *vice versa*, every *general notion* is conceived to be *abstracted*. But this I hold to be a mistake: for, in the first place, I think I have shewn, that we not only *may* have a conception of a particular quality of any substance, *abstracted* from its other qualities, without conceiving such quality to belong to any other substance; but that we *must* have had such an *abstract* conception before we could

* This is the language of Dr Berkeley in his *Theory of Vision*.

have

Ch. 7. have any *general* conception. And we may go further, and say, that such abstracted conception of the individual quality may never be generalized. Thus, *e.g.* if I believe that there is no other sun in the universe than ours, and if I consider his rays, or any other quality peculiar to him, separately from his other qualities, I have an *abstracted* notion of his rays, but no *general* notion or *idea* of them.

Thus it appears, that there may be *abstraction* without *generalization*. But can there be *generalization* without *abstraction*? Or are there no other ideas but *abstract* ideas? That all those in the human mind are such, is admitted. But are there no other in the universe? Does every intelligence think in the manner we do? If so, *matter* must be the *eldest* of things; and even *mind* and *intelligence* are to be derived from it: for that must be the consequence, if there be no ideas but such as arise from matter; because it is impossible to conceive intelligence without ideas. And yet to this consequence Mr Locke's philosophy naturally leads; which makes mind so dependent upon body, as not to operate without it,

it, and knows nothing beyond sensation, and its *ideas*, as he calls them. I am persuaded, that Mr Locke did not mean to draw such consequences from his philosophy; but it is certain, that such consequences have been drawn from it, and that the most extravagant systems of scepticism have been founded on it. Ch. 7.

The philosophy I have learned is of a very different kind: it teaches me, That mind is the most antient of things*; and that, as it alone has activity, and the *principle of motion in itself*, it is the efficient cause of every thing: that therefore there are *ideas* of a much higher order than those which we abstract from matter, being the *models* or *archtypes* of all *material forms*: that of such ideas *the intellectual world* is composed; of which *the material* is no more than a copy: that there are other intelligences in the universe besides ours, and infinitely superior to ours; and *one* highest of all, in whose intellect resides that intellectual world, and who is not only the *efficient cause* of all things, but

* Plato, in *Epinom.* p. 1008. edit. Ficini.

Ch. 7. *virtually* comprehends in himself every thing existing.

These ideas of highest order and dignity are, in the language of antient philosophy, said to be *before the many* *; that is, anterior to all individual and particular forms; which being infinite in number, are said to be *many*, in contradistinction to the *one* idea that is the pattern of them. Again, if they are considered as existing in the particulars or individuals of which they constitute the nature and essence, they are said to be *in the many* †. And in this way exists the whole *visible world*; which is nothing but the intellectual world made perceptible to the sense. And last of all come the ideas of our minds abstracted from the *many*; that is, from the material world: for such is our condition in this period of our existence, that we must necessarily draw all our ideas from that source; and this sort of ideas is said to be *after the many* ‡.

To

* Πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν.

† Ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς.

‡ Ἐπὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς. See Mr Harris's *Hermes*, book 3. ch. 4. where this doctrine is finely illustrated by an example from

To this triple order of forms, as Mr Ch. 7.
 Harris elegantly calls them, belong three
 several sciences. To the first and highest
 order belongs that science which, from
 Aristotle's method of treating it, has got
 the name of *Metaphysics*; but I think is
 better denominated the *first philosophy*: the
 subject of which are the *intellectual forms*,
 previous to the *material*, of which they are
 the pattern, and eternal and unchange-
 able, as not partaking of the corruption
 or contagion of matter; and therefore ha-
 ving a fixed and permanent existence: for
 those forms that are *united with matter* are
 in a constant change and flux, as well as
 the matter itself *. Of these intellectual
 forms,

from the works of art, and by several elegant quotations
 from the Greek commentators upon Aristotle. What I
 have here said relates only to the works of nature.

* See upon this subject a *Pythagorean* philosopher of
 the later times, *Nicomachus Gerasinus*, in his treatise up-
 on *Arithmetic*, in *initio*. The passage is somewhat long,
 but I will transcribe it for the sake of the learned reader,
 who may not have the book, as it is rare, never having
 been but once printed. It is where he explains Pythago-
 ras's definition of philosophy, which was ἐπιστήμη τῶν ὄντων.
 Upon that occasion, he explains what the ὄντα, or *things*
really existing, are, in contradistinction to what has no
 fixed

Ch. 7. forms, this science explains the nature; and in those of them that are most general, such as the *categories* above mentioned, contemplates the *first principles and elements of things*: for all things existing, are nothing else but those universals unfolded, as it were, and developed. From the intellectual world, it naturally ascends to the contemplation of that *universal mind*, in

fixed or permanent existence. The words are, "ὄντα δὲ, τὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως αἰεὶ διατελῶντα ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ ὑδέποτε τῷ εἶναι ἐξιστάμενα, ὑδὲ ἐπὶ βραχύ. ταῦτα τ' ἂν εἴη, τὰ αἰὺλα καὶ ὧν κατὰ μετεοίαν ἕκαστον λοιπὸν, τῶν ὁμωνύμως ὄντων καλυμμένων, τὸ δὲ τι λέγεται καὶ ἐστὶ. τὰ μὲν γὰρ σωματικά δήπῃ καὶ ὑλικά, ἐν διηνεκῇ ῥύσει καὶ μεταβολῇ, διὰ παντὸς ἐστὶ, μιμύμενα τὴν τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰδίου ὕλης καὶ ὑποστάσεως φύσιν καὶ ἰδιότητα. ὕλη γὰρ δι' ὅλης ἦν τρεπλὴ καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴ. τὰ δὲ περὶ αὐτὴν, ἢ καὶ συν αὐτῇ, θεωρούμενα, ἀσώματα. οἷον ποιότητες, ποσότητες, σχηματισμοί, μεγέθη, μικρότητες, ἰσότητες, σχέσεις, ἐνέργειαι, διαθέσεις, τόποι, χρόνοι. πάντα ἀπλῶς οἷς περιέχεται τὰ ἐν ἐκάστῳ σώματι ὑπάρχει καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἀκίνητα καὶ ἀμετάπτωτα. συμβεβηκότως δὲ μετέχει καὶ παραπολαύει τῶν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα παθῶν. τῶν δὲ τοιούτων, ἐξαιρέτως ἐπισήμη ἐστὶν, ἢ σοφία. συμβεβηκότως δὲ, καὶ τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτῶν, ὅσα ἐστὶ σῶματων. Ἀλλ' ἐκείνα μὲν αἰὺλα καὶ αἰδία, καὶ ἀτελεύτητα καὶ διὰ παντὸς ὅμοια, καὶ ἀπαράλλακτα, πεφυκε διατελεῖν ὡσαύτως τῇ αὐτῶν ὕσιν ἐπιδιαμένοντα, καὶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, κυρίως ὧν λέγεται. The sense in substance is, that *ideas*, or *intellectual forms*, alone can be properly said to exist, being immaterial, eternal, and unchangeable; that *matter and body* are by their natures in a continual flux and change; that it is only by participation of the *intellectual form* that the *corporeal form* can be said to have any existence at all; that these *intellectual forms*, though of their own nature *immortal*, yet being united to body, they by accident (συμβεβηκότως) partake of its affections, and become liable to change.

which

which this intellectual world is contained ; Ch. 7.
and *that* makes the highest part of this philosophy, called by the antients *Theology*.
With respect to the ideas *united* with matter, that is, *material forms*, they are the subject of that science called *Natural Philosophy*.
And as to ideas *abstracted* from matter, the science conversant about them is what we call *Mathematics* * ; the subject of which are, *length, breadth, thickness*, and in general *magnitude*, likewise *number*, and its *affections, ratios, proportions, &c.* : which are all ideas abstracted by our minds *from* material forms ; and not considered as existing *in* those forms, for then they become the subject of *natural philosophy* or *mixed mathematics* ; nor as *previous* to those forms, for in that view they would be the subject of the *first philosophy*.

If this account that I have given of these three orders of ideas be just, any philosophy of ideas which does not distinguish them must appear very defective. The first are the fountain and source of the other two, if it be true that this world is the

* This is the way in which Aristotle has divided the sciences. See his *Metaphysics*, lib. 6. in initio.

Ch. 7. production of mind and intelligence, not of blind chance; for if so, there must be an *intellectual* world previous to the *material*. To deny, therefore, the existence of such ideas, is to deny, that the universe is the work of *mind*. This is an impiety which I am far from imputing to Mr Locke: but thus much I may be allowed to say, that by not carrying his philosophy of ideas beyond sense and matter, he has given at least the appearance of *materialism* to his system.

C H A P. VIII.

Of perfect and imperfect Ideas.—Of the Ideas of Plato.—Of Science and Opinion; and the difference betwixt these two.

IN describing the progress of the human mind in the formation of ideas, I have said, that the idea may be more or less *perfect*; from which it follows, that there may be a general notion or conception of the thing, but such as is not what we emphatically, and properly enough in English, call the *idea of the thing*. This requires

requires explanation; without which our philosophy of *ideas*, and consequently of *language*, of which ideas make so essential a part, would be imperfect. Ch. 8.

From the account we have given of the formation of ideas, it is plain it must be a work of difficulty if rightly performed, requiring attention and accuracy. It is therefore impossible that it can be equally well performed by all, or by any at first. The brute, as we have seen, has some confused notion of the *species* in the *individual*. Our children at first, I am persuaded, have no more distinct idea of it; and I believe they have this further resemblance to the brute, that the idea, such as it is, is excited only by the presence of the object, or by some bodily impulse of one kind or another; their minds not having yet acquired that *self-moving* power, by which the mind, without such excitement, reviews and compares together the perceptions of sense lodged in the memory or imagination. They learn, no doubt, by conversation with grown persons, to form, pretty early, more distinct conceptions of the different species of *substances*: but as to *qualities*, and particularly

Ch. 8. larly *general* qualities, such as, *good, bad, fair, handsome, just, and unjust*, though they have those words frequently in their mouths, the ideas they annex to them are so very confused and indistinct, as hardly to deserve the name. Nor have they any clear conception of any term they use denoting any general quality, except it be of such as denotes a *sensation*, as *sweet, bitter, painful, pleasant*; of which they have as clear ideas as many philosophers. The vulgar may be said to continue children in this respect all their lives, at least in some degree; for though their notions are, no doubt, more distinct than those of children, and such as they can better explain, yet they are far from being those perfect ideas which we are now to describe.

This idea is no other than the idea of the man of science, or philosopher; which is very different from that of the vulgar. For, in the *first* place, it is entirely separated and abstracted from every thing material, all the several particular objects from which it is collected being laid out of the view of the mind, and *that* only which they have in *common* being considered;

ed; whereas the vulgar never perfectly Ch. 8.
make this separation, but still continue to
see the *one* only in the *many*: so that a-
mong them, *man*, *e. g.* is no more than
one name given to *Peter*, *James*, and *John*,
and other individuals of the species; and
when they want to explain their idea of
any thing, they cannot do it without an
example; that is, without shewing to the
person with whom they converse, the ma-
terial image of the thing in their own
minds. *2dly*, It is such an idea as con-
stitutes the nature and essence of the thing
unmixt with any thing else.

How difficult this last requisite is to be
attained, we shall be convinced, if we
consider, that *every thing in nature is mixed
with every thing*, according to the saying
of the antient philosopher, I think it was A-
naxagoras. Thus *length*, *breadth*, and *thick-
ness*, *figure*, *situation*, and *qualities* with-
out number, are all joined together in the
same subject, and in that way presented
to the senses. Now it is the business of
intellect to discriminate these, and setting
them each apart by itself, in that way to
form the idea of it. If this is rightly
done, then is the idea that perfect idea

Ch. 8. we seek for, such as is expressed in the definitions of the terms of science. But it may be defective in several respects. In the *first* place, It may only contain qualities, such as are *accidental*, and not distinguishing or *characteristical of the species*; as if I were to form my idea of a man from the colour or size, or any other property belonging to the individuals I may have seen, but not *common* to the species. *Secondly*, The qualities that form my general idea may be *common* to the species, but not *peculiar*; as if I should make my idea of a man to be that of a creature walking on two legs, or of a horse that of a creature with four legs. *Thirdly*, The quality may be *common* to all the species, and also *peculiar*, but may not contain its *nature and essence*. Thus if I define a man by his risible faculty, or a horse by his neighing, these qualities, though both common, and peculiar to each of these species, yet as they do not constitute their nature and essence, they are not the idea of the philosopher. *Fourthly*, The qualities of which I form my idea of the species, I may not have a *clear and distinct conception of*; as, *e. g.* if I define man to be

be a rational animal, capable of intellect and science, unless I know what *rationality* is, and what *intellect* and *science* are, I cannot have a perfect idea of a man. And, *lastly*, My idea may contain the qualities that are *common* and *peculiar* to the species, and also such as constitute its *nature* and *essence*; but if it contains, besides these, other qualities that are *accidental*, or *idiomatical*, that is, peculiar to the individual, or that are *common* to *other* species; in short, if it contains any thing else but those very qualities which constitute the nature and essence of the thing, from which all its *properties* are derived; nay, if it should contain any even of those *properties* which are by demonstration deducible from its nature, as, *e.g.* if, in my definition of a triangle, I should include the quality of its having its three angles equal to two right ones; it would not be the *perfect idea* of the philosopher, which must contain nothing, as I have said, but the *very essence* of the thing. Ch. 8.

But if it have not this superfluity, and have all the requisites above mentioned, then is it the *idea* of Plato, so much talked of, and so little understood, being a sense

Ch. 8. of the word different from that in which it is used in modern philosophy. For it is not the meaning that I have given to it, which comprehends every *general* notion, however inadequate to the nature of the thing; and far less is it the idea of Mr Locke, which comprehends even perceptions of sense, though it was no doubt from the philosophy of Plato that he borrowed the use of the word. This *idea* is the *real thing existing* *, of which Plato speaks so often in a language that appears mysterious, but which may be understood from what I have said: for he tells us, “It is
 “ that which makes *one* of the *many*; which
 “ preserving the *unity and integrity* of its
 “ own nature, runs through and mixes
 “ with things *infinite* in number; and yet,
 “ however *multiform* it may appear, is al-
 “ ways *the same*: so that by it we find
 “ out and discriminate the thing, whatever
 “ different shapes it may assume, and un-
 “ der whatever disguise it may, *Proteus-*
 “ *like*, hide itself †.” Now, though this description alludes to a peculiar notion of

* Τὸ ὅντως ὄν.

† See Plato, in *Philebo*, et alibi.

his concerning ideas, which I shall afterwards explain, and which Plato never has out of his view, it may be understood of the idea, such as I have described it, by which we discriminate a thing from all others, and find it out mixed with many other things in various forms and substances. Ch. 8.

This perfect idea is, in many cases, very difficult to be apprehended, especially if it be a very general idea; for such ideas are the principles of things, and therefore the most simple and uncompounded: but for that very reason they are the most difficult to be by us apprehended; *first*, because we are accustomed to perceive only what is mixed and compounded; and, *secondly*, because those general principles are joined, and incorporated as it were, with so many various forms and substances, that it is very difficult to evolve them, and shew them by themselves. It is therefore true what Aristotle says, that those principles, by how much they are great in power and efficacy, by so much they are the more difficult to be distinctly apprehended.

Of this kind of ideas are the ideas of justice,

Ch. 8. justice, goodness, and beauty; which are so general, and therefore of so difficult definition, that they furnished ample matter for the Sophists of old to shew their art, and to puzzle and perplex those with whom they conversed. Plato has written no less than ten books *, in order to explain what *justice* is; and he has given us a definition of it, taken from the school of Pythagoras †, and which is very different from the common notion of it. He has also, in the same books, spoken much of *the good*, or τὸ ἀγαθόν, but he has not defined it. He tells us, in the way of similitude, that what the sun is in the visible world, the τὸ ἀγαθόν is in the intellectual. And he further says, that to know it is the perfection of all knowledge, as it is the governing principle in nature, and ought to be so in all human actions and pursuits ‡. Whether Plato himself knew any more of the matter than what

* These are his books, Περὶ πολιτείας, or, *De Republica*.

† See the Pythagorean philosopher Theages, in his most valuable work, Περὶ ἀρετῶν, inserted in Gale's collection, intitled, *Opuscula Mythologica*, &c. p. 681.

‡ Plato, *De Republica*, lib. 7.

he has told the reader in these books, Ch. 8.
may perhaps be doubted, though I should
incline to think he did; and therefore I
hold this to be one of the mysteries of his
philosophy, which he did not communi-
cate except to a very few: and according-
ly it is so treated by his later followers,
Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Proclus, who
have made the doctrine of the *τὸ ἀγαθόν* a
great part of the *mystical theology* of Plato.

As to the third of those general ideas,
the beautiful, or *το καλόν*, he has spoken
much of it in the *Symposium*: and as what
he says there shews, that he understood
ideas were formed in the way I have de-
scribed, (though by the mysterious man-
ner in which he speaks of them one should
think otherwise), I will here give the sub-
stance of it. “The first objects,” says he,
“in which we discern the beautiful, are
“*corporeal forms*: and we begin with lo-
“ving *one* beauty of that kind; from
“thence we proceed to contemplate other
“beauties of the same kind, till we dis-
“cover *that* in which they all resemble
“one another; and then abating of our
“love for *the individual*, we come to be lo-
“vers of *this species* of beauty, and gene-
“ral

Ch. 8. “ral admirers of *all fine forms*. From bo-
“dy we next proceed to *mind*, and disco-
“ver the beautiful in *characters, manners,*
“and *institutions*; and finding here, too,
“the same resemblance in all these, we
“become general admirers of this species
“of beauty likewise, esteeming but very
“little the former in comparifon with it.
“The next ftep is to the beautiful *in science*:
“and here, in like manner, we are not to
“attach ourfelves to the beauty of a fingle
“fcience, but in general to contemplate
“that fpecies of beauty; and by this
“courfe of ftudy, we come at laft to dif-
“cover the *general idea* of beauty, com-
“prehending all the fpecies above men-
“tioned, viz. the beautiful in *forms, in*
“*manners*, and in *science*. A moft wonder-
“ful beauty indeed, fays our author, and
“for the fake of which only all other beau-
“ties are to be ftudied. It is eternal and
“incorruptible, having neither beginning
“nor end, increafe nor diminution: it is
“not beautiful in one refpect and ugly in
“another; it is not beautiful at one time,
“or in one place, and ugly at another
“time, or in another place; nor can it be
“conceived by the imagination, like a
“fine

“ fine face, or a fine hand, or any other Ch. 8.
“ corporeal form; nor must we represent
“ to ourselves this universal beauty as ex-
“ isting in any particular thing, such as
“ an animal, or even the earth and hea-
“ vens; but we must consider it singly by
“ itself, and detached from every thing
“ else; and all things else we must confi-
“ der as beautiful, only by *participation* of
“ this universal beauty, which always re-
“ mains the same, without suffering the
“ least impair or diminution by the de-
“ struction of those other things in which
“ it exists. This, says Diotima, (the
“ prophetess, in whose mouth Socrates
“ puts this discourse), is the perfect science
“ of beauty, and will make you, Socrates,
“ (to whom she is introduced as speaking)
“ a perfect lover, if you are capable of be-
“ ing initiated into such mysteries.”

In this manner has Plato mixed with the merriment of a feast, and even the riot of a debauch, for in that way it ends at last, his sublime philosophy of ideas and intellectual forms, which he has hardly ever out of his view in any of his dialogues, whether he is serious or pleasant*.

* The note is on the following page.

Ch. 8. From what is said, it will be further evident, how difficult it is to give a precise

* *The following note is referred to on the preceding page.*

Those who are not acquainted with this intellectual philosophy, will be surprised at one part of this description, namely, that we are not to consider this idea of beauty as inherent in any particular subject, not even the heavens. But those who have studied the precious remains that we have left of the Pythagorean philosophy, from which it is evident that Plato took almost all his philosophy, particularly his theology and doctrine of ideas, will not be surprised at this expression of his: for the Pythagoreans made the same distinction with respect to music that Plato makes with respect to beauty, distinguishing sensible and intellectual music; by which last they understood the ratios and proportions of numbers, considered simply by themselves, abstracted from voice or sound, and every sensible object, even the stars or planets; (see *Nicomachus's Arithmetic*, p. 5.). So that this music, according to their notion, was superior even to their music of the spheres, so much talked of, and so little understood. If it be objected, that this intellectual music of the Pythagoreans is as difficult to be conceived as Plato's intellectual beauty, I answer, that I myself have known a man who understood it perfectly, and took great delight in it; for he would spend whole days in reading music, without applying either voice or instrument to it. Now this was certainly intellectual music, though conveyed to the mind by sensible marks, as much as reading any book is an exercise of the intellectual faculty, though the thoughts are there likewise conveyed to the mind by sensible characters; because in both cases, the marks have not the least analogy or resemblance to the things signified; and therefore they only excite the memory, but do not in the least operate

cise definition of ideas of such high abstraction. Plato, we see, has not attempted to define *the beautiful* in this passage, nor in another dialogue which he has written wholly upon the subject; I mean, the *Hippias Major*; where he shews indeed very clearly, that Hippias did not understand what it was; but he makes us nothing the wiser for that. The good, as I have said, he explains by a similitude, in the same manner as he does the nature of the soul in the *Phædrus*; where he tells us, that to have the idea of the soul (that is, in his language, the perfect idea above mentioned) is divine knowledge, and of most difficult attainment: but to know what it is like, is human, and of less difficulty *.

This distinction betwixt *perfect* and *imperfect ideas*, which I have so much insisted upon, will explain a thing that is but little understood, the difference betwixt *science* and *opinion*. The subject of science is *perfect ideas*, such as I have described

rate upon the sense or imagination. The pleasure, therefore, of this musician, must have been altogether intellectual, produced by the idea of those numbers of which melody and harmony consist.

* p. 1221. *Ficini.*

Ch. 8. them; the subject of opinion is *imperfect ideas*. For if the idea wants any of the requisites above mentioned; if it is not *common* to all the individuals of the species; or, though common, if it be not *peculiar*; or, though both common and peculiar, if it be not *essential*; or, with all these three requisites, if we have not a *clear and distinct conception* of it; or, lastly, if, besides the essential qualities, we throw into our idea of the thing *others not essential*; in short, if it be not *the idea of the thing*; then is it the subject of *opinion*, about which we see men wrangle and dispute without end; because they do not argue about the thing itself, but about an imperfect notion of it. It was not therefore without reason that Plato said, that the subject of opinion was neither the τὸ ὄν, or *the thing itself*, nor was it the τὸ μὴ ὄν, or *nothing*; but something *betwixt* these two. This may appear at first sight a little mysterious, and difficult to be understood; but, like other things of that kind in Plato, when examined to the bottom, it has a very clear meaning, and explains the nature of opinion very well: for, as he says, every man that *opines* must opine *something*. The subject of opinion, therefore, is not *nothing*;
at

at the same time, it is not *the thing itself*, Ch. 8.
but something betwixt the two.

There is a difference also betwixt science and opinion in the *discursus mentis*, or the combination and comparison of ideas, as well as with respect to the simple ideas. But to treat of this would carry me too far from my present purpose *.

* These *ideas* of Plato being the subjects of science, are, in the language of Aristotle's philosophy, the *τὰ νοητά*, that is, *the objects of intellect*, or of that faculty of the human mind which, in the proper sense of the word, is called *νῦς*; by which, not general conceptions only are formed, but perfect ideas, such as contain the nature and essence of things. The conclusions from thence deduced with demonstrative certainty by the *discursus mentis*, make what the Greek philosophy calls *ἐπιστήμη*, and which we may express in English by the word *science*. And now it is easy to explain the whole of the definition of *man*, of which before I explained only a part. The definition is, *ζῶον λογικόν, νῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν*, that is, *a rational animal, capable of intellect and science*. By the first part of the definition, as I have already observed, is expressed that faculty of *comparison* which is the foundation of our rational nature; for *λόγος*, as I have shewn, in its proper signification denotes *comparison*, though it is commonly used to denote all the *operations* of intellect, and *intellect itself*. Of this *comparative faculty* the animal must be in *actual* possession, that is, he must be *ζῶον λογικόν*, otherwise he is not a man. But as to *intellect*, by which we form *perfect ideas*, or definitions of things, and that *discursus mentis* which science requires, the *capacity* of these two is all that is required to constitute a man.

C H A P. IX.

Of Plato's peculiar notion concerning the existence of Ideas. — The opinion of some modern philosophers upon that subject.

Ch. 9. **T**HE doctrine of ideas, as I have delivered it, is taken from the Peripatetic school. I have shewn at the same time, that, with respect to the formation of them by the human mind, Plato does not differ from Aristotle. But I mentioned a peculiar opinion of Plato concerning ideas, which it is possible the curious reader, if he does not already know, may desire to know; and which therefore, as belonging to the subject we are now treating, I will endeavour to explain.

Plato's opinion then is, that his *ideas*, though the human mind comes to the knowledge of them in the way I have described, have a *real existence by themselves* out of our minds, and out of the mind of any other intelligence, being *incorporeal substances*, not *accidents* or *qualities* of any other

other substance; that they are by their nature eternal and unchangeable; and it is by participation of them that every thing is denominated to be what it is. An *individual* man, *e. g.* by the participation of the idea of man, is that animal, and no other, and is called by that name *. What the nature of this *participation* is, or how it is to be conceived that one simple indivisible idea (for such they all are according to Plato), existing as a substance by itself, should mix and incorporate with so many different masses of matter, and yet still preserve the unity and indivisibility of its nature, is one of the mysteries of the Platonic philosophy, which neither he, nor any of his followers, so far as I know, have ever explained.

This opinion appears so extraordinary, that I have known some learned men, very much conversant in the writings of Plato, who could not believe that this was really his opinion. But that he did truly hold such opinion, is to me evident: 1st, From

* The *idea* of man, in the language of the Platonic philosophy, is called *αὐτο-άνθρωπος*, that is, *man itself*, or the real man; while the *corporeal* man is only *άνθρωπος*, or simply *man*.

Ch. 9. his own writings; particularly, the *Philebus*, which I quoted above, the *Sophista*, and the *Parmenides*; in which last he treats professedly of *ideas*, and of the *one*, and states several different opinions concerning them. And indeed, as I said before, this doctrine of ideas runs through his whole philosophy, and is hardly ever out of his view: so that it is not from a single passage that we collect this opinion, but from the whole strain of his writings.

2dly, If there were any doubt as to Plato's meaning, or if we could suppose that it was not his own opinion, but only put into the mouth of the interlocutors in his dialogues, and maintained, by way of argument, as he maintains several things which he certainly did not believe himself, we have the testimony of his scholar Aristotle; who has told us, in the most express terms, that his opinion was such as I have stated it; and not only so, but he has bestowed the greatest pains, and employed all the acuteness of his genius, and all the subtlety of his logic, in refuting it; and this not in one place only, but in many passages both of his *Metaphysics* and *Physics*, and even in his *Ethics*; where

where he makes an apology for differing Ch. 9.
 from a man for whom he had so great a
 regard *. In short, it appears from the
 writings of Aristotle, that this was the
 chief ground of that difference of opinion,
 which, it is well known, was betwixt him
 and his master. I know there are some
 who think, that Aristotle has often misre-
 presented the opinions of other philoso-
 phers, that he might have the pleasure
 of refuting them, and exposing their
 absurdity; and, among others, his com-
 mentator Philoponus is of that opi-
 nion †. But whatever freedom he might
 have used with the opinions of more
 antient philosophers, we can hardly be-
 lieve that he would have ventured to mis-
 represent the opinion of his own master

* *Ethic. ad Nicom. lib. 1. cap. 4.*

† This passage is to be found in *Philoponus's Commen-
 tary* upon Aristotle's third book of General Physics, or,
De naturali auscultatione, where Aristotle refutes ano-
 ther opinion of Plato, about two infinities. There Philo-
 ponus plainly says, that Aristotle affects to misunderstand
 Plato, and refutes his words, not his meaning; and he
 adds, that this was a common practice of his with respect
 to the antient philosophers. Καὶ ἕτως ἐπιλαμβάνεται τῷ λόγῳ
 ὡς δηλονότι πανταχὺ τὸ φαινόμενον ἐλεγχεν, καὶ ὅτην διανοίαν τῶν
 ἀρχαίων. A most grievous charge against his candour, by
 a disciple too of his school, and one who, in other re-
 spects, was his great admirer.

Ch. 9.

Plato, which must have been well known to many others. But besides, he has not only told us, that this was the opinion of Plato, but he has also given us a probable enough account how he came to form it. He had learned, says he, when he was very young, from some disciples of Heraclitus with whom he conversed, that all material things were in a perpetual flux; and therefore that there could be no science or distinct comprehension of them: and this always continued to be his opinion. Afterwards he became the scholar of Socrates, whose philosophy was entirely confined to morals, but who first attempted, says our author, to define and investigate generals. This Plato learned from him; but perceiving that there could be neither definition nor science of the objects of sense, for the reason just now mentioned, and thinking it was necessary that the subjects of science should be something fixed and permanent, he therefore introduced *ideas*, which he conceived to be eternal and unchangeable, and to have an existence by themselves, independent of all *material things* *.

* *Metaphys. lib. 6. cap. 1.*

But,

But, 3dly, Suppose that we should re- Ch. 9.
ject the authority of Aristotle altogether
in this matter, the same Philoponus, who
has accused this philosopher of misrep-
resenting the opinions of antient philoso-
phers, has himself stated the opinion of
Plato to be such as Aristotle has represent-
ed it. For in his commentary upon the
second book of Aristotle's Physics, speak-
ing of ideas, or forms separated from all
matter *, he says, they are either, accor-
ding to Plato, substances, having a sepa-
rate existence by themselves †, or they are
forms existing only in the mind of the
creator ‡; which was the opinion of A-
ristotle.

Lastly, This opinion concerning ideas,
was also the opinion of the Pythagoreans;

* *χωριστὰ εἶδη*, that is what Mr Harris calls *previous forms*, in contradistinction to forms existing either *in* material substances, or abstracted *from* them by our understanding.

† *Ἄυτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὑφ' ἑωυτὰ.*

‡ Philoponus's expression is, *Λογοὶ ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ*; for understanding which, we are to know, that in the language of Aristotle's philosophy, the thing existing *ἐνέργεια*, that is, existing *materially*, was only called *ἰσία*; but the idea of it was no more than the *λόγος τῆς ἰσίας*, or simply *λόγος*.

Ch. 9. from whom Plato took almost his whole philosophy, and particularly, as it appears, his doctrine of ideas: for in that genuine piece of Pythagorean philosophy yet preserved to us, I mean the treatise of Timæus the Locrian, *De anima mundi*, ideas are mentioned as one of the three principles of things *; and, as I had occasion to observe before, it was from the school of Pythagoras that Plato borrowed the term *idea*, which is now become so common a word in the English language. Further, there is a remarkable passage in Simplicius's commentary upon the first book of Aristotle's *Physics*, which shows, that the doctrine of ideas made an essential part of the *Theology* of the Pythagoreans: for they not only maintained, that they existed separately by themselves, but they made them to be a part of the divine nature; which they understood to be threefold, consisting of so many *ones* or *persons*, as we may call them. "The first one was

* The three principles are, the *idea*, the *matter*, and the *body*, falling under the senses, which is the produce of the two first. The words are, τὰ δὲ ὅλα πάντα ἴδιαν ἰλάν ἀισθητὸν δὲ οἶον ἐκγόνον ταύτην. *Timæus*, in initio.

" of

“of transcendent excellency, above all
 “*entity* and *substance*. The *second* was *ideas*,
 “that is, intelligible things, which have
 “a real and true existence. The *third*
 “was *animal life*, or spirit, as we may call
 “it, participating of the *first one* and of
 “*ideas*.” If Simplicius delivered this up-
 on his own authority only, we might just-
 ly doubt of it; but he quotes for it one
 Moderatus, a philosopher who appears to
 have given the best account of the doctrines
 of Pythagoras, and who for that reason is
 frequently quoted by Porphyry in his life
 of Pythagoras. Simplicius gives us the
 very words of this philosopher, which I
 have transcribed below *.

I

* Οὗτος γὰρ, (meaning *Moderatus*), κατὰ τῆς Πυθαγορείου τὸ μὲν
 πρῶτον ἐν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν ὁσίαν ἀποφαίνεται· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐν, ὅπερ
 ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὄν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἶδη φησὶν εἶναι· τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ψυχί-
 κόν, μετέχειν τῷ ἐνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν, fol. 50. This passage plainly
 shews, that Plato took from the Pythagoreans, not only
 his doctrine of *ideas*, but his *theology*, and particularly his
 notion of the *Trinity* in the divine nature, which I took
 occasion to mention in a former note. This notion ap-
 pears to me to be as antient as any thing in the Greek
 philosophy, and very probably was brought by Pythago-
 ras from Egypt with the rest of his philosophy.

Those who are learned in the *Hebrew*, and the books
 of *Moses*, may perhaps find the *Platonic* doctrine of i-
 deas

Ch. 9.

I have dwelt the longer upon this difference betwixt Plato and his scholar, that many authors, both antient and modern, have laboured much to prove, that there was really no difference betwixt them: but however successful they may have been in reconciling them upon other points, they are, I think, clearly irreconcilable with respect to ideas.

The very reverse of this opinion of Plato is the notion of certain philosophers of our own time concerning ideas. For as Plato maintains, that ideas are substances, which have a separate existence by themselves out of any mind, these philosophers, on the other hand, assert, that they have no existence at all, not even in the mind; that all our conceptions are perceptions of sense, being nothing else but

ideas in that passage of the second chapter of *Genesis*, where it is said, *That God made every plant in the field before it was in the earth, and every herb in the field before it grew*; which I think can hardly be understood but of the *ideas* of such plants and herbs. And the same learned men may also find some connection betwixt that *water* which Simplicius, in the same book, *fol. 51.* says the Egyptians made the symbol of the *first matter*, and *that deep, and those waters*, upon which *Moses* says the Spirit of God moved when the world was created.

impressions

impressions made upon the mind by external objects, through the medium of the organs of sense. These impressions being preserved in the memory, are what we call *ideas*; which therefore are nothing but fainter perceptions of sense. This doctrine was first advanced by Dr Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, and afterwards supported, and much enlarged upon, by a later philosopher, in a work intitled, *A treatise of Human Nature*; to which, as he has not put his name, nor ever publicly acknowledged it, so far as I know, I think he is intitled not to be named. That this late writer, who professes the sceptical philosophy, and whose intention appears to be, to overturn all science and evidence of every kind, should be fond of a doctrine that suits so well with his purpose, is no wonder at all: but I do wonder that Dr Berkeley, whose intentions were certainly good, however erroneous his philosophy may be, should have advanced it; more especially as it does not appear to me to have any connection with his favourite doctrine of the *nonexistence of matter*, which he maintained with the pious design of striking at the very root of *Atheism*, then
entirely

Ch. 9.

Ch. 9. entirely founded upon the doctrine of *materialism*. For he thought, that if he could shew, that *matter* did not exist, it would follow of necessary consequence, that there was nothing in the universe but *mind*; not foreseeing, that a philosopher was to arise, who should deny the existence of mind as well as body.

The consequence of the opinion of these gentlemen concerning ideas certainly is, that there is no science, demonstration, nor general truth of any kind; nay, there cannot be so much as a general proposition, nor indeed any proposition, as one term at least of a proposition must be a *general term*, expressing some *general notion*. If, therefore, these gentlemen are in the right, there is an end of all belief in religion, morals, philosophy, or science of any kind. *2dly*, There is no such faculty of the human mind as *intellect*; the business of which, as we have shewn, is, to abstract, and to consider separately, what is joined in nature, and in that way is presented to the senses. For if we have no perception of things in any other way, it is evident, that we have no intellect, nor any thing besides *sense*, *memory*, and *imagination*.

nation. These are all the powers of human nature, according to those philosophers; and these the brutes possess as well as we. So that this philosophy, at the same time that it destroys all science and certainty of every kind, degrades us to a level with the brute, by stripping us of that intellect which, by the antient philosophers, was thought to be the distinguishing characteristic of human nature. Ch. 9.

As this philosophy leads to such alarming consequences, and is entirely subversive of the theory which I have endeavoured to establish, that the mind operates by itself, without the assistance of *sense*, and consequently destroys altogether the distinction that I have been at so much pains to establish betwixt *perceptions of sense* and *ideas*, I must stop to consider it a little more particularly. And, first, I would ask these gentlemen, whether their proposition be general, that no such ideas as I suppose, exist at all in any mind or intelligence? or do they only maintain, that they exist not in the human mind? The first of these propositions, I am persuaded Dr Berkeley at least did not mean to assert, though he has expressed himself in much

Ch. 9. too general terms: for he certainly believed that there exists a *supreme mind*; and if so, he could not believe that this mind perceived by organs of sense, and had no other perceptions.

But without entering into such high metaphysical disquisitions, let us confine ourselves to man, and inquire, whether in his mind there are any such ideas. Now this appears to me to be truly a question of fact, Whether does man actually divide, abstract, and generalise, in the manner I have described? or does he consider things in no other way than as they are presented to him by the senses? If therefore it be a question of fact, every man's consciousness of what passes in his own mind must determine it. Now I ask any man of science, (for I admit it is only such that form an idea perfectly), Whether he cannot separate and abstract any particular property of any subject from its other properties, and make *that* property the object of the mind's contemplation by itself? whether he cannot conceive that quality as existing in many other subjects? and, lastly, whether he cannot consider *that* which those several subjects have in common,

mon, laying aside the consideration of Ch. 9.
what may belong to each of them in particular? I ask a geometer, *e.g.* Whether he cannot separate that property of a figure of being bounded by three lines, from any other property belonging to the figure, and consider that property by itself? whether he cannot perceive that such a property belongs to many other figures? and whether he cannot consider this common property by itself, without taking into his consideration the particular properties of each figure? whether he cannot reason upon this common nature of a triangle, without considering any other quality which may belong to it? and whether it would not be the greatest defect in a geometer, and such as would render him utterly incapable ever to attain to any the least degree of excellence in the science, if he could not conceive and argue about a triangle in general, without imbarassing his thoughts, by considering whether it was of wood or of metal, whether it was white or black, whether isosceles or scalenum. Or without appealing to a man of science, I ask any common man, Whether he cannot observe, speak, and reason, about

P 2

Ch. 9. about the length of the room where he sits, without taking into his consideration its breadth or height, or what the finishing is, whether wainscot or plaister? whether he cannot observe the size or figure of any animal or vegetable, without considering its other qualities? If these, and such like questions, must be answered in the affirmative, as I think they must be, then it is decided by common observation and experience, that the human mind must at least have the faculty of *abstraction*; and that it is not so much under the dominion of sense, that it must necessarily contemplate every object as presented to it by the sense, but can exert a power superior to sense, by separating and dividing those things which sense presents only in the lump.

The latter writer I have mentioned, admits the fact to be as I have stated it; and acknowledges, that the mind, in contemplating any individual object of sense, can lay aside the consideration of the qualities peculiar to that object, and consider only those which it has in common with others of the same kind: and to these common qualities so considered by the mind,

mind, we affix, says he, a name, which Ch. 9.
he admits to be a general term for all
things of that kind, and to stand for them,
in speaking and writing; as, *e. g.* I see a
three-sided figure upon the paper, and this
is an object which I perceive by my sense
of sight. Now, says he, I can lay aside
the consideration of the white paper, the
black lines, and I can also throw out of
my view, whether it be a great or small
figure, right-angled, acute or obtuse
angled, and can consider only its quality
of being a plain figure, bounded by three
straight lines, to which I give the name of
triangle; and this is a general term, ap-
plicable to all plain figures bounded by
three right lines, without any other addi-
tional circumstance.

Now I should desire to know, whether
the idea described by this writer is not pre-
cisely what other philosophers call an *ab-*
tract idea? 2dly, I would ask this gentle-
man, by what faculty of the mind this
discrimination of the qualities of a triangle
is performed, so that some of them are
made the objects of the mind's contempla-
tion, while others of them are set out of
its sight? He will not surely say it is
sense;

Ch. 9. *sense*; because *sense* discriminates nothing, but without distinction perceives every quality of an object that is presented to it, not considering whether it be common to the kind, or peculiar to the individual. Neither is it *imagination*; which is nothing else but a weaker sensation. It is evident, therefore, that it must be some faculty different from either of these two, and this faculty is what I call *intellect*; unless it could be shewn, that there is any faculty of the human mind by which it perceives or knows any thing, other than sense, imagination, and intellect.

It is said by this writer, That the triangle upon the paper is truly the triangle which is perceived by the mind, but it is considered as *representing* all other triangles. But this appears to me to be playing with words, and speaking in figure and metaphor, not with philosophical propriety and exactness. For what is meant by the word *representing*? If it signifies, that the triangle upon the paper stands for a sign of the idea of triangle, in the same manner that the word *triangle* does in speaking, it is admitted. If, on the other hand, it is meant, that the triangle upon the paper is

is the exact image of the triangle in the mind, it is denied. For how can a triangle, that must of necessity be either right-angled, acute or obtuse angled, represent in that sense a triangle which this writer allows to be considered by the mind without any of those qualities? Ch. 9.

The diagrams, however, used by geometers in demonstrating their propositions, may possibly have led those gentlemen into so gross an error. But they ought to have considered, that such diagrams are no other than *signs* of ideas, and that it is the weakness of our intellect which obliges us to take that assistance from sense. And accordingly we see, that men who are far advanced in the science, can go through long demonstrations without such assistance; and though we do not possess, we may at least conceive such a degree of intellect, as to have no need of such material signs or symbols, but to be able to converse with the pure intellectual forms themselves. But even in our present state, to argue, that because we use signs of ideas, therefore we have no ideas, is the same thing as if one should argue, that because we use another sort of signs, namely
sounds,

Ch. 9. founds, therefore we have no conceptions but of founds. Now the fact is so far otherwise, that when we hear or read any thing attentively, we do not at all attend to the founds, letters, or words, but only to the things signified by them.

The arguments they use, tend chiefly to prove, that ideas have no *real existence*, and that they cannot be apprehended either by sense or imagination: for who can perceive, by the sense or figure in his imagination, a triangle, *e. g.* that is neither equilateral, isosceles, nor scalenum? But this is arguing against the ideas of Plato, not those of Aristotle. And in this way the antient philosophers, and particularly Sextus Empiricus *, the great defender of

* This writer is of later times, having lived, as I conjecture, in the age of the *Antonines*; but there are very few writers of the best times that exceed him in purity or elegance of style: and I would advise all our sceptical writers to study him diligently, not only for the improvement of their *style*, if they happen to understand the original, (or if they do not, there is a very good *Latin* translation of him), but of their *matter*; for there is as great copiousness of argument in him as in any writer I know. I would also advise such of them as write against the Christian religion, to study *Julian* the Emperor's work of that kind, preserved to us by one of the fathers of

of the Sceptic philosophy, has argued a- Ch. 9.
gainst *abstract ideas*, not denying their ex-
istence *in the human mind*, but maintain-
ing, that it was impossible they could
really exist *in nature*. And indeed, if those
philosophers had entered a little more into
that antient controversy, and known per-
fectly the difference betwixt those two
kinds of ideas, they never would have
supposed, that the ideas of Aristotle, which
are the operation of mind alone, could ex-
ist any where else but in the mind, or be
perceived by the sense, or figured by the
imagination, any more than mind itself.
And so much for this strange opinion con-
cerning ideas, which appears to me to be
entirely new, and unsupported by any
authority, antient or modern, and as re-
pugnant to sound philosophy as to com-
mon understanding. I will only add, that
the philosophy of Mr Locke appears to me
to have led into this as well as into other
errors: for from the way in which he talks

of the church, *Cyrillus*; who, in answering him, has
done his antagonist the justice to give us his own words.
They will there learn better arguments, and much more
elegantly expressed, than any they have used.

Ch. 9. of abstract ideas, it would seem he did not believe that they existed even in the mind. He says of the abstract idea of a triangle, "That in effect it is somewhat imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put together*." And accordingly Bishop Berkeley avails himself of this authority from Mr Locke, in arguing against abstract ideas †. Indeed it is no wonder that a philosopher, such as Mr Locke, who derives every thing from sense and matter, and seems to know nothing beyond these, should not believe in the existence of ideas that are altogether the work of mind, operating by itself, without the assistance of body.

Betwixt those two opinions, so opposite, lies the opinion of the Peripatetic school, which, it may be thought, I have explained at too great length; and, instead of a treatise upon language, have written a system of the philosophy of mind. But it should be considered, that I have under-

* *Essay on the Human Understanding*, book 4. ch. 7. § 9.

† *Theory of Vision*, p. 147.

taken to give a philosophical account of the Origin and Progress of Language, which it would have been impossible for me to give, if I had not entered into the philosophy of mind and ideas; without the knowledge of which, the study of language is the most barren of all studies, being that of *sound* merely, and therefore unworthy of a philosopher or man of science. But further, I hope this inquiry into the nature and origin of our ideas will facilitate the decision of the question which I am to treat of in the next chapter, namely, Whether ideas be the natural growth of the mind, or the fruit of acquired habit?

Ch. 9.

Q 2


CHAP.

C H A P. X.

*That Ideas are formed by the Mind, not naturally, but in consequence of acquired habit.
—General reflections upon the subject.*

C. 10. **I** Know that the argument I am now to maintain, will appear to many a very ungracious argument. Are we then no better originally, they will say, than the brute beasts? and is there then no *natural* difference betwixt us and the brute? To which I answer, That no man is more convinced than I, of the superior dignity and excellence of human nature, and the difference betwixt us and the brutes in the state we see them in: and accordingly I have been at great pains to shew this difference, in the account that I have given of the operations of the human mind, and to mark the boundaries, as well as I could, betwixt the brute and us; and I have very much blamed certain philosophers for stripping us of that prime faculty which makes the chief distinction betwixt them
and

and us, I mean *intellect*. But it is no de- C. 10.
gradation to human nature to maintain,
that this faculty is *acquired*, as well as ma-
ny others, which set us so much above
the brute, confessedly are: on the contra-
ry, it seems to be our praise, that *we* owe
to our own industry and sagacity, not to
nature, our chief excellence, while *they*
have added little or nothing to the faculties
which nature has bestowed upon them.
It is enough, I think, for the honour of
our species, that our *capacity* is allowed to
be greater, and that we have from nature
a greater facility in forming *habits* and ac-
quiring *faculties* that are not born with us.
Further than this I cannot, though I
should give offence, carry the superiority
of our nature above the brute, in the pre-
sent state in which both they and we are;
(for as to any future or past state of either,
it is beyond the bounds of this work to
inquire): nor can I exactly determine how
far the brute might be carried by culture
and education. Only thus much I think I
may say, that his progress would be much
slower, for the reason just now mentioned;
and I think it is likely, that with any cul-
ture

C. 10.  ture he would not go so far.—But to proceed in our argument :

From the sketch I have given of the *ideal* world, it appears to be entirely different from the *natural*. For, in the *first* place, In the ideal world, there is nothing but *shadowy forms*, as those would call them who believe that nothing really exists except what is *material*; whereas the *natural* consists of substances, compounded of *matter and form*. *Secondly*, The *natural* world is a composition of infinite variety; of which it is true, in some sense, what the antient philosopher said that I quoted above, that all things are mixed with all; not as in the chaos of the poets, without order or regularity,

*Frigida ubi pugnant calidis, humentia siccis,
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus;*

but with the most perfect order and regularity, though with such a mixture in the composition, that almost every thing participates of every thing, and the most distant extremes run into one another. In the *ideal* world it is just the reverse: for every thing there is separated and discriminated

minated from every thing; and it is the great business of human intelligence, to untwist, as it were, this great web of nature, and show every thread by itself. C. 10.
Thirdly, As the objects in this world are different from those in the natural, so are the faculties by which we recognise those objects: the natural world we perceive by our *senses*, the ideal by our *intellect*; two faculties altogether different in their nature, and manner of operation.

The last difference I shall observe is, that the natural world opens upon us at our birth, at least in some degree, and our infancy and younger years are wholly employed in making discoveries in it; whereas it is evident, that the ideal world is not disclosed to us till a considerable time after our birth; for at first we are entirely immersed in matter, and it is only through the medium of sense and matter, as I have shewn, that we enter into this world of ideas*.

When

* There is another difference, which, though not immediately belonging to our subject, is well worth observing by the philosopher; and it is this: That the ideal world, being entirely of our own creation, is, or ought to be,

C. 10.

When I say this, I would not have it believed to be my opinion, that, however we are connected with matter at the time of our birth, there is any thing material, or

be, perfectly known to us, so that we should be able to define or explain the essence of every thing in it; whereas in the world made by God, we know not the essence or constituent principles of any thing; for I deny that we can define any natural substance. Not to speak of the *first matter* of the philosophers, which by all of them is allowed to be undefineable and incomprehensible, what do we know more of those bodies with which we are surrounded, and are daily conversant, or even of our own bodies, with which we are so intimately connected, except certain qualities or properties? But what constitutes the essence of any particular body, or of body in general, no man can tell. The common definition of *body* is, that which hath three dimensions. But this is telling us no more than that it is bounded in a certain way: and I ask, *What* is it that is thus bounded? It is also defined to be that which resists, or fills place. But still I ask, *What* is it that has this quality of *resistance*, or *filling place*? I have already observed, that *Euclid*, in his definitions, has very properly not meddled with *space*, *extension*, *quantity*, or any other of those *universals* which are the subject of the first philosophy. He has also wisely abstained from making mention of *σῶμα*, or *body*, even when he defines a solid. For he tells us, that a solid is *that* which hath length, breadth, and thickness, without telling us *what* it is; though he no doubt knew that it was body, and nothing else. But the subject of his science was not that undefineable thing we call *body*, but only the *boundaries* of body; which being abstracted from body, are treated off by the geometer. It is therefore no impeachment

or congenial to matter, in the nature of our mind: for the reader, I hope, by what he has already seen of this work, will not believe that I am addicted to that *mad philosophy* * which excludes *mind* from the system of nature, and supposes that nothing exists but *matter* and *motion*, governed by blind *chance*. Far from holding that opinion, I do most firmly believe, that there is a *governing mind* in the universe, *immaterial, eternal, and unchangeable*; that our minds are of a nature congenial to this supreme mind; and that there is in us, even at the time our birth, a portion of those *celestial seeds*, of which the Latin poet, quitting poetical fiction, and assuming the philosopher, divinely sings,

*Ignæus est ollis vigor et COELESTIS ORIGO
Seminibus, —————*

But he very properly adds this exception,
—— *quantum non noxia corpora tardant,
Terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra.*

impeachment of the certainty of the science, that *body*, which is what is contained within these boundaries, cannot be defined.

* *Infanientis dum sapientiæ
Consultus erro.*

HOR.

VOL. I.

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
Now

C. 10. Now these incumbrances are so great when we first come into the world, and the *particle of the divinity* within us, as the ancients chose to call it, is then so immersed in matter, and *imbruted*, if I may so speak, that it cannot exert that power of *self-motion* which is peculiar to its nature, but is altogether passive to material impulses, either from external objects, or from its own habitation of clay; I mean, from appetites and feelings arising from the body.

This is the natural state of man when he first appears upon this stage: and the question is, How he undergoes so great a change, as to become, of a creature merely passive and sensitive, active and intelligent? By what means does he enter into this intellectual world, so different from the natural, and become, as it were, a new creature? Is it by nature merely that this metamorphosis is brought about, as the worm is changed into a butterfly? or is it by habit which he acquires? Do not we at first learn to *think* as we afterwards acquire *arts* and *sciences*? and does not the mind, by slow degrees, and very feeble attempts in the beginning, at last disengage

gage itself from the intanglements of matter, and learn to exert its native power of intellect? C. 10.

Before we proceed further in reasoning upon this subject, let us try what is to be learned from fact and experience, beginning with the infants of our own species. That they have at first no ideas, and but very imperfect sensations, is a matter of fact that cannot be denied; and it is as certain that they acquire their ideas, not by nature, as they do their bodily faculties, but by instruction, and by conversing with elderly persons. Now suppose them deprived of this method of communication, how long may we suppose that their infancy of mind would last? I have been informed of an instance of a child, who was come to be betwixt eight and nine years of age, and had learned, not only to speak, but to read, and by consequence must have had ideas, however imperfect, when he lost his hearing by the small pox, and continued deaf all his life after. At the age of five and twenty he was put under the care of a master, who professes a most curious art, of which I shall have occasion to make frequent men-

C. 10.  tion afterwards, I mean the art of teaching in the deaf to speak. This master told me, that as he had been much neglected after the loss of his hearing, without the pains being bestowed upon him that are commonly bestowed upon deaf persons, he found him, even at that advanced age, almost totally void of ideas, and was obliged to teach him to think as well as to speak. Yet this young man had been supplied with all the necessaries of life. But let us suppose that he had had all those necessaries to furnish for himself, can we believe, that if he had been so employed, he ever would have learned to think, or have become a rational creature, even supposing that he had lived in company with such as himself?

In order to form a right judgement of this matter, let us consider the state of savage and barbarous nations. Those who have studied the history of *man*, not of particular nations only, that is, have studied history in the liberal and extensive view of discovering the nature of *man*, from fact and experience, know very well, that all nations, even the most polished and civilized, of which we read in history, were originally

originally barbarians; and as all the vegetables, such as the vine and olive, which are now cultivated and improved by art, and in like manner the brute animals, that are tamed, were at first wild; so likewise man himself was originally a wild savage animal, till he was tamed, and, as I may say, *humanized*, by civility and arts. Whoever, therefore, would trace human nature up to its source, must study very diligently the manners of barbarous nations, instead of forming theories of *man* from what he observes among civilized nations. Whether we can, in that way, trace man up to what I suppose his original state to have been, may perhaps be doubted; but it is certain we can come very near it: for we are sure, that there have been in the world, and are still, herds of men (for they do not deserve the name of nations) living in a state almost entirely brutish, and indeed in some respects more wild than that of certain brutes, as they have neither government nor arts *. Some of them who are advanced the length of civil society and language, have neverthe-

C. 10.

* Of such nations more will be said in the sequel.

C. 10. less ideas exceedingly imperfect: for tho' they have general notions, without which there could be no language, they can hardly be said to have abstracted ideas, as shall be shewn when we come to speak of the barbarous languages. From such beginnings, however, men proceed to form distinct ideas; then they advance to arts and sciences, and so on to refinement and politeness. Now where-ever there is a progress, there must be a beginning; and the beginning in this case can be no other than the mere animal: for in tracing back the progress, where else can we stop? If we have discovered so many links of the chain, we are at liberty to suppose the rest, and conclude, that the beginning of it must hold of that common nature which connects us with the rest of the animal creation.

From savage men we are naturally led to consider the condition of the brutes; betwixt whom and the savages there is such a resemblance, that there are many who will hardly admit of any difference; and even betwixt us and them at the time of our birth, and for some considerable time after, there is not, as I have already observed,

observed, any material difference. The C. 10.
mind of the brute (so I call the inward principle in him that governs his motions and actions) is inseparably connected with his body, and bound in the chains of matter, in the same manner that we are when we first come into the world. And accordingly, in the first operations of our mind, we see the very same process: for they have the same perceptions of sense that we have; they preserve those perceptions in their memory or imagination; and they have also, as well as we, a notion of *sameness*, *likeness*, or *diversity*, in the objects of sense; and they recognise the *species* in the *individual*, as readily as our children do. Does not this plainly indicate, that there is no *natural* difference betwixt our minds and theirs, and that the superiority we have over them is *adventitious*, and from *acquired habit*? How far the brute might go in that way, we have no sufficient experience to determine with any certainty. If we can believe some stories told of them, and by philosophers too, we cannot deny their capacity of acquiring the habit, not only of forming ideas, but of comparing them together; that

C. 10. that is, of reasoning. The story told by Mr Locke of the Brazil parrot belonging to Prince Maurice of Nassau, is well known. And Porphyry, the greatest philosopher, as well as best writer of his age, relates, that crows and magpyes, and parrots, (and another bird that he calls *ἐγιδνακος*), were taught in his time, not only to imitate human speech, but to attend to what was told them, and to remember it; and many of them, says he, have learned to inform against those whom they saw doing any mischief in the house. And he himself, he says, tamed a partridge that he found some where about Carthage, to such a degree, that it not only played and fondled with him, but answered him when he spoke to it, in a voice different from that in which the partridges call one another; but was so well bred, that it never made this noise but when it was spoken to *. And in this work he maintains, that all animals who have sense and memory are capable of reason: and this, he says, is not only his opinion, but that of the Pythagoreans †;

* *Porphyr. De Abst. lib. 3. cap. 4.* † *Ibid. cap. 1.*

the greatest philosophers, in my opinion, that ever existed, next to the masters of their master, I mean the Egyptian priests. And he adds, that besides the Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, Empedocles, and Democritus, were of the same opinion *. One thing cannot be denied, that their natures may be very much improved by use and instruction, by which they may be made to do things that are really wonderful, and far exceeding their natural power of instinct. There is a man in England at present, who has practised more upon them, and with greater success, than I believe any body living; and he says, as I am informed, that if they lived long enough, and pains sufficient were taken upon them, it is impossible to say to what lengths some of them might be carried; for there is a great difference among them, as well as us, in docility and natural capacity.

But allowing, that in these two respects we are superior to all the brute creation, and that we can go farther than the brute with any culture can go, this is saying no

* *Perpbyr. De Abstin. lib. 3. cap. 6. in fine.*

C. 10. more than what I have already said, that we have by nature greater capabilities than they, and a greater facility of forming and improving habits; but I deny that there is any other difference betwixt us and them. We are for a time, like them, immersed in matter,

—— *inclusi tenebris et carcere cæco.*


VIRG. *Æn.* 6.

Like them we acquire faculties, and improve our nature by use and instruction. Where then should the difference be but where I have placed it? The maturity of age, we see, makes no such alteration upon their mind, as to take it out of the natural state: it does no more than give greater strength to their bodies, and the perfect use of their senses; and perhaps by use and experience it may improve their instinct. What reasons, or what facts, can induce us to believe, that it should have any other effect upon us, so that when we come to a certain time of life, we should instantly burst our prison of flesh and blood, and be transformed in a moment into rational creatures, without any use or instruction, or previous habit

bit acquired? It is certainly much more C. 10.
probable, and more agreeable to the ana-
logy of nature, and the progress which
we observe in our species, from a state
little better than that of the vegetable, to
suppose, that we acquire ideas, as we do
the arts and sciences, that are founded up-
on them; and that as Nature has not gi-
ven us the one, so she has not given us
the other; and for the same reason,
namely, that we have the capacity of ac-
quiring both: for Nature is always fru-
gal in her gifts; nor is she in any other
instance so profuse, as to bestow upon one
and the same animal, both the capacity
of acquiring any faculty, and the actual
possession of that faculty.

C H A P. XI.

Continuation of the subject. — Ideas of Reflection not from Nature.

C. II.  IN order to examine this question more closely, we must go back to the division that I have made of ideas, into those of *external objects*, and those of the *operations* of our own *mind*, or, as Mr Locke calls them, *ideas of reflection*. In forming the ideas of either kind, we may be said to study and investigate the nature of things; for we discover, in things of which we form the idea, that *common nature* which binds them together, and constitutes the genus or species under which we recognise them. By the ideas, therefore, formed from the perceptions of sense, we investigate the nature of external objects; by ideas of reflection, we study ourselves, and discover the nature of our mind, and its operations. The question then is, Whether those reflex acts of the mind by which this discovery is made, are the mere

mere operation of nature? or whether this faculty of reflection is not acquired by use and exercise, like other faculties belonging to our nature? C. II.

In order to decide this question, we must consider the state of savages; who, as I have observed, are so much nearer the natural state of man than we, that it is from them only that we can form any idea of the *original* nature of man: and I will venture to affirm, that any man who attempts to form a system of *human nature* from what he observes among civilized nations only, will produce a system, not of *nature*, but of *art*; and instead of the *natural* man, the workmanship of *God*, will exhibit an *artificial* creature of *human* institution *. Now though we should suppose,

* See *Mons. Rousseau*, in his *Treatise on the inequality of Men*, where he ridicules the folly of those who think they understand human nature, because they know the character and manners of their own nation, and perhaps some of the neighbouring nations, and very wisely tell us, that *man* is the same in all ages and all nations.

I am very happy to find, that my notions, both with respect to the original state of human nature, and the origin of language, agree so perfectly with the notions of an author of so much genius, and original thought, as well as learning.

that

C. II. that the mere savages, employed altogether either in gratifying their natural appetites, or procuring the means of such gratification; wanting that leisure, and that assistance to knowledge, which civil society affords to speculative men; without curiosity also, or any desire of knowledge, which is known to be the character of all savages, would nevertheless apply themselves to the study of things without them; is it possible to suppose, that they would turn their eyes inward, and carry their philosophy so far as to study their own natures? If we can suppose them to do this by nature merely, we may likewise suppose that they will, in the same way, invent all arts and sciences; for ideas are the foundation of all arts and sciences, which cannot exist without definitions; and these, as we have shewn, are nothing else but perfect ideas of the things defined, which necessarily must be preceded in order of time by ideas less perfect: And particularly of this most useful of all sciences, the science of man, the ground-work are the ideas of reflection, of which we are now speaking.

Not only is such a supposition altogether absurd in *theory*, but in *fact* it appears, as
much

much as such a fact can be known, that savages have no such ideas. For even such of them as have formed themselves into society, and have got the use of language, and of other arts, have hardly any words to express the operations of mind. And in all languages, even those the most cultivated, the words of that kind are metaphors borrowed from the objects of sense*. Now as it is by language that we trace, with the greatest certainty, the progress of the human mind, it is evident, that ideas of reflection must have come only in process of time, and after ideas of external things were not only formed, but had got a name. We must therefore consider this kind of ideas, not as the first step of the progress of the human mind towards science and philosophy; so that if we are at liberty to suppose it to be the work of nature, we cannot stop, but must likewise suppose every other step, and the arts and sciences themselves, to be the work of nature, and nothing at all to be produced by acquired habit.

It may be objected, That *consciousness* is

* This, I think, is an observation of Mr Locke.

C. II.

held by all philosophers to be essential to human nature; so that if a man is not conscious of what he does, he does not deserve the appellation of a human creature. Now if a man knows that he *thinks, deliberates, chooses, &c.* he must necessarily have the idea of *thinking, deliberation, &c.*; and these are ideas of reflection.

To this I answer, *1st*, That those philosophers who suppose, that *consciousness* is essential to human nature, are such as I mentioned before, who have formed their systems of *man* from what they observe among us; and because they see that all men in this country are rational, they conclude that man was always so; and that our forefathers, inhabiting the woods two or three thousand years ago, were men in that respect as well as we. But this is plainly begging the question. For I deny, that in the natural state, and previous to any acquired habit, there is any difference with respect to mental faculties betwixt us and the brute, to whom I suppose those philosophers will not allow the privilege of consciousness. Further, I say, that after man has raised himself so far above the brute, as to form ideas of external things, he

he may be long in that state before he has any *consciousness*, or knowledge of his own operations. For even among us, nothing is more true than the common saying, That we often act without reflection, or knowing what we are doing, going on in a course of action, sometimes for a considerable time, without any reflex act of the mind upon itself. But, *2dly*, I answer, Suppose that a man is conscious of one single thought, he has not therefore the idea of thinking, any more than a man that has the perception of any one external object, has the idea of that object; since an *idea* is of *that* which is common to many things, not belonging to one only.

C. II.

C H A P. XII.

That Ideas of external Objects are not from Nature.

C. 12. **S**O far, therefore, we have proceeded in this argument, as to be able to affirm, with great certainty, that the *reflex act* of the mind upon itself, by which it is conscious of its own operations, is not from *nature*. Here then is one class of ideas which must be produced by *acquired habit*; and this creates at least a presumption, that the other set of ideas is to be derived from the same source: for in that way the system of the human mind will be much more uniform and consistent, than if we were to divide the matter, and suppose that one class of ideas arose from nature, and the other from acquired habit. Both, according to my hypothesis, are from the last-mentioned source; and nature has done no more than to furnish the materials, I mean the perceptions of sense; from which are derived, *mediately* or *immediately*, both classes of ideas.

But

But to come closer to the point, — it C. 12.
will be necessary, for the decision of this
question, that the reader should recollect
what we have said concerning the nature
of the *intellectual* world, and the forma-
tion of those ideas which constitute it. We
have seen how different in every respect it
is from the *natural*; we have seen how we
come by the knowledge of this last; and
the question is, How the *intellectual* is dis-
closed to us? To suppose that there is a-
ny secret communication betwixt our
minds and superior minds, by which it is
revealed to us, is a kind of visionary and
enthusiastical philosophy that is now alto-
gether exploded. The fact truly is, that
every man is the architect of his own i-
deas, and forms a little intellectual world
in his own mind.

How artificial the operation is by which
he does so, we have endeavoured to ex-
plain: and indeed it may in some sense
be said to be an *unnatural* operation, if we
consider that every thing here below con-
sists of *matter* and *form* joined together. It
is from this *compound* we receive our first
impressions; and it is with it only that,
in our natural state, we are conversant.

C. 12. To separate, therefore, matter from form, as we do in framing ideas, may be said to be an *unnatural* operation, since it is *disjoining* what *nature* has *joined*. And it must appear still more unnatural and artificial, if we further consider how long we were accustomed to view this compound in its natural state, before we began to make so violent an abstraction. This must make the operation at first most painful and laborious. It appears indeed easy to us, who are accustomed to it, by insensible degrees, from our early years, and assisted by instruction, and conversation with those who had already formed the habit. But the philosopher, who can carry himself back to the first ages of the world, must be convinced, that to a savage, nothing could be more difficult, than an operation, by which he learns to think in a way so different from that to which he had been accustomed. Even the vulgar among us, though they have the advantage of being educated among thinking and speaking men, make this abstraction of the *matter* from the *form* very clumsily, and, if I may be allowed to use the expression, leave always some of the matter *sticking*

sticking to the form. But how much more C. 12.
clumsily, and with how much more dif-
ficulty, must it be performed by the rude
untaught savage?

Can we then suppose, that so *unnatural*
an operation is the work of *nature*? or that
what is performed with so much difficulty
is a natural energy? The operations of
nature, we see, are all easy, and they
are performed as readily, and as well, at
first as at last. Now this is certainly not
true of the ideas of external things; for
there is a progress in the formation of
them, as shall be very clearly shewn from
fact and observation, when we come to
speak of the barbarous languages; and ma-
ny abstractions which were not at all made
at first, come afterwards to be made, till
at last the idea ripens into that *perfect idea*
which is the object of science. Even in
our present state, we are daily forming
new ideas, or making more perfect those
we have already formed, in proportion as
we advance in knowledge. For every man
that learns any art or science, acquires i-
deas that he had not before. Thus a man
who studies geometry, gets the ideas of
figures which he had not before; such as,

C. 12. *a rhombus, a rhomboid, a paralellopped, &c.*
And of the figures which he knew, he learns to distinguish species which before he did not attend to; such as, *equilateral, isosceles, and scalene* triangles, and the like. And as we advance in this and other sciences, we learn to correct our former ideas, and to acquire new and more perfect ones*. But setting aside philosophy and science, how many ideas has any common artist, that a man not skilled in the art never dreamed of, and which he has to learn if he studies the art? How then can we sup-

* *Geometry* affords a very remarkable instance of this in the doctrine of *proportions*. After having learned that doctrine in the common way in which it is taught in our schools, if we study the 5th book of *Euclid*, we there learn an idea of proportion altogether new, and much more general and comprehensive, including *incommensurables* as well as *commensurables*. This idea will appear to the young geometer so new and strange, that he will find it difficult to apprehend it, and more difficult still to make it familiar to him; and before he perfectly understands it, and sees the consequences of it, he may be disposed to reject it, as some modern smatterers in geometry have done. The same thing happens in other sciences, and in every branch of philosophy, till we come up to the *highest* philosophy, or *science of sciences*, as it may be called; where we find ideas that many persons are by nature incapable of forming, because they require a power of abstraction which few persons are possessed of.

pose,

pose, that a thing in which there is such C. 12.
progress, correction, and amendment, is
a natural operation? or how can we doubt,
that men acquired ideas at first, in the
same manner as we acquire them now?
only with much more labour and difficul-
ty, and with much less accuracy, no
doubt, as being unpractised in the art of
thinking.

If, indeed, we were not so much crea-
tures of artificial habit as it appears we
are, it might be doubted, whether this
faculty, as well as others, was not from
nature. But the account I have given of
human nature clearly shews, that it is al-
most wholly composed of artificial habits;
and that even the perceptions of sense,
which one should think were natural, if
any thing belonging to us was so, are, for
the greater part, the result of acquired
habit. In *seeing*, for example, we *natural-*
ly perceive no distance, and see the object
inverted, double, and of no greater mag-
nitude than the picture upon the bottom
of our eye: so that we see objects as we
now see them, only by habits of *judging*
acquired from experience and observation;
without which, that most useful sense
would

C. 12. would hardly be of any use at all*. What reason, then, can we have to doubt, that our ideas, which are so much farther removed from sense and matter, are not the work of nature; and that there is nothing from that source, except the bare impulses of external objects upon our organs of sense, conveyed to the mind in some way that we cannot explain?

If any doubt upon this subject could remain, it appears to be entirely removed, by considering what I have so much laboured to establish, namely, that the ideas even of external objects are altogether the operation of mind. The body, therefore, and its faculties, are in this argument entirely out of the question. So that we are not to inquire what faculties belong to the body, or at what time of life they are most perfect. Such inquiry might be very proper, if the question were

* This is a discovery of *modern* philosophy, which was unknown to *Aristotle*: for he reckons *seeing* among those things which we do entirely by *nature*, not by *custom*. Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκῶσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν· ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, ὃ ἔχρησάμενοι ἔχομεν. *Eth. Nicom. lib. 2 cap. 1.*; whereas it appears to be, at least for the greater part, *what we learn to do by doing*.

concerning

concerning the perceptions of sense; but C. 12.
it has nothing to do with this question
concerning ideas; in forming which the
mind singly is employed. The only que-
stion, therefore, is, What influence the
growth of the body has upon the mind?
When the mind is to operate by the as-
sistance of the body, it is evident that it
will have a great deal, and that the mind
will perform such operations much better,
when the body has come to maturity, and
the man has got the perfect use of all his
senses. But how can the mind be there-
by assisted in those operations which it
performs by itself? It may be said, that
during the time in which the body is
growing, the mind improves by expe-
rience and observation; and I am persua-
ded it does so. It learns in that way, as
we have seen, the use of the senses; and
if it is admitted, that it learns in the same
way to form ideas, there is an end of the
question. But the hypothesis I am com-
bating is, that men do not learn to *think*
by degrees, and from practice and expe-
rience, as they learn to *see*; but that, all
at once, when we come to a certain age,
intellect breaks out, like an animal out of

C. 12. its shell; and the mind, though conversant before with material forms only, is instantly enabled to lay aside the use of its instruments of perception, the senses, to *disembody*, if I may so speak, the *form*, and to contemplate the idea pure and unmixed. This hypothesis, when attentively considered, is really wild and phantastical, and altogether unsupported either by theory or fact.

The only way in which ideas could be conceived to be from nature, is to suppose, that they are formed by what we call *instinct*; which is an inward principle in animals, moving them to perform certain actions. But I say, *imo*, That the operations of instinct, being from nature, are *involuntary*; for they are not from the mind itself, but are certain determinations or dispositions of the mind to act, not proceeding from choice or deliberation, but impressed upon it by the author of nature for certain purposes. Whereas the forming of ideas is a *voluntary* act of the mind; by which, from certain motives, which shall hereafter be explained, the mind is induced to study the nature of things, to observe what is common to *the many*, what peculiar to the *individual*; and
in

in that way to form notions and ideas. C. 12.

But, *2do*, Let us consider for what purposes instinct is given to animals. For this we are to seek among the brutes, in whom it is still the governing principle, as I admit it was once in our species. Now among them, instinct serves no other purpose than to direct to what is necessary for the preservation of the individual, or the continuation of the species; nor is there the least reason to believe, that it ever served any other purpose among us. Now we are sure, from the example of the brutes, that ideas are not necessary for either of these purposes. Arts, indeed, may be necessary; and accordingly some brutes have the practice of certain arts, such as *weaving* and *building*. They have not, however, ideas, but are directed to the practice of those arts by that superior impulse above mentioned: and indeed it is impossible to conceive how ideas by themselves, without arts, can be either necessary or useful for the preservation of the animal life in the individual, or the continuation of it in the species. Instinct, therefore, would not have answered its end, if it had bestowed upon us *ideas*,

C. 12. without giving us at the same time *arts*; which it is certain it has not done: for there is no dividing the matter, or stopping betwixt the two; but we must say, either that nature has given us both ideas and arts, or that she has given us neither.

It may be thought by some, that we have from *instinct* a love for knowledge, and that this would be a sufficient motive to excite the mind when we come to maturity, to study the nature of things, and to form ideas. And in support of this hypothesis, great authorities from philosophers might be quoted, to prove, that the desire of knowledge is natural to man*.

But I answer, *imo*, That this is using the term *instinct* in a sense very different from the common acceptation of it; and if we are to use such freedom with words, we may as well call by that name any motive directing us to any pursuit. But, *2do*, The love of knowledge belongs to

* Μανθάνειν ἔ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἤδισον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως. *Aristot. Poet. cap. 4.* And he assigns this as one of the natural causes why *poetry*, and the other *arts of imitation*, please us so much.

the rational nature alone; of which only C. 12.
those philosophers must be understood to
speak: for the mind, as soon as it comes
to feel its own vigour, and to exert its
power of contemplation, is delighted with
the exercise of this its noblest faculty; and
if it attains to any degree of perfection in
such exercise, is infinitely more delighted
with it than with any thing else. But the
question here is, How our nature *becomes*
rational, and how we first get that taste
of knowledge, of which we are afterwards
so fond? Till that happens, we can have
no desire of it; for, according to the com-
mon saying, *Ignoti nulla cupido*. And ac-
cordingly we observe, that the most bar-
barous nations, that is, those who are
nearest the original state we speak of, shew
no desire of knowledge at all; which is
one, among other reasons, that makes
them pass among us for animals quite stu-
pid and insensible, and little better than
idiots.

If then ideas are not from instinct, they
cannot be from nature in any other way
than as other natural operations are, such
as breathing and digestion. But this is
too absurd to be maintained. It remains,
therefore,

C. 12. therefore, that they must be from what I call *acquired habit*. Now this habit is acquired by frequently doing the thing. If in this practice we have the assistance of a master, or if, without being taught, we have any pattern that we can imitate, we learn much faster. But even without such assistance, by practice merely, and by observing what is done wrong, and correcting it, and so becoming our own masters, we learn at last to do the thing: and thus the habit is formed by similar or homogeneous energies, as Mr Harris has expressed it, that is, by doing the thing, we learn to do it *. And in this way men have learned to build, and to weave, and to practise other arts; and, among other things, to form ideas.

If it be objected, That it is impossible to do any thing before we have learned to do it, and that therefore we cannot learn to do any thing by doing it; the answer is, That we must have from nature the faculty of doing something of the kind, though very imperfectly; and upon that founda-

* "Α γὰρ δὲ μαθόντες ποιεῖν, τὰυτα ποιῶντες μαθάνομεν, ὅιον οἰκοδομῶντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται, καὶ καθαρίζοντες καθαρισαί. *Ethic. Nichomach. lib. 2. cap. 1.*

tion going on, we learn at last to do the thing as it should be done *. Thus a man could never learn to build, if he had not from nature the faculty of laying a stone; nor to weave, if he could not stretch out and arrange threads; nor to speak, if he had not organs for that purpose from nature, and could not move those organs, and put them in certain positions. In like manner, we could not form ideas, if we had not sense and memory; and, besides these, the faculty of separating things that are joined in nature, and of comparing two or more things together. This separation, and this comparison, will at first be very clumsily performed, like the rudiments and first beginnings of all arts. Things, for example, will not be sufficiently separated or sifted, but taken together, as it were, in great lumps; and the comparisons will be inaccurately made; so that similitudes will be observed which do not exist, and many will be overlook-

C. 12.

* This objection was made by the *Sophists* in the days of Aristotle, as appears from his *Metaphysics*, lib. 9. cap. 8.; where it is answered very shortly, and indeed but in a word, according to the manner of Aristotle in his *Esoteric works*; but I think in the same way that I have answered it.

C. 12. ed that do exist. In this way, the ideas at first will be exceedingly imperfect, and hardly deserving the name. But the practice being constantly continued, they will be improved by degrees, till they come to be good enough for the ordinary purposes of life, and at last so perfect, as to be fit for the objects of science.

And thus, I think, I have proved, that the ideas of the objects of sense, as well as those of the operations of our own mind, are not from nature, but acquired; and if I shall be able to shew, from facts and examples, by what degrees they have been acquired, as I hope I shall in the sequel, the evidence I think must be allowed to be complete; for then the proposition will be proved, both *a priori* and *a posteriori*; that is, from fact as well as from theory.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIII.

Conclusion of the subject of Ideas. — General view of Human Nature, and the rank it possesses in the scale of Being, — compared with Superior Natures.

I Cannot conclude this subject, without C. 13.
 taking a general view of human nature, according to the account that I have given of it; which, I am persuaded, will be found agreeable to the general analogy of nature: for it seems to be a law of nature, that no species of thing is formed at once, but by steps and progression from one stage to another. Thus naturalists observe several different appearances betwixt the *seed* and the *vegetable*, the *embryo* and the *animal*. The *principles of body in general*, are, *points*, *lines*, and *surfaces*, which are not *body* *; and of *number*, the *monad*, and *duad*,

* It is in this way that the antient *Sceptics* argued against the principles of *geometry*. What is a *point*? said they: Is it *body*? or is it *spirit*? And if it be neither one nor t'other, it has no existence at all. The answer

C. 13. *duad*, which are not *numbers*; and in general, the *elements* of things are different from the *things themselves*. There is the same progress, according to my hypothesis, in the formation of *man*, and the same distinction betwixt the *elements* of this species, and the *species* itself. The progress of his body I am not concerned with at present: but with respect to the mind, the first observable step in its progress is sensation, or perception by sense; but even before we arrive at that, there is a progress, though not commonly observed. For, as we have seen, *sense* is very imperfect at first; and it is only in process of time that this primary faculty, of all others the most natural, becomes complete. Next in order comes the faculty by which those perceptions, otherwise fleeting and transitory, are retained in the mind; for I am persuaded it is not so early as sensation, and therefore does not exist at all in new-born infants, nor perhaps for some considerable time after the

is, That though it be not *body*, and much less *spirit*, it is the *element* of body. See *Sextus Empiricus adversus geomet.*

birth.

birth. This retentive faculty is of two kinds ; or perhaps only assumes two different names, according to the different ways in which it retains the sensations : for if they are there *painted*, (to use a metaphor of Plato *), it is called *fancy*, or *imagination* ;

C. 13.

* The passage is in the *Philebus*, p. 388. edit. Ficini.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς τὸ αὐτὸν, καὶ κείνη ἃ περὶ ταῦτα ἐστὶ τὰ παθήματα, φαίνονται μοι σχεδὸν οἷον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους κ τ λ. — ΠΡΩ. Πάνυ μὲν ἔν δοκέ μοι, καὶ ἀποδέχομαι τὰ ρηθέντα ὑπὸ. ΣΩ. Ἀποδέχου δὴ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ γιγνομένου. ΠΡΩ. Τίνα ; ΣΩ. Ζωγράφον, ὅς μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν, τῶν λεγομένων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶντων γράφει. ΠΡΩ. Πῶς δὴ τῶτον αὖ καὶ πότε λέγωμεν ; ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἀπ' ὀφθαλμοῦ ἢ τινος ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως τὰ τότε δοξαζόμενα καὶ λεγόμενα ἀπαγαγὼν τις, τὰς τῶν δοξασθέντων καὶ λεχθέντων εἰκόνας ἐν αὐτῷ ὁρᾷ πως.

This is well said, but shortly said, and only by way of *metaphor* or *similitude* ; which is one great fault that Aristotle finds with his master. For, says he, he does not tell us *what* a thing is, but *what* it is *like*. But even Aristotle himself does not satisfy me entirely by what he has said upon this subject, though he has taken a good deal of pains upon it in his books *De Anima et de Memoria*. The reader, if he is not satisfied neither, may content himself with the following observations, till he shall find something better.

Memory and imagination (considering them as different faculties) agree in this, that they are both subsequent to sense, and prior to reason and intellect ; 2dly, they both preserve in the mind the perceptions brought into it by the senses, which would be transitory and evanescent, if it were not for the aid of these two faculties. But they differ in the following particulars.

C. 13. *imagination*; but if they are only *written*, that is, simply preserved, without colour or

1mo, Memory, as Aristotle has observed, always refers to what the mind formerly perceived or knew; whereas the imagination only presents the object to the mind, but without any reference to the past, except it be accompanied with memory, which it is not always; for imagination so far resembles sense more than memory, that it represents the object as present, and affects the mind nearly in the same way as if it were present; and from thence is called, by some antient philosophers, a *weaker sensation*.

2do, The imagination preserves in the mind the perceptions of sense only; whereas the memory retains not only these, but also ideas, and theorems, or propositions.

3tio, The image of the object preserved in the memory is not near so lively and strong, as that which is presented to the mind by the imagination: for we often remember things in general only; or if we remember also the particular circumstances, they do not affect us near so much as the original perception of them by the senses; whereas imagination paints them, as I have said, and exhibits them to the mind with all the colourings, and all the peculiarities, with which they appear to the senses, and with very near as much emotion as they at first produced. The consequence of this is, that having seen any object of the agreeable or disagreeable kind, if I have a good memory only, I can give a particular description of it, which will be very well understood, but such as will not much affect the hearer: but if I have the eye and imagination of a painter or a poet, I can describe the object in so lively a manner, that it will produce in the hearer
very


or shape, it is called *memory*. And thus C. 13.
sensation, memory, and imagination, to-
gether

very nearly the same emotions that it produced in me when I first saw it.

4th, This lively painting of the imagination, and the emotions which it produces in the mind, of joy, grief, terror, or whatever other passion was excited by the object itself, have a very great effect upon the happiness or misery of our lives; so that the man possessed of such an imagination, must necessarily be more happy or more miserable than other men.

5th, The imagination has not only the power of retention, as well as memory, but it has a *creative* power, which is peculiar to it, and distinguishes it essentially both from sense and memory: for sense is only conversant with the present, memory with the past; whereas imagination, by the means of this faculty, is conversant with the future as well as the past, and paints to itself scenes that never did exist, and it is likely never will; for it may be said to create even the materials of those scenes, being such as are not directly and immediately furnished by the sense, but are formed upon the model of objects that have been presented by the sense, and are, as it were, imitations of them.

This is that great work of imagination, which is the foundation of all *the fine arts*, and stamps men truly *poets*, or *makers*. By this faculty we are enabled to exhibit scenes both of natural and human things, which, though they are far beyond real life and nature, are nevertheless *natural*; because they are imitated from things that have really existed. I say, *imitated*; for if they are servilely copied, it is not poetry or painting, but history or portrait-

C. 13.  gether with certain natural appetites and desires, complete the *animal*. Next in order

portrait-drawing. And it is for this reason that those *fine arts* are very properly called *arts of imitation*.

As the imagination is often joined with memory, as we have already observed; so it is very frequently accompanied with *opinion*, particularly with respect to those pictures of futurity which the imagination presents to the mind; for we often believe that the things are really to happen. And this has likewise a great effect with respect to the happiness or misery of life: for if the events which we suppose are to happen, are of the joyful and prosperous kind, we have all the pleasures of hope, which makes a man of a warm lively imagination happier while it lasts, than the actual enjoyment would do. But what he hopes for may never happen, and then he suffers the pain of disappointment; which, in some cases, is so insufferable, that men rather chuse to go out of life than endure it: or he may obtain the object of his hopes and wishes; but it may not, and in fact it very seldom does, answer his expectations; and *there* is another disappointment, often more cruel than the first. — If, on the other hand, the events I believe will happen are of the unprosperous kind, the fear of them must make me very unhappy; and if they are strongly painted on my imagination, and appear unavoidable, they make me as unhappy, perhaps more unhappy, than if they were actually present, and, by anticipation, reduce me to that state of mind, which is well known by the name of *despair*. If such belief is taken up rashly, and without sufficient grounds, it is the effect of a melancholy and gloomy turn of mind; which sometimes makes men miserable in the greatest seeming prosperity.

Further, we may suppose the picture of those fairy scenes

der comes the *comparative*, or rational faculty, by which we become *men*, or ratio-

C. 13.


scenes by the imagination so very lively, that, instead of believing the things *will happen*, we think they *have already happened*. Thus a man believes himself to be a king, or to be possessed of great wealth and power, who perhaps is a beggar; and he acts accordingly. This state of the imagination is what we call *madness*. But if the person does not go so far as to believe himself actually possessed of those things he desires, but only believes, upon very slight grounds, or no grounds at all, that he is to be possessed of them, such a man, in common language, is called a *fool*. So that, according to this account, madness is a disease of the imagination; folly an error of the judgement. As to the first, there is little difference of opinion betwixt the vulgar and the philosopher; but as to the last there is a very great difference. For those errors in judgement, which make us esteem wealth, and power, and luxury, the greatest blessings in life, and pursue them accordingly, are, by the philosopher, held to be the greatest folly. But, on the contrary, the vulgar hold, that there is no error at all in the case; that such pursuits are rational; and whoever succeeds in them they esteem a wise man.

To conclude this note, which has drawn out to too great a length, it thus appears that the mind operates in two very different ways upon the materials which sense brings into it. For, either it abstracts from them ideas, which serve for the materials of science, when thoroughly purged and refined from matter; or it forms representations and pictures of them, which, properly chosen, and well painted, make the subjects of the most delightful arts among men.

nal

C. 13.

nal creatures ; and the first exercise of reason is *opinion* * : and, last of all, out of sense, memory, imagination, reason, and opinion, is produced, by very slow degrees, as I imagine, that best faculty of the human mind, and which therefore, in the common course of nature, ought to come last, I mean *intellect*, from which is derived science. And thus *man* is completed, and brought to the perfection of his nature.

This is *the scale of being*, rising by proper gradations, from mere *matter* and *sense* to *intellect*, through the medium of *memory*, *imagination*, and *opinion*. Some animals appear to have only *sense*, such as muscles, and other shell-fish. There are others that never attain even to *sense* in any degree of perfection, but fill up the interval betwixt the *vegetable* and *animal*, participating something of the nature of each, from which they have the name of *Zoöphytes*. Other animals, besides *sense*, have *memory* and *imagination* ; and some perhaps only *one* of these two ; but man being a

* Man, in this state, is very properly called by Polybius
ζῶον δοξολητικόν.

little world, as the antients called him, C. 13.
has in his frame a portion of every thing
to be found in *nature*. He has in his body
all the elements of which the *inanimate*
world is composed; he has the growth and
nutrition of the *vegetable*; and he has sense,
memory, and imagination, belonging to
the *animal* life; and, last of all, he acquires
reason and intellect. Thus is man formed,
not however at once, but by degrees, and
in succession: for he appears at first to be
little more than a mere vegetable, hardly
deserving the name of a *Zoöphyte*; then
he gets sense, but sense only, so that he is
yet little better than a muscle; then he be-
comes an animal of a more complete kind;
then a rational creature; and finally a
man of intellect and science, which is the
summit and completion of our nature.

From this point of view let us try if we
can discern the difference betwixt us and
higher intelligences. *We* begin with *mat-*
ter and *material objects*, and through *parti-*
culars and *individuals* investigate *generals*.
They (so far as we can conceive of their
operations) proceed in a method directly
opposite to this: for, beginning with *ge-*
nerals, they through them recognise *parti-*

C. 13. *culars.* In this way we too proceed, after we have attained to intellect and science; but with this difference, that those more perfect minds see the particulars in the generals *intuitively*; whereas we for the greater part are obliged to *investigate* them, and find them out by *circuit* and *collection*. If it were otherwise, and that in the *universals* we could see at once the several *subordinate specieses*, and their several properties, connections, and dependencies, we should then indeed be *divine* intelligences, and be ranked with beings of superior order. But, if we cannot be *gods*, let us continue *men*, and not be degraded to *brutes*, by being stripped of that prerogative which chiefly distinguishes us from them, I mean *intellect*.

CHAP.

C H A P. XIV.

That Articulation is not natural to Man.

WE are now to descend from those high speculations concerning ideas which constitute the *form* of language, to sounds, which are the *matter* of it. And though I may have failed in my endeavours to convince the reader, that the operation of abstracting the perceptions of sense, and forming of them generals and universals, (for as to ideas of reflection I think there can be no doubt), is not performed by any natural instinct, but has arisen, like the arts that are founded upon it, from experience and observation, and by use has been formed into habit; I cannot doubt but that I shall convince every one who will think it worth his while to read what follows, that articulation is altogether the work of art, at least of a habit acquired by custom and exercise, and that we are truly by nature the *mutum pecus* that Horace makes us to be. This I think I am

C. 14.
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C. 14. able to prove, both from theory and facts. I will begin with the facts which will serve to explain my theory.

It is a clear case, that we do not speak in that state which, of all others, best deserves the appellation of *natural*, I mean when we are born, nor for a considerable time after; and even then we learn but slowly, and with a great deal of labour and difficulty. About the same time also we begin to form ideas. But the same answer, I know, is made to serve for both; namely, That our minds, as well as our bodily organs, are then weak, and therefore are unable to perform several of their natural functions; but as soon as they become strong and confirmed by age, then we both think and speak. That this is not true with respect to *thinking*, I have already endeavoured to show; and with respect to *speaking*, I say, in the first place, that of all those savages which have been caught in different parts of Europe \*, not one had the use of

\* See an account of them in Rousseau's treatise *sur l'inégalité des hommes*, note 3. The first of these savages was caught near Hesse-Cassel in 1344, and was taught to speak. Another was found in the forests of Lithuania in



of speech, though they had all the organs of pronunciation such as we have them, and the understanding of a man, at least as much as was possible, when it is considered, that their minds were not cultivated by any kind of conversation or intercourse with their own species; nor had they come the length, according to my hypothesis, of forming ideas, or thinking at all. One of these was caught in the woods of Hano-

C. 14.

in the year 1694. He too was mute when he was found; and whether he ever learned to speak, does not appear. In 1719, two savages were found in the Pyrenæan mountains; and the Hanoverian savage was caught and brought to England in the reign of George I. All these, when they were first caught, were not only mute, that is, had no articulation, but appeared to be truly quadrupeds; and the first mentioned, our author says, was taught with much difficulty to walk upright. When we join to this a fact which Mons. Rousseau likewise avers, that the children of the Hottentots and Caribbees walk so long upon their hands, that they are with much difficulty taught to walk upright, it would seem that we must add to man's other acquired habits his quality of *biped*, which has been always thought an essential part of his original nature, and accordingly is made part of some definitions of him. But Aristotle knew better; for all that he has said is, that by nature man is *more* a biped than any other animal, — *μαλιστα γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ διπύς*. *De animalium incessu*, cap. 5. The meaning of which I take to be, that he has by nature a greater aptitude to acquire the habit of walking *on two* than any other animal. And Mons. Rousseau's arguments in support of his natural erectness appear to me to prove no more.

ver



C. 14.

ver as late as the reign of George I. and for any thing I know is yet alive ; at least I am sure he was so some years ago. He was a man in mind as well as body, as I have been informed by a person who lived for a considerable time in the neighbourhood of a farmer's house where he was kept, and had an opportunity of seeing him almost every day ; not an idiot, as he has been represented by some who cannot make allowance for the difference that education makes upon mens minds ; yet he was not only mute when first caught, but he never learned to speak, though at the time the gentleman from whom I have my information saw him, he had been above thirty years in England.

Further, not only solitary savages, but a whole nation, if I may call them so, have been found without the use of speech. This is the case of the Ouran Outangs that are found in the kingdom of Angola in Africa, and in several parts of Asia. They are exactly of the human form ; walking erect, not upon all-four, like the savages that have been found in Europe ; they use sticks for weapons ; they live in society ; they make huts of branches of trees, and they



they carry off negroe girls, whom they C. 14.  
make slaves of, and use both for work and  
pleasure. These facts are related of them  
by Monf. Buffon in his natural history:  
and I was further told by a gentleman  
who had been in Angola, that there were  
some of them seven feet high, and that  
the negroes were extremely afraid of them;  
for when they did any mischief to the Ou-  
ran Outangs, they were sure to be heartily  
cudgelled when they were caught. But  
though from the particulars above men-  
tioned it appears certain, that they are of  
our species, and though they have made  
some progress in the arts of life, they have  
not come the length of language; and ac-  
cordingly none of them that have been  
brought to Europe could speak, and what  
seems strange, never learned to speak. I  
myself saw at Paris one of them, whose  
skin was stuffed, standing upon a shelf in  
the King's cabinet of natural curiosities.  
He had exactly the shape and features of a  
man; and particularly I was informed,  
that he had organs of pronunciation as  
perfect as we have. He lived several years  
at Versailles, and died by drinking spi-  
rits. He had as much of the understand-  
ing



C. 14. ing of a man as could be expected from his education, and performed many little offices to the lady with whom he lived ; but never learned to speak. I was well informed too, of one of them belonging to a French gentleman in India, who used to go to market for him, but was likewise mute \*.

Further, to shew the difficulty of pronunciation, the fact is most certain, that those who have been accustomed to speak all their lives, cannot without the greatest labour and pains learn to pronounce sounds that they have not been accustomed to. Thus a Frenchman that has not been taught English early in his youth, can hardly ever learn to pronounce the aspirated *t*, that is, the *th*; and an Englishman cannot pronounce the aspirated *K*, or *x* of the Greeks, which we in Scot-

\* *Monf. Rousseau*, in his work above quoted, *note 10.* has collected the several accounts given of this animal by travellers, and agrees with me in opinion, that he belongs to our species ; rejecting with great contempt the notion of those who think that speech is natural to man. Now if we get over that prejudice, and do not insist, that other arts of life, which the Ouran Outangs want, are likewise natural to man, it is impossible we can refuse them the appellation of *men*.



land pronounce with the greatest ease. And C. 14.  
the Baron Hontan, who travelled so much  
in North America, tells us, that he spent  
four days to no purpose in trying to teach  
a Huron to pronounce the labial conso-  
nants *b*, *p*, and *m*, which we reckon so  
easy, and which are among the first con-  
sonants that our children pronounce; the  
reason of which was, that the Hurons  
have no such consonants in their lan-  
guage.

But what puts the matter out of all  
doubt in my apprehension, is the case  
of deaf persons among us. And their  
case deserves to be the more attentively  
considered, that they are precisely in the  
condition in which we suppose men to  
have been in the natural state. For, like  
them, they have the organs of pronun-  
ciation; and, like them too, they have  
inarticulate cries, by which they express  
their wants and desires. They have like-  
wise, by constant intercourse with men who  
have the use of reason, and who converse  
with them in their way, acquired the ha-  
bit of forming ideas; which we must also  
suppose the savage to have acquired, tho'  
with infinitely more labour, before he



C. 14. could have a language to express them. They want therefore nothing in order to speak, but instruction or example, which the savages who invented the first languages likewise wanted. In this situation, do they invent a language when they come to perfect age, as it is supposed we all should do if we had not learnt one in our infancy? or do they ever come to speak during their whole lives? The fact most certainly is, that they never do; but continue to communicate their thoughts by looks and gestures, which we call *signs*, unless they be taught to articulate by an art lately invented.

The inventor of this wonderful art, which, I think, does honour to modern times, was Dr John Wallis, one of the first members of the Royal Society, and a most ingenious, as well as learned man. He has written an excellent English grammar, which was reprinted in 1765, and subjoined to it is a letter of the author to one Beverly, wherein he gives an account of this art which he had invented, and mentions two persons upon whom he had practised it with success. I knew two professors of the art in Paris, one of them

*Monsr.*



*Mons. l'Abbé de l'Epée*, with whom I was C. 14.  
several times, and whose civility, and the  
trouble he took to shew me his method of  
teaching, I take this opportunity of ac-  
knowledging. He had brought some of  
his scholars a surprising length; and one  
of them I particularly remember, a girl,  
who spoke so pleasantly that I should not  
have known her to be deaf.—There is at  
present in Edinburgh a professor of the  
same art, Mr Braidwood, whom I know,  
and who has likewise been at the trouble  
of shewing me his method of teaching; of  
which I very much approve. He has  
taught many with great success; and there  
is one of his scholars particularly who is  
presently carrying on the business of a  
painter in London, and who both speaks  
and writes good English. But it is sur-  
prising what labour it costs him to teach,  
and his scholars to learn: which puts it  
out of all doubt, that articulation is not  
only an art, but an art of most difficult  
acquisition, otherwise than by imitation,  
and constant practice, from our earliest  
years. For, in the first place, it is diffi-  
cult to teach those scholars to make any  
sound at all. They at first only breathe  
Z 2 strongly,



C. 14. strongly, till they are taught to make that concussion and tremulous motion of the windpipe which produces audible sounds. These are very harsh, low, and guttural, at first, and more like croaking than a clear vocal sound; which I think will account for what *Monf. la Condamine* tells us of the strange method of speaking of a people he found upon the banks of the river Amazons; for the sound of their language was so low, and so much inward, more resembling muttering than speaking, that he imagined they spoke by drawing in their breath: and a girl whom I myself saw in France, that had been caught wild in the woods of Champagne\*, when she shewed me how the language of her country was

\* There was an account of this strange phenomenon published in France by a lady, under the title, *Histoire d'une Fille Sauvage*, and revised by *Monf. la Condamine*. It was translated into English, and published in Edinburgh in 1767, with a preface, shewing it to be very probable, that she came from a country upon the coast of Hudson's bay, where she was taken, and carried to one of the French islands in the West Indies; from whence she was again embarked, and the ship was wrecked somewhere on the coast of France or Flanders; and it appears, that only she and a negro girl escaped by swimming. At the time I saw her, she had been thirty years in France, but remembered many particulars concerning her own country.

spoken,



spoken, made a low muttering sound in her throat, in which I could hardly distinguish any articulation! After this difficulty, which is not small, is got over, then comes the chief labour, to teach them the pronunciation of the several letters; in doing which, the teacher is obliged, not only himself to use many distortions and grimaces in order to shew his scholars the positions and actions of the several organs, but likewise to employ his hands to place and move their organs properly; while the scholars themselves labour so much, and bestow such pains and attention, that I am really surpris'd, that, with all the desire they have to learn, which is very great, they should be able to support the drudgery. And I am assured by Mr Braidwood, that if he did not take different methods with them, according to their different capacities, and the difference of their organs, it would be impossible to teach many of them. And this very well accounts for what seems so strange at first, that those Ouran Outangs that have been brought from Africa or Asia, and many of those solitary savages that have been catch'd in Europe, never learned to speak, tho' they

C. 14.



C. 14. they had the organs of pronunciation as perfect as we: for, as it is well known, savages are very indolent, at least with respect to any exercise of the mind, and are hardly excited to action by any curiosity, or desire of learning.

If, therefore, this art be so difficult to be learned without imitation, even by the assistance of the most diligent instruction, how much more difficult must the invention of it have been; that is, the acquiring of it without either instruction or example?

Having thus proved the fact, as I think, incontestably, it will not be difficult to assign the reasons, and explain the theory. For we need only consider with a little attention the mechanism of speech, and we shall soon find, that there is required for speaking certain positions and motions of the organs of the mouth, such as, the tongue, the teeth, lips, and palate, that cannot be from nature, but must be the effect of art: for their action, when they are employed in the enunciation of speech, is so different from their natural and quiescent situation, that nothing but long use and exercise could have taught us to employ them in that



that way. To explain this more particularly I think is not necessary for my present purpose. I shall have occasion to say more of it afterwards ; but who would desire in the mean time to be better informed about it, may consult Dionysius the Halicarnassian, in his treatise of Composition, where he has most accurately explained the different operations of the organs in the pronunciation of the different letters. And whoever would desire to be still better informed, let him attend Mr Braidwood when he teaches, who, from his practice in that way, has learned to know more of the mechanism of language than any grammarian or philosopher.

C. 14.

I shall only say further on this subject, that pronunciation is one of those arts of which the instruments are the members of the human body ; like dancing, and another art more akin to this, I mean singing : and like those arts it is learned, either by mere imitation, man being, as Aristotle has told us, the most imitative of all animals ; or by teaching, as in the case of deaf men ; but joined with very constant and assiduous practice, that being absolutely necessary for the acquiring  
of



C. 14. of any art, in whichever of the two ways it is learned.

And here we may observe, that it is a very false conclusion, to infer, from the facility of doing any thing, that it is a natural operation. For what is it that we do more easily and readily than speaking? and yet we see it is an art that is not to be taught without the greatest labour and difficulty, both on the part of the master and the scholar; nor to be learned by imitation, without continual practice, from our infancy upwards. For it is not to be learned, like other arts, such as dancing and finging, by practising an hour or two a-day, for a few years, or perhaps only some months; but constant and uninterrupted practice is required for many years, and for every hour, I may say, every minute of the day. And even after it is learned with so much trouble and pains, it may, like other acquired habits, be lost by disuse: of which I mentioned a remarkable instance before, in a boy, who did not lose his hearing till he was after eight years old, and had learned, not only to speak perfectly, but to read; and yet, when he came to be taught by Mr Braidwood,



wood, which was at the age of five and twenty, he had absolutely lost the use of speech, and had it to learn as much as any of his scholars. So that we need not doubt of what we are told of Alexander Selkirk, who was but three years in the desert island of Juan Fernandez ; and yet during that short time he had lost the use of speech so much as to be hardly intelligible to those who found him there. They therefore who, from the facility of a performance, conclude, that it is not a work of art, but of nature, do not sufficiently consider how much of artificial habit there is in our natures, in the state we are in at present, and that in this chiefly we differ from other animals ; that the most of them, I mean such as are wild, are altogether creatures of nature ; and even such of them as we have tamed, and assimilated in some degree to ourselves, have still much more of nature in them than of art. Whereas a civilized man is so much more a creature of art than of nature, that his natural habits are almost lost in his artificial.

I will make another observation before I conclude this article. If it had not been




C. 14. for this new-invented art of teaching deaf persons to speak, hardly any body would have believed that the material or mechanical part of language was learned with so much difficulty. But if we could get an Ouran Outang, or a mute savage, such as he above mentioned, that was caught in the woods of Hanover, and would take the same pains to teach him to think that Mr Braidwood takes to teach his scholars to speak, we should soon be convinced, that the formal part of language was as difficult to be learned as the material. For my own part, I am fully persuaded, that the minds of men laboured as much at first, when they formed abstract ideas, as their organs of pronunciation did when they formed articulate sounds; and till the mind is stored with ideas, it is a perfect void, and in a kind of lethargy, out of which it is roused, only by external objects of sense, or calls of appetite from within. It was this want of ideas which made the Hanoverian savage pass, in the opinion of many, for an idiot; and it accounts for that brutish insensibility in a nation of which Diodorus Siculus, in his  
third



third book \*, has given us an account. C. 14.  
They were situated upon the coast of the Indian ocean, beyond the straits which join that ocean to the Arabian gulf. Pto- lomy king of Egypt, the third of that name, having heard, he says, much of their brutishness and stupidity, had the curiosity to send one of his friends to bring him an account of them; who accordingly went, properly attended, and brought back to the king a report, which in substance amounted to this: That they neither desired the company of strangers, nor shunned it: That no appearance, however strange, seemed to move them, for they kept their eyes always fixt, and never altered their countenance: That when any person advanced upon them with a drawn sword, they did not run away; and they bore all kinds of insults and injuries without shewing the least sign of anger. Nor did those of them who were spectators of such injuries shew any indignation at what they saw their countrymen suffer. He adds, That they carried their insensibility so far, that when

\* cap. 18. edit. Wesseling.



C. 14.  their wives and children were killed in their presence, they were even then unmoved, shewing no signs, either of pity or anger. In short, says he, in the most terrible situations they seemed perfectly tranquil, looking stedfastly at what was doing, and at every event that happened giving a nod with their heads. Thus far Diodorus; and with this account many of the relations of our modern travellers, concerning people living in the lowest state of barbarity, agree. And I know a gentleman who saw in Batavia two savages brought from New Holland, that appeared to him to be perfectly stupid and idiotical, though he had no reason to think that they were more so than the other natives of that country.

BOOK



## B O O K II.

## I N T R O D U C T I O N.

I N the preceding book I have endeavoured to shew, that our ideas of external objects, as well as those of the operations of our own minds, are not the gift of nature. Further, I think I have clearly shewn, that articulation is not the work of nature. From these premisses one of two things must necessarily follow: either that language altogether, the form as well as the matter, is the fruit of human art and industry, as I suppose it to be; or it must have been revealed from heaven. Intr.

Another thing also appears to be evident from what has been said, That if language was invented, it was of very difficult invention: for if, even after it was discovered, it is *learned*, as we have seen, with so much pains and labour, it must have been *invented* with infinitely more. And indeed the difficulty of the invention appears



Intr. appears so very great, that it seems hard to account how it ever happened; and it is the more so, that it must have been among the first arts invented. For one art discovered, naturally leads to another; but the beginning in all things is exceeding difficult: and what makes the difficulty the greater is, that, as Aristotle has observed, all our learning at first is from imitation \*. Children among us do certainly learn in that way; and what is commonly said I believe to be true, that men learned at first to build, from the swallow, or any other bird that makes such an artificial nest; from the spider to weave; and from the birds to sing. This last I have a particular reason to believe to be true, because the wild girl above mentioned, whom I saw in France, told me, the only music of the people of her country was the imitation of the singing of birds; and she affirmed, that she herself could once have imitated the notes of any bird. But this faculty, as well as many others which she possessed in the wild state, she had lost; for it was then,

\* *Poetic. cap. 4.*

when



when I saw her, above thirty years after she was caught. In short, it appears to me, that we resemble very much an American or West-India bird that I have heard of, called the *Mock-bird*, which has no tune of its own, but imitates the notes of any other bird: for we seem to set out in life without any original stock of our own, nor any natural talent besides that faculty of imitation, which nature has bestowed upon us in so high a degree, that Aristotle has denominated man, very properly, the most imitative of all animals. Now while man was learning other arts by imitating the instinct of the brute creation, by what imitation could he learn to speak?

These, and many other considerations that might be mentioned, have induced some learned men that I have known to believe, upon philosophical as well as religious principles, that it exceeded the power of man to invent so wonderful an art; and that therefore it was the gift of God, or of some superior nature\*. This is

\* This appears to have been an opinion as old as the days of *Plato*, who, in his dialogue upon language, I mean the *Cratylus*, p. 291. edit. *Ficini*, tells us, that some,



Intr. is an opinion that I am far from rejecting as absurd, or improbable; nor would I have it believed that I pay no regard to the account given in our sacred books of the origin of our species: but it does not belong to me as a philosopher or grammarian to inquire whether such account is to be understood allegorically, according to the opinions of some divines\*; or literally, and as an historical fact; an inquiry, besides, which I am very ill qualified for, not understanding the original language of those books. But supposing that we are to understand the story in the literal sense, and to suppose the gift of speech to have been once bestowed by God

some, in order to solve the difficulty about the first names or radical words of language, did, as the tragic poets do when they cannot otherwise unravel their fables, bring down a god in a machine to cut the knot.

\* See upon this subject *Burnet's Archaeologia Philosophica*, lib. 2. cap. 7. and the authorities by him there quoted; from which it appears, that it was not only the opinion of the Jews, but of the Christians of the first centuries, that the circumstances related by Moses concerning the origin of man are to be considered as allegorical or parabolical, like the parables in the New Testament, and as many other passages in the Old must be understood. See also two very elegant epistles of the same author annexed to his *Archæology*.


upon



upon man, it may afterwards have been Intr.  
lost. For it is a fact that cannot be ~  
controverted, that in many parts of this  
earth great calamities have befallen the  
human race, by fire or water, plague  
or famine, infomuch that they have been  
either totally destroyed, or very small re-  
mains left, and these scattered and disper-  
sed: so that all arts, and even language  
itself, which cannot be preserved with-  
out social intercourse, were in process of  
time lost among them \*. In this solitary  
state we may suppose them to have been  
for some time, till the males and females,  
by natural instinct, going together, the  
race would increase, and at last become  
numerous enough to herd and associate to-  
gether. Or, without having recourse to  
such extraordinary accidents as the de-

\* See *Plato in Timæo*, in the beginning, where the conversation is related betwixt *Solon* and the *Egyptian priest*, in which, among many calamities that have befallen this earth at different times, by fire and water chiefly, but likewise from many other causes, he mentions particularly the destruction of the Atlantic island, by the subsiding of the earth, and the inundation of the sea, in the same way that a part of the city of Lisbon was lately destroyed.



Intr. struction of whole nations by fire or inundation, we may suppose that those savages above mentioned, which have been found in different parts of Europe, had come together, (and two of them were actually found together in the Pyrenæan mountains), and had multiplied. In such cases we have no warrant to believe, that another miracle would be wrought, and that language would be again revealed; and therefore we are at liberty to suppose it possible, and I say no more, that in process of time they might have invented a language. It will be the subject of this book to shew, how this might have happened, by what steps and degrees, and of what nature the first invented languages probably were.

CHAP.



## C H A P. I.

*Of the connection betwixt Society and Language. — An Inquiry into the Origin of Society necessary.*

THE difficulty of the invention of language must appear so very great to the philosophical reader, that he will not be surpris'd that I have spent so much time, and must still spend more, upon the preliminaries of it. I said in the beginning of the work, that it was an inquiry that would lead me back to the very origin of the human race; and it has so happened. For I could not give the philosophical account I propos'd, of the origin of language, without inquiring into the origin of our ideas. This made it necessary for me to define and divide them, to explain the nature of the two several kinds of them, and to shew how they were formed, without supposing them to be the work of nature. I have thought it proper also, in this disquisition, to state the several opinions of philosophers concerning ideas,

Ch. I.



Ch. 1. and to refute, as well as I was able, the opinion of those who maintain, that we have no *ideas*, but only *perceptions of sense*.

*Tantæ molis erat HUMANAM condere gentem* \*.

But with all this labour we have only made of man a *rational* animal; it remains still to make him a *speaking* animal. For this purpose I hold *society* to be absolutely necessary: for though a solitary savage might in process of time acquire the habit of forming ideas, it is impossible to suppose, that he would invent a method of communicating them, for which he had no occasion. Our subject, therefore, further leads us to inquire into the origin of society; which appears to Mons. Rousseau † to have so necessary a connection with language, that he proposes it as a question to be resolved by the learned, *Which was most necessary, language for the institution of society, or society for the invention of language?* This question I hope I shall be able to solve, by shewing, that so-

\* *Tantæ molis erat Romanam condere gentem.*

VIRG. ÆN. i.

† See his treatise on the inequality of mankind.



ciety must have been first in the order of Ch. I. things; and that, though it was impossible that language could have been invented without society, yet society, and even *civil* society, may have subsisted, perhaps for ages, before language was invented.

This is an extensive subject of inquiry, and belongs to a greater work, which I have long meditated, but probably shall not live to execute, I mean, *The History of Man*. But as my present subject requires that I should say something of it, I will endeavour, in as few words as possible, to explain my notions concerning the beginning of society.

And the first question to be considered upon this subject, as well as with respect to language, is, Whether it had a beginning at all? that is, Whether it be from nature, or of human institution? for there are many who believe that we are naturally a *political*, as well as a *speaking* animal: and indeed there is such a connection betwixt the two, that if it could be shewn that we are by nature *political*, I should think it not improbable that we derived from the same source the gift of speech.

C H A P.



## C H A P. II.

*Division of Animals into Solitary and Gregarious, Political and not Political.—Man to be ranked in neither of those divisions, but in the middle of each of them.—Other Animals of the same amphibious kind.*

Ch. 2. **A**LL animals, says Aristotle, are gregarious, solitary, or betwixt the two; that is, participating of the nature of both, and able to live, either in solitude, or in company, as occasion requires. Again, of the gregarious kind, some are political; that is, carry on together one common work; others have no such bond of union, and live together without any joint stock, or common good of any kind \*. The question is, What place we are

\* The passage is in the first chapter of the first book of *Aristotle's History of Animals*. The words are, τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν (ζῴων) εἰσὶν ἀγελαῖα· τὰ δὲ μοναδικὰ, καὶ πεζὰ, καὶ πτηνὰ, καὶ πλωτὰ· τὰ δὲ ἐπαμφοτερίζει. καὶ τῶν ἀγελαίων καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν τὰ μὲν πολιτικά, τὰ δὲ σποραδικὰ ἐστὶ. Ἀγελαῖα μὲν ὄν, ὅτιον ἐν τοῖς πτηνοῖς τὸ τῶν περιστερῶν γένος, καὶ γέρανος, καὶ κύκνος· γαμφωνύχων δὲ ὅθεν ἀγελαῖον· καὶ τῶν πλωτῶν πολλὰ γένη τῶν ἰχθύων, ὅτιον ὅς καλεῖται δρομάδας, θύννοι, πηλαμίδες,



are to assign to man in these two divisions? Ch. 2.  
 And with respect to the first division Aristotle has decided, that he is by nature  
 neither

λαμίδες, ἄμιαι· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐπαμφοτερίζει. Πολιτικά δὲ ἐστὶ, ὧν ἐν τι καὶ κοινὸν γίνεται πάντων τὸ ἔργον· ὅπερ ἔ πάντα ποιᾷ τὰ ἀγελαῖα. ἔστι δὲ τοιοῦτον, ἄνθρωπος, μέλιττα, σφήξ, μύρμηξ, γέρανός.

Upon this passage there are several observations to be made. In the *first* place, I hold, that an error has crept, either into the MS, or the printed editions, where it is said, that τῶν ἀγελαίων καὶ τῶν μοναδικῶν τὰ μὲν πολιτικά, &c. For it is impossible to conceive, that any of the solitary animals, that is, such as by nature live in solitude, and in solitude only, should be political. It is therefore plain, that the division only relates to the gregarious; so that the text should run thus, τῶν δὲ ἀγελαίων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πολιτικά, τὰ δὲ σποραδικά, where we may observe the great propriety of the word σποραδικά, which denotes, *scattered, like seed that is sown upon the ground*; and therefore very fitly expresses the condition of those animals living together in flocks or herds, but having no common bond of union.

2dly, In this passage Aristotle calls man a *political animal*, and classes him with the bee and ant; from which it may be inferred, that Aristotle understood man to be by *nature* political, not by institution only. But with respect to his applying to him the word πολιτικός, it is to be observed, that those adjectives in -ικός, whether derived from verbs or nouns, signify the *capacity* of doing, without distinction whether the thing to which they are applied have the actual possession of the capacity, or the power only of acquiring it. Thus it may be said of man at the time of his birth, that he is ζῶον θεωρητικόν, as well as when he is grown up, and in possession of the faculty. And in the Peripatetic definition of *man*, he is said to be, ζῶον λογικόν; by which is certainly not meant, that



Ch. 2. neither gregarious nor solitary, but participates of both: and, I think, rightly. For man is allowed by all physiologists to be

that he is rational at the time of his birth, but only has the capacity of becoming so: and Aristotle himself, in his *Categories*, has used the words *δρομικος* and *πυκτικός* to denote him that has no more than a *natural aptitude* for excelling in those exercises, without having acquired the *habit*. See *Ammonius in Categor. p. 135*. It is true, the Greek language is very rich in words, and is plainly the work, not of grammarians only, but of philosophers; yet it has not made all those accurate distinctions and divisions of things which philosophy makes: and accordingly, though it has distinguished betwixt *energy* and *power*, yet it has not distinguished betwixt that kind of power which I call *capability*, and *actual capacity*, or *faculty*; so that Aristotle, as we have seen, was obliged to use the same word (*δυναμις*) to express both, though he has very accurately made the distinction. I hold, therefore, that *ζωον πολιτικον* in this passage denotes only an animal *capable of being political*. And as to his classing man with ants and bees, it must be allowed to be somewhat inaccurate, that he did not there make the distinction betwixt being actually political by nature, and only capable of becoming so: but I think it is almost impossible to believe he thought man naturally political in the same sense that a bee is, when he reckons him, not even of the gregarious kind, but something betwixt them and the solitary.

Lastly, We may observe upon this passage how properly *Theodorus Gaza*, the translator of this part of Aristotle's works, has paraphrased the word *ἐπαμφοτερίζει*, *vitam aliæ (animantes) ancipitem degunt, ut eadem modo societate, modo solitudine, gaudeant*. This *Theodorus Ca-*



be of more various mixture and composition than any other animal known, as we have already seen. He is rational, and he is irrational; he has intellect, and he has not intellect; he is a biped, and he is not a biped; he is a land-animal, and he is a water-animal; and, among other varieties, he is social, and he is not social. In short, he appears to be placed on the

Ch. 2.

za was one of those learned Greeks who fled from the barbarians, after the taking of Constantinople, into Italy; and was employed by the Pope of those times to translate the Greek learning into Latin. For this purpose it was necessary that he, and the rest of his countrymen who were so employed, should first learn the Latin tongue, the knowledge of which was as totally lost in the east, as that of the Greek was in the west. We may judge, therefore, how much we are obliged to the labours of those learned Greeks, who, if they had not submitted to the drudgery of learning Latin, as our boys do at school, (a most ungracious task for men that knew a language so much better, and in which all arts and sciences are to be found in greater perfection than in Latin), could never have taught us Greek. Some of them, as it appears, thought themselves very ill paid for their labours; and it was either this *Theodorus*, or his countryman *Georgius Trapezuntius*, I have forgot which, that having got a purse of gold from one of the popes, which he thought too small a reward for the trouble it had cost him to translate some Greek author, threw it into the river Tiber, with this saying, *Periêre labores; pereat et eorum ingrata merces.* Vid. *Bruckeri Hist. Philosoph.*



Ch. 2. confines betwixt different kinds of beings ; and as the *Zoöphyte* is in the middle betwixt the vegetable and animal, so *man* appears to occupy the space betwixt the several classes of animals.

But in what sense does man participate both of the gregarious and solitary kind ? Aristotle has not explained this : but it is obvious, that in one sense at least he is akin to both ; for as he can live in society, so he can live without it. For not only savages can procure for themselves the means of subsistence in a solitary life, but even men that had been brought up in societies, such as those of Europe, and consequently were in that state of indigence and dependence which is necessarily produced by such an education, have been able, when forced to it, to live by themselves. But further, as by no necessity of his nature he is obliged to live in society, so neither do I think, that by any propensity of his nature he is determined to live in that way more than in the solitary life. And in that respect too I think he is in the middle betwixt the two kinds, and differs from other animals, such as horses, oxen,



oxen, sheep, and deer, which though they can subsist without one another's assistance, yet have a strong inclination to the fellowship of their own species. Ch. 2.

When I say so, I would not have it understood, that I believe, as Mr Hobbes does, that man is naturally the enemy of man; and that the state of *nature* is a state of *war* of every man against every man \*. This is such a state as neither does exist, nor ever did exist, in any species of animals: and however ingenious Mr Hobbes may have been, (and he certainly was a very acute man, and much more learned than those who now-a-days set up for masters in philosophy), it is plain to me, that he did not know what man was by nature, divested of all the habits and opinions that he acquires in civil life; but supposed, that, previous to the institution of society, he had all the desires and passions that he now has. But my opinion is, that man participates so much of the gregarious animal as to have no aversion to the society of his fellow-creatures, far less to be the natural enemy of his own species,

\* Hobbes's *Leviathan*, cap. 13.



Ch. 2. as certain specieses are of others ; and that he also has so much of the nature of the solitary wild beast, that he has no natural propensity to enter into society, but was urged to it by motives which I shall afterwards explain. What induces me to think that he is of this mixt kind, is the formation of his teeth and intestines. He has teeth for tearing, and others for grinding ; whereas the solitary beast of prey has only teeth for tearing ; and the frugivorous animals (so I call those who feed only on grain or herbage) have only grinders, such as the ox and sheep ; or if they have teeth which serve sometimes for tearing, such as those of the horse, they are not near so much incisive as those of man, which, by one nation that has been discovered upon the coast of New Guinea, are used as an offensive weapon ; for we are told, they bite those they attack, like dogs \*. As to the intestines, the animals of prey have short guts, the frugivorous have them long ; but man has them of a middle length betwixt the two. And in

\* This is related by *Le Mere*. See the passage quoted below, when I speak of barbarous nations.

conformity



conformity to this structure of his body, it Ch. 2.  
is well known that man can live, either  
upon the fruits of the earth, or upon the  
flesh of other animals. His nails, too,  
seem to place him in a middle state be-  
twixt those two kinds of animals. The  
frugivorous have no nails at all; the car-  
nivorous have crooked nails or talons;  
and all such animals Aristotle, in the pas-  
sage above quoted, says are solitary. But  
man's nails are straight; and therefore are  
fit for tearing, though not so fit for piercing,  
or holding, as those of the beasts of prey.  
Accordingly Sir Francis Drake tells us,  
that he found a people in the South sea  
who had the nails of their fingers about  
an inch long, which served them for of-  
fensive arms \*.

But though I think that man has from  
nature the capacity of living, either by  
prey, or upon the fruits of the earth; it  
appears to me, that by nature, and in his  
original state, he is a frugivorous animal,  
and that he only becomes an animal of  
prey by acquired habit. The histories of  
antient nations inform us, that the people

\* The particular passage is quoted afterwards.



Ch. 2. in the first ages lived only upon the fruits of the earth \* ; and that he is not naturally an animal of prey, what Monf. Bougainville relates, and which I have heard

\* *Diodorus*, in the beginning of his history, *lib. 1. cap. 8. edit. Weffeling.* gives this account of the way of living of the first men. He says, they subsisted upon herbs, and the fruits of trees. *Pausanias*, in his description of Greece, *lib. 8. in initio*, informs us, that, according to the traditions of the Arcadians, a very antient people of Greece, the first inhabitants of that country, lived in the same manner. And even in the times of history we see, from an oracle recorded by *Herodotus*, that they were then eaters of acorns, *lib. 1. cap. 66.* The poetical fictions concerning the golden age, have, like most of the other fictions, a foundation in historical truth ; particularly in that circumstance, of men living upon the fruits of the earth without blood or slaughter. For the account which the antient Greek poets, who were their first historians, as well as philosophers and divines, give us of that age, is no other than a representation, a little embellished and exaggerated, after the manner of the poets, of the simple and natural way in which men lived in the first ages of the world, feeding upon herbs and fruits, which the earth produced spontaneously. This golden age may be said yet to exist in some of the countries that have been discovered in the South sea, where the inhabitants live, without toil or labour, upon the natural productions of the earth. In some of those countries there was nothing else that the inhabitants could subsist upon ; particularly in the *Ladrone islands*, when they were first discovered by the Spaniards, there was neither hog nor dog, which are animals commonly found in the islands of the South sea, nor any other terrestrial animal, besides man.

likewise



likewise from others, that when he landed Ch. 2.  
in the Malouine, or *Falkland islands*, as  
we call them, which are uninhabited, all  
the animals came about him and his  
men; the fowls perching upon their heads  
and shoulders, and the fourfooted animals  
running among their feet. Now if man  
had been naturally an animal of prey,  
their instinct would have directed them  
to avoid him, as experience directs the  
wild animals of this country to do. But  
though he be not in this first stage of his  
nature an animal of prey, yet I hold, that  
he has even then no natural propensity to  
society.

I know that this opinion of mine is very  
different from the common opinion, and  
that it is generally believed, that men are  
by nature as much, or more, united to  
their kind, than any other species of ani-  
mal. But let those who believe so, consider  
one thing belonging to our species, and  
which seems to be a peculiarity that dis-  
tinguishes us from every other land-animal,  
and sets us at a greater distance from our  
kind, than even the beasts of prey are  
from theirs; what I mean is, the practice  
of men feeding upon one another. Those  
who



Ch. 2. who judge of mankind only by what they see of the modern nations of Europe, are not, I know, disposed to believe this; but they may as well not believe, that there are men who live without cloaths, or houses, without corn, wine, or beer, and without planting or sowing: and if there was any doubt before, it is now entirely removed, by the late discoveries that have been made in the South sea \*. And I am persuaded,

\* I mean, those made by Mr Banks and Dr Solander in their late voyage to the South sea, where they found in the country called *New Zealand*, a people who fed on human flesh; but were, in other respects, far from being a barbarous or inhuman people, but, on the contrary, brave and generous. I myself know a French Jesuit, one *Monf. Roubaud*, who was missionary among a tribe of Indians in North America, called the *Albinoquois*, and who told me he saw eight and twenty British men eaten at a breakfast by a tribe of Indians who had come to the assistance of the French in the late war, from a remote part of that country towards the west, where they still preserved the custom of eating men, which appears to have been once universal among the nations of that continent. The British had been taken prisoners by this tribe; and though the French general, *Monf. Moncalme*, was at great pains to save them, and offered the Indians double the number of beeves in the place of them, he could not accomplish it; for the Indians said, they were not such fools as to prefer the flesh of oxen to that of Englishmen. And I have heard it well attested, that some civilized men, who by great necessity have been reduced to the extremity



persuaded, that all nations have at some time or another been cannibals; and that men, as soon as they became animals of prey, which, as I have said, they were not originally, fed upon those of their own kind, as well as upon other animals: so that it appears to me evident, that man has not that natural abhorrence to the flesh of man, that lions and tigers, and

Ch. 2.

extremity of eating human flesh, have declared, that they thought it the sweetest they ever tasted. I am well informed, too, that there is a nation in the inland parts of Africa, where human flesh is exposed to sale in the market as beef and mutton is among us. *Garcilasso de la Vega*, (an author of whom I shall give a particular account afterwards), in his history of Peru, says the same thing of a certain nation in South America, upon the authority of a Spanish writer, one *Pedro de Cieca*, who affirms, that he saw there, with his own eyes, the human flesh exposed to sale in the shambles; and that they ate their own children whom they begat upon their female captives; and with respect to their male captives, they gave them women to breed out of, and they fattened and ate the offspring as we do calves and lambs; *book 1. chap. 5.* We need not therefore doubt of the truth of those stories told by Herodotus, and other antient authors, of Indian and Scythian nations that fed on mens flesh. We are not however to believe, that there ever was a nation that fed promiscuously upon one another; for the fact is, that all such nations eat only their enemies, or strangers, whom they treat as enemies, and such of their own people as die, or become useless through age or infirmities.



Ch. 2. other beasts of prey, have to that of their own species; who, so far as I can learn, never feed upon one another except when urged by the extremest hunger.

This therefore is another peculiarity of our species, which distinguishes us both from the carnivorous and frugivorous kinds of animals; and proves to me incontestably, that what is said by philosophers of the attachment we have to our common nature, and of those ties of love and sympathy which bind us so fast together, applies only to the rational, not to the natural animal; for as Marcus Antoninus the Emperor has observed, we are social, because we are rational \*.

Let us next consider how man stands with respect to the other division of animals, into *political* and *not political*: and I say, that he is likewise in the middle betwixt these two; for he is political, not by nature, but by institution, and acquired habit. And indeed, if he be not by nature even a herding animal, it follows of consequence, that he is not political: nor can we suppose that any thing is *natural* to an animal that is not *necessary* for his

\* ἐστὶ τὸ λογικόν, εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν. *Meditat. lib. 10.*

subsistence,



subſiſtence, which certainly the political life is not to man ; whereas to the bee and ant it is natural, becauſe it is neceſſary ; and accordingly thoſe animals have never been found ſingle or detached. With reſpect to man, it appears to me, that he has herded, and entered into the political life, for the ſame reaſons, and at the ſame time ; and therefore I believe no men have been found herding together who did not likewiſe carry on ſome common work ; that is to ſay, as has been explained, lived in the political ſtate. Ch. 2.

But is man the only animal that is in this ſtate with reſpect to the ſocial and political life ? If it were ſo, it would be nothing extraordinary in ſo extraordinary an animal as man. But there are other animals of the ſame amphibious nature. And, *firſt*, there is the wild boar, which, while he is young, is a herding animal ; but when he grows old, he lives by himſelf, and becomes what the French call *un ſolitaire*. Then with reſpect to the political ſtate, the horſe in this country is not a political animal, though ſocial and gregarious : but in the deſerts of Tartary and Siberia he is political ; for being there hunted by



Ch. 2. the Tartars, as hares and deer are in this country, they, for self-defence, form themselves into a kind of community, and take joint measures for saving themselves, which they commonly do by flight; and that they may not be surpris'd by their enemy, they set watches, and have commanders, who direct and hasten their flight; some of whom have been seen bringing up the rear, and biting and kicking the hindmost, in order to make them run faster.

But there is another animal that resembles us still more in this respect, and that is the beaver; of which I shall say a great deal more afterwards, but it is sufficient for my present purpose to observe, that he is precisely what I suppose man to be, amphibious betwixt the solitary and the social life: for in certain countries, particularly in North America, and some of the northern countries of Europe, he is found living in what may be called *civil society*, without metaphor or exaggeration; whereas in other countries, where they are not so numerous, or in those very countries when they happen to be dispersed, and their villages (for so I may call them)



them) ruined by the men who hunt them, or when they are prevented by men from associating, as they are in all the southern countries of Europe, they lead a solitary life, and hide themselves in holes, without any community or public good \*.

Ch. 2.

Of the same amphibious kind is an animal well known in this country, viz. the hare, which being few in number in all the countries of Europe, and much persecuted by men, lead a solitary life, and never associate or form a public; but in the plains of Tartary they are gregarious. The fact we are assured of by the same author who informs us of what is above related concerning the horse, viz. Mr Bell, who has published his travels through Tartary and Siberia, which he made with the Russian caravan that goes to China. Now I cannot conceive that the hare, which by its nature appears to be solitary, should associate in Tartary for any other reason except sustenance and self-defence; which, as I shall shew afterwards, are the reasons that made men first herd together, and enter into the po-

\* *Buffon's Hist. Natur.* vol. 8. pag. 297.

litical



Ch. 2. litical life. Whether the hares have any thing of *policy* in their associated state, Mr Bell has not told us; but I think it is likely they have; otherwise I do not think that they would have come together. For even those animals, such as the sheep, which are not political while they are fed and protected by us, become so when they live in a kind of natural state by themselves in the hills: and accordingly they are observed to set watches in the night-time against their enemy the fox, who give notice of his approach; and, when he attacks them, they draw up in a body, and defend themselves. And, in general, as nature appears to me to have always some further intention than pleasure merely, and the gratification of appetite and inclination, I think it is probable that she has not given to any animal that desire for society, without intending that it should be useful for some political purpose, either of sustenance or defence: so that I doubt whether *gregarious* and *political* animals differ entirely in their natures, or only in the *more* or *less*, so that some by the necessities of their nature are more political, others less.

But



But that the fierce and ravenous animals, which subsist entirely by prey, are naturally solitary, and averse to all society, cannot be doubted, for this plain reason, that they can both subsist and defend themselves without it. For though some wild beasts are much stronger than others, yet as they do not prey upon one another, the weaker have no occasion to associate in order to protect themselves against the stronger. But though they have no society on that account, they are by nature directed to associate with the female at certain times, for the purpose of propagating the species ; but this intercourse continues no longer than is necessary for that purpose. That time is longer or shorter according to the nature of the animal. In birds it continues a considerable time, because both the parents must contribute to the support of the young ; whereas in beasts it is commonly over very soon, the care of the offspring being entirely left to the mother. Of what kind our commerce with the female is in the natural state, whether we be of those animals which Linnæus calls *bigamous* ; that is to say, which pair for the propagation of the species,



Ch. 2. cies, and continue jointly their care of the offspring ; or whether we are not in this respect rather to be classed with the ox, the sheep, the deer, and almost all the other beasts of the frugivorous kind, as well as those of the carnivorous ; is a disquisition which belongs indeed to the history of *man*, but not I think to our present subject.

I shall add only one observation more before I conclude this chapter : That tho' we should suppose that men herded together before they entered into civil society, yet I think it is impossible to believe, that while they only herded together, they ever could invent a language, which could only be the fruit of that strict intercourse which the political life produces. Our business therefore at present is, to inquire how the political life began.

CHAP.



## C H A P. III.

*Examples from antient and modern history of  
Men living in the Brutish State, without  
Arts or Civility.*

**B**UT before I enter upon this inquiry, I Ch. 3.  
think it proper to support the account I have given of the original state of human nature, both with respect to *rationality* and *society*, by facts as well as by arguments: for it is very different from the notions commonly received, and will no doubt appear incredible to those who have been taught, that man is by nature a rational, as well as a social and political animal, and have read large volumes on the subject of the *law of nature*, founded all upon the supposition that civil society, or the political life, is the *original* and *natural* state of man. I have already given fundry examples of solitary savages that have been found at different times, in different parts of Europe, without language or arts of any kind, and even without the erect form; and I will now proceed to shew, from the history



Ch. 3.

both of the antient and modern world, that there have been found whole nations, not indeed altogether without arts or civility, (for that is impossible, since, according to my hypothesis, they associated together only for the purpose of carrying on some joint work), but with so little of either, that we can be at no loss to suppose a prior state, in which there were none at all.

And I will begin with instances furnished me by an antient author, namely Diodorus Siculus, who was a traveller as well as an historian, and whose work, the greatest part of which is unhappily lost, was the fruit of the labour of thirty years, which he spent in collecting materials, and travelling into the different parts of the world, which he had occasion to mention in his history \*. I am the more inclined to lay weight upon the facts recorded by him, that his style is very plain and simple; so that he appears to me to have spent that time in preparing and digesting the *matter* of his history, which many historians, antient as well as modern, have spent in adorning their *style*.

\* *Diodor. Biblioth. lib. 1. in initio.*



In the beginning of his history he says, Ch. 3.  
that men at first lived dispersed, and subsisted upon the natural productions of the earth; that they had no use of speech, and uttered only inarticulate cries; but that having herded together, for fear, as he says, of the wild beasts, they invented a language, and imposed names upon things \*. This opinion of the original state of man he no doubt formed from the study of many antient books of history that are now lost. But besides this, he relates particular facts concerning certain savage nations which lived, either in Africa, or upon the opposite coast of the Indian ocean, or that gulf of it which is now called the *Red sea*. Of these he had an opportunity of being very well informed, by the curiosity of one of the Ptolemies, king of Egypt, who, as I mentioned before, sent men whom he could trust, on purpose to be informed concerning such nations; and besides, the passion he had for hunting elephants made him discover more of Africa than I believe has been discovered in modern times.

\* *Lib. 1. cap. 8. edit. Wesseling.*



Ch. 3. The first instance I shall mention from Diodorus is of a nation, if a herd of men may be called so, of *ἰχθυοφαγοί*, or *fish-eaters*, that lived near the strait which joins the Indian ocean to the Red sea or Arabian gulf, upon the Asiatic side. They went naked, and lived entirely by fishing, which they practised without any art, other than that of making dikes or mounds of stones to prevent the fish which had come with the full tide into the hollows and gullies upon that coast, from going out again with the ebbing tide, and then catching them in those ponds as in a net \*. In this way they employed themselves for four days, and the fifth day they all set out for the upland country, where there were certain springs of fresh water, of which they drank, after having filled their bellies with fish. This journey, says

\* This is precisely the way of fishing practised by the inhabitants of New Holland, as described by Dampier in his Travels. This Dampier appears to me to be one of the most accurate and judicious of our modern travellers; so that when we find him agreeing in his account of the customs of barbarous nations, with an antient historian whom I am persuaded he never read, nor perhaps ever heard of, we can hardly doubt of the truth of the fact.

our



our author, they performed just like a Ch. 3.  
herd of cattle, making a great noise, and  
uttering loud cries, but all inarticulate;  
and after having filled their bellies with  
water, so that they could hardly walk,  
they returned to their habitations upon  
the coast, and there passed a whole day  
incapable to do any thing, lying upon the  
ground, and hardly able to breathe  
through fullness; after which they re-  
turned to their only occupation, of fishing  
in the manner above described: and this  
was the round of their life. The women  
and children were common, belonging to  
the herd. They had no sense of what is  
just, honest, or decent, living entirely un-  
der the guidance of instinct and appetite.  
They had no arts, unless we give that  
name to their way of fishing above men-  
tioned, and a certain method which they  
had of curing and preserving their fish,  
very particularly described by Diodorus.  
They used no weapons except stones, and  
the sharp horns of goats, with which they  
killed the stronger fish. They had no use  
of fire, but roasted their fish upon the  
rocks by the heat of the sun. Neither do  
they appear to me to have had the faculty  
of



Ch. 3. of speech; for though our author does not expressly say so, yet I think it is his meaning, from the account he gives of their journey to the springs: and it is clear that they had nothing like religion or government \*.

The next nation he mentions is that of the *Insensibles* †, as he calls them, of whom I have already spoken. Of these he says expressly, that they had not the use of speech, but made signs, like our dumb people, with their heads and hands. They lived, he says, promiscuously with other animals, and particularly with seals, which, he says, catch the fish in the same manner that these men did, who were also of the race of fish-eaters; and he adds, that they lived with those other animals, and with one another, with great good faith, and in great peace and concord. The most extraordinary particular he tells concerning them is, that they never used water, nor any kind of liquid, not having so much as an idea of that sort of nourish-

\* *Diod. lib. 3. p. 106. Stephani.*

† ἀναίσθητοι.



ment \* ; though even this I think is less Ch. 3.  
incredible than what more than one modern traveller has told us of people in the South sea, that when they had occasion to be long at sea, supplied the want of liquids by drinking sea-water.

The next nation mentioned by Diodorus that I shall take notice of, is one upon the African side, in that part of Æthiopia which is above Egypt. They were of a quite different race, being what he calls *ὑλοφαγοί*, or *wood-eaters* ; for they subsisted entirely upon the woods, eating either the fruits of the trees, or, when they could not get these, chewing the tender shoots, and young branches, as we see our cattle do in this country. This way of living made them very nimble in climbing trees ; and they leapt, says our author, with amazing agility from one branch or one tree to another, using both feet and hands ; and when they happened to fall, their bodies were so light that they received no hurt †. They

\* *Diod. lib. 3. p. 108.*

† The wild girl whom I mentioned above, must have been of a race of people very like this mentioned by Diodorus : for she climbed trees like a squirrel, and leapt from



Ch. 3. They too went naked, had no arms but sticks, like the Ouran Outangs, who are still to be found on the same continent, and their wives and children were in common. *Diod. p. 111.*

Diodorus concludes his account of those savage African nations by telling us, that in the southern part of that great peninsula there are races of men who, in the human form, live a life altogether brutal. *p. 115.*

Thus far Diodorus Siculus; from whose account it is evident, that there were in Africa, and the opposite continent of Asia, in his time, herds of people that lived without any civil society, even the do-

from one branch to another, upon all-four, with wonderful agility, as I was informed by the people of the village of *Songè* in *Champagne*, where she was caught: and she still retained, when I saw her, a mark of the use of her hands as feet in leaping; for her thumbs were of an unusual breadth. When she happened to fall too, she was so light and nimble that she received very little hurt. For the Abbess of the convent of *Chalons*, (near to *Songè*), where she was confined for some time after she was taken, shewed me a very high window that she leapt out of into the street, without receiving much harm; and what she did receive, she imputed to the gross aliment they had given her, which she said had made her so much heavier than when she lived upon wild food.

mestic



mestic society of man and wife, which is the first step towards forming a state or political society. Ch. 3.

With Diodorus, in this account of the savageness and barbarity of the people of Africa, agrees Herodotus; a man of the greatest curiosity and diligence that perhaps ever lived, and whose authority may be depended upon, when he relates a thing simply as an historical fact, and not as a hearsay. He speaks of herds of people in this peninsula that coupled together promiscuously (*κτνηνῶδες*) like cattle, *lib. 4. c. 180.*; and of men and women absolutely wild, *lib. 4. c. 191.*; and particularly of the Troglodytes he says, that they fed upon serpents and other reptiles, were hunted like wild beasts by the Garamantes, and by way of language made a kind of murmuring inarticulate sound which he compares to the cry of a bat, *ibid. c. 183.* And it is not unlikely that it is the same kind of language that *Monf. la Condamine* reports to have been spoken by a nation that he met with upon the banks of the river *Amazon*: for it was a muttering murmuring kind of noise, as he has described it, and which appeared to him to be formed in

VOL. I. F f drawing



Ch. 3. drawing in the breath ; probably because it was a low and obscure sound, not unlike that which a man makes who is very hoarse by reason of a cold \*.

As to modern authorities, I will begin with that of Leo Africanus, an African Moor of the sixteenth century, who coming to Rome, did there abjure the Mahometan faith, and was baptized by the name of the pontiff who then filled the papal chair, Leo X. He had travelled much in the interior parts of Africa with caravans of merchants, and appears to me to have known more of that country than any modern. He wrote a description of it in Arabic, which is translated into Latin, and published in nine books, containing a very accurate account, both of the men

\* There is a race of men yet to be found in that part of antient Æthiopia that we call *Abyssinia*, whose language resembles still more that of the *Troglodytes*, as described by Herodotus ; for it makes a hissing kind of noise, very fitly expressed by the Greek word *τροῦζω*, (in Latin *strideo*), which Herodotus applies to the language of the *Troglodytes*, and which I suppose resembles the sound made by a bat. Of these people in Æthiopia, Linnæus, as I was informed by one of his scholars, had an account from two travellers who had been in that country at different times ; and both agreed in this, and several other particulars concerning those men. See *Linnaei Systema Naturæ*, vol. 1. p. 33.

and



and manners, and natural curiosities of the country : and he agrees with Diodorus as to the savageness of some of the people of Africa ; and particularly he says, that in the inward parts of the country, southward from Barbary, there are people that live a life entirely brutish, without government or policy, and copulating promiscuously with their females, after the manner of the brutes \*. And he mentions another nation to whom he gives a name, calling them *Bornians*, who lived not far distant from the fountain of the river Niger. These people, says he, are without religion of any kind, and have their women and children in common †.

The next modern author I shall mention is likewise a very diligent and accurate writer. It is Garcilasso de la Vega, who has written in Spanish the History of the *Incas* of Peru, of whose race he himself was ‡. According to his account of that

\* *Lib. 7. in initio.*

† *Ibid. p. 656.*

‡ He was born, as he informs us, eight years after the Spanish conquest of Peru was completed. His mother was the grand-daughter, if I mistake not, of the *Inca*



Ch. 3. that country, when the first Inca began his conquests, or rather his taming and civilization of men, (for he was a conqueror of that kind, such as the Egyptians report their Osiris to have been), it was inhabited, for the greater part, by men living in a state altogether brutish, without government, civility, or arts of any kind; and such of them as were in any degree civilized, had a tradition preserved among them, that they had been taught, as the sub-

that preceded him who was dethroned and put to death by the Spaniards. He was brought up among his relations of the Inca race, till he was twenty years of age; and from his mother and her brothers, as he tells us, he received information of the facts which he relates in his history. He also employed his school-fellows the Indians, after he had formed the design of writing it, to get him information from all parts of the country. His history therefore, I think, may be credited as much as any that is only from tradition; which, however, this history was not altogether; for they had a kind of record by threads and knots. And indeed the facts he relates, and his manner of relating them, bear intrinsic marks of truth, at least that no falsehood or fiction was intended. And with respect to the principal facts, we may believe a tradition that went no farther back than four hundred years; about which time the first *Inca*, *Manco Capac*, began his reign; especially when it was preserved in the family of that prince, and we may believe carefully preserved, and the more carefully that they had no written records.

jects




jects of the Incas were, by men, who came from distant countries, and imported among them the arts of life. And, more particularly, he relates, that in some parts of Peru, which were afterwards civilized by the Incas, the people were under no kind of government, living together in herds or flocks, like so many cattle or sheep, and like them copulating promiscuously \*. In other parts of the country, they did not so much as live in herds, but dwelt in caves, and holes of rocks and mountains, in small numbers of two or three together, feeding upon herbs, grafs, roots, and wild fruits, and copulating promiscuously †. And in later times, under the fourth or fifth Inca, he mentions a people in the great province of *Chirihuana*, who lived altogether like beasts, wandering in the mountains and woods, without religion or worship of any kind, and without any community or political government, unless when they associated to infest their neighbours, and make use of them for food; for the end of their wars was to eat their enemies. These people were

Ch. 3.  
~~~~~\* *Lib. 1. c. 5. & 6.*† *Ibid. c. 7.*


Ch. 3. so brutish, and the country of so difficult access, that the Inca gave over thoughts of conquering or civilizing them; and the Spaniards afterwards attempted it, but without success, *lib. 7. c. 17.* He mentions also another people of the same province that lived near the Cape of *Passau*, who never having been conquered, or rather civilized, by the Incas, lived, even at the time the author wrote, in a state of the utmost savageness and barbarity, having no religion at all, and worshipping nothing either above or below them; inhabiting caves, and hollows of trees, without communication, friendship, or commerce, and hardly having language sufficient to understand one another *. One of the Incas, he says, coming with an army to subdue them, but despairing of being able to reclaim them from their brutish life, said to his people, “Come, let us return again; for these deserve not the honour of our dominion.” Upon which the whole army faced about, and returned home †. And these people were in

* *Lib. 1. c. 4. & 5.*

† *Lib. 9. c. 8.*

that state of barbarity, or very little better, Ch. 3,
at the time the author wrote; for he says, 
he himself saw some of them *. He further
tells us, that one of the Incas found men
that preyed on one another like wild beasts,
attacking their fellow-creatures for no o-
ther purpose than to eat them. These the
Inca hunted on the mountains, and in the
woods, like so many beasts †.

But the communication and intercourse
that has been betwixt the several parts of
the old world on this side of the globe,
and likewise betwixt the old and the new
world discovered by Columbus, during
these last three hundred years, has made
so great a change of the manners and way
of living of men in those countries, that
it is not there we are now to look for peo-
ple living in the natural state, but in an-
other part of the world, as yet very im-
perfectly discovered, and with which we
have had hitherto very little intercourse,
I mean the countries in the South sea, and
such parts of the Atlantic ocean as have not

* *Lib. 9. c. 8.*

† *Lib. 8. c. 3.* See also *c. 6. & 7.* of the same book,
where there are other accounts to the same purpose.

been

Ch. 3. been frequented by European ships. What I shall here set down of the wild people found in those countries is taken from a French collection of voyages to the South sea, printed at *Paris* in the year 1756, in two volumes 4to. The author's name, as I am informed, is *Labrosse*.


Americus Vespucius, who made the discovery of the continent of America for the King of Spain, and gave his name to it, was afterwards employed by the King of Portugal, in whose service he made a voyage in that great ocean which extends from Brazil eastward, towards the Cape of Good Hope; and in this voyage he discovered a great tract of country, which he calls a continent, where he found a people who, though living together in herds, had neither government, religion, nor arts, nor any property; and every one of them had as many wives as he pleased. Americus was among them seven and twenty days, which was long enough to have observed what he affirms of their manner of living. *Vol. 1. p. 96. of Labrosse's Collection.*

Jack *the Hermit*, a Dutch traveller, affirms, that the people of Terra del Fuego live entirely like brutes, without religion,
or

or policy, or any the least regard to decency, vol. 1. p. 445. And the same is said of them by an English traveller, Sir John Narburgh, vol. 2. p. 33. They are besides cannibals, and have not the least idea of honesty or good faith in their dealings, vol. 1. p. 445. Ch. 3.

Another Dutch traveller, one *Roggeveen*, came to an island in the South sea, where he could not find out that the people had any kind of government; but some way or other they had got a religion, in which they were very zealous, and trusted to it for their defence, in place of arms, against the Europeans, vol. 2. p. 235.

Many people in those countries have been found without almost any of the arts of life, even the art of defending themselves, or attacking their enemies; for but few of them have been found that have the use of the bow and arrow. Most of them, like the Ouran Outangs, use nothing but sticks and stones; and the last-mentioned people, who had so much religion, used no arms at all. Sir Francis Drake discovered certain islands in the South sea, to the north of the line, where he found inhabitants who had the

Ch. 3.  nails of their fingers about an inch long, which he understood served them for offensive arms, vol. 1. p. 197. And Le Mere met with a people in New Guinea, who used their teeth as an offensive weapon, and bit like dogs, vol. 2. p. 396. & 397. Among such a people, if there was any government or civil society, it must have been very imperfect, and of late institution.

This is all, so far as I have observed, that has hitherto been discovered in the South sea concerning the natural state of men there. But we have reason to expect from those countries, in a short time, much greater and more certain discoveries, such as I hope will improve and enlarge the knowledge of our own species as much as the natural history of other animals, and of plants and minerals.

Before I conclude this article of travels, I will quote one traveller more, who is very little known, though he reports a very extraordinary fact concerning our species, and which well deserves the attention of naturalists. His name is *Keoping*, a Swede by birth, who, in the year 1647, went to the East Indies, and there served
aboard

aboard a Dutch ship of force, belonging to the Dutch East-India company, in quality of Lieutenant. In sailing through those seas they had occasion to come upon the coast of an island in the gulf of Bengal called *Nicobar*, where they saw men with tails like those of cats, and which they moved in the same manner. They came in canoes along-side of the ship, with an intention to trade with them, and to give them parrots in exchange for iron, which they wanted very much. Several of them came aboard the ship, and many more would have come; but the Dutch were afraid of being overpowered by their numbers, and therefore they fired their great guns, and frightened them away. The next day they sent ashore a boat with five men; but they not having returned the following night, the day after the Captain sent a larger boat ashore with more hands, and two pieces of cannon. When they landed, the men with the tails came about them in great numbers; but by firing their cannon they chased them away: but found only the bones of their companions, who had been devoured by the savages; and the boat in which they

Ch. 3. had landed they found taken to pieces, and the iron of it carried away.

The author who relates this is, as I am well informed, an author of very good credit *. He writes in a simple plain manner,

* The story is told in the 6th volume of Linnæus's *Amœnitates academicae*, in an academical oration of one *Hoppius*, a scholar, as I suppose, of Linnæus, who relates the story upon the credit of this Keoping, with several more circumstances than I have mentioned. As I knew nothing then of any other author who had spoken of men with tails, I thought the fact extraordinary, and was not disposed to believe it without knowing who this Keoping was, and what credit he deserved. I therefore wrote to Linnæus, inquiring about him, and desiring to know where his book was to be found. He returned me a very polite answer, informing me, that the book was lately reprinted at Stockholm, 1743, *apud Salvium*; that the author was “natione Suecus, secutus naves Belgicas per plures annos, imprimis ad insulas Indiæ Orientalis. Incepit iter 1647. Erat Lieutenant navalis rei. Habet multa de animalibus et plantis sparsa, simplici stylo; sed omnia reliqua quæ retulit de his, simplicitate et fide summa recenset; quorum omnia reliqua hodie notissima et confirmata.”

Upon this information I got the book from Stockholm. It is in the Swedish language, which I do not understand; but that passage of it having been translated to me by a Swedish gentleman, I found it to agree exactly with the story told by *Hoppius*. And the gentleman, who was very well acquainted with the book, confirmed what Linnæus says, of its being written in a plain and simple style, bearing intrinsic marks of truth.

As

ner, not like a man who intended to im-
 pose a lie upon the world, merely for the silly
 pleasure of making people stare ; and if it
 be a lie, (for it cannot be a mistake), it is
 the only lie in his book ; for every thing
 else that he has related of animals and ve-

Ch. 3.

As this is a matter of great curiosity, I will subjoin what Linnæus further says in his letter to me.

“ 2. *Bontius* longius post eum (Keoping) vidit ipse
 “ homines caudatos et nocturnos.

“ 3. *Gesnerus* et *Aldrovandus* habent ex antiquis simi-
 lem figuram caudati.

“ 4. Opus istud Chinesse lingua et stylo Chinesi cum
 “ figuris, 30 vol. 8vo. quod possideo, et sistit fideliter
 “ multas et plantas et animalia, idem depingit.

“ 5. *Rumphius* habuit per plures annos vivum homi-
 “ nem nocturnum, quem aluit ; auctor fidissimus vocat
 “ eum *Cacutlack*.

“ 6. *Brad* mercator vivus qui diu, per septennium,
 “ vixit in Malacca, siquis alius vir gravis, candidus, et
 “ sincerus, vidit hominem nocturnum, et descripsit in
 “ familiari colloquio ; omnia quæ ego novi antea ita sin-
 “ cere, ut de ejus fide dubitare nequeam, mihi retulit.
 “ Et nocturnus et caudatus recti incedunt ; caudatus
 “ non loquitur.

“ *Dalin* fuit informator Principis nostri hæreditarii,
 “ vir infinita eruditione et sapientia. Hic edidit oratio-
 “ nem quam habuit coram Soc. Reg. Acad. Scient. in
 “ qua de his agit.

“ *Montpertuis* epistola Gallica Berolini ad Regem
 “ Borussæ de his multum agit.

“ Unius oculati testimonium, quod vidit, pluris mihi
 “ est, quam centum negantium ideo quod non vide-
 “ runt.”

getables

Ch. 3. getables has been found to be true. I am sensible, however, that those who believe that men are, and always have been, the same in all ages and nations of the world, and such as we see them in Europe, will think this story quite incredible; but for my own part I am convinced, that we have not yet discovered all the variety of nature, not even in our own species; and the most incredible thing, in my apprehension, that could be told, even if there were no facts to contradict it, would be, that all the men in the different parts of the earth were the same in size, figure, shape, and colour. I am therefore disposed to believe, upon credible evidence, that there are still greater varieties in our species than what is mentioned by this traveller: for that there are men with tails, such as the ancients gave to their satyrs, is a fact so well attested that I think it cannot be doubted *. But our Swedish traveller, so far as I know, is the only one who speaks of tails of such length as those of the inhabitants of Nicobar.

That these animals were men, as they


* See *Linnaei Systema Naturæ*, vol. 1. p. 33. and *Buffon's Natural History*.

trafficked,

trafficked, and used the art of navigation, Ch. 3.
I think cannot be denied. It appears, that
they herded together, and lived in some
kind of society; but whether they had the
use of language or not, does not appear
from our author's relation: and I should
incline to think that they had not, and
that in this respect they resembled the Ou-
ran Outangs, though in other respects
they appeared to be farther advanced in
the arts of life; for I do not think that
any traveller has said, that the Ouran Ou-
tangs practised navigation or commerce.
They live however in society, act together
in concert, particularly in attacking ele-
phants, build huts, and no doubt prac-
tise other arts, both for sustenance and de-
fence; so that they may be reckoned to be
in the first stage of the human progression,
being associated, and practising certain
arts of life; but not so far advanced as to
have invented the great art of language,
to which I think the inhabitants of Nico-
bar must have approached nearer, (if they
have not already found it out), as they are
so much farther advanced in other arts.

C H A P. IV.

Of the progress of Civil Society. — That this progress shews it is not from Nature.

Ch. 4.  ENOUGH, I am persuaded, has been said in the preceding chapter, to shew from fact, and the history of mankind, that *civil* society at least is not from nature, but of human institution. And indeed there is such a progress in it, that it must needs have had a beginning: for, as we have observed, there is no such progress in natural things. First, we see men living together in herds, like cattle or horses, without even coupling together, or pairing, as we see the males and females of certain other species do; but, nevertheless, carrying on some common business, such as fishing or hunting, or whatever else may be necessary for their sustenance, though without any thing that can be called government or rule; and of this kind are the instances that I have quoted from Diodorous Siculus, Herodotus, and modern travellers. Next, we see them

them submitting to government, but only upon certain occasions; and particularly for the purpose of self-defence: in which case, it has been observed, that other animals, such as sheep and horses, who are not by nature political, institute a kind of regimen and discipline; but which appears to last no longer than the danger. Under this kind of occasional government certain inhabitants of the Caribbee islands were when we first discovered those islands. They had chiefs and generals in time of war; but in time of peace, they lived under no government at all *.

The next stage of civil society I shall observe, is that of the Indians of North America, who have a government in time of peace as well as war, and may be said to form a state. This government is administered by their sachems, or old men, who meet together in council to deliberate upon public matters; and to their determinations in such matters the young men submit; but without any compulsion or punishment, if they are refractory. But in other matters, every man is his own master, subject to no controul, not

* See *Le Bas's* account of those islands.

Ch. 4. even that of his parents. For though they have all separate and distinct families, there is no domestic government among them; neither have they any laws or judges: so that every man defends his own rights, and revenges the injuries done him.

A stricter and more regular form of government obtains in the several countries of Europe, which is administered by certain magistrates, known under different names in the different countries, according to certain rules and regulations, to which every member of the state is obliged to submit, under certain pains and penalties. For the great difference betwixt this government and the last mentioned, is the power of punishment which the magistrate assumes; not only for offences against the state, but for injuries done to any member of it, who is not allowed to be judge in his own cause, but must apply to the magistrate for redress; and he also determines every question concerning right or property among the citizens, according to established rules. But the private lives of the subjects under those governments are left as much to the free will of each individual,
and

and as little subjected to rule, as in the Ch. 4.
American governments above mentioned :
and every man in such a state may with
impunity educate his children in the worst
manner possible, and may abuse his own
person and fortune as much as he pleases,
provided he does no injury to his neigh-
bours, nor attempts any thing against the
state.

The last stage of civil society, in which
the progression ends, is that most perfect
form of polity, which, to all the advan-
tages of the governments last mentioned,
joins the care of the education of the
youth, and of the private lives of the ci-
tizens ; neither of which is left to the will
and pleasure of each individual, but both
are regulated by public wisdom. Such
was the government of antient Sparta,
and such were all the plans of government
devised by Plato and other philosophers.

Nor do societies differ less in their size
and extent, than in their nature and insti-
tutions. The first society among men
was undoubtedly the family-society. In
this way, as Homer tells us, the Cyclops,
a barbarous people of those times, lived.
And Mons. Frezier, in his voyage to the

Ch. 4. South sea, informs us, that a great part of the inhabitants of Chili live in the same manner at this day. Some of those families produced out of themselves, without any foreign mixture, great nations. This was the case of the family of Jacob. But the most of nations have been formed by the association of several families; not, however, a great number at first. For the Indian nations of North America consisted originally of no more than three families, which are yet preserved among them distinct, and there is always one of them that is accounted more honourable than either of the other two *. The Roman state, in like manner, consisted originally of associated families; a clear proof of which is, that even in the civil state, the antient family-government among them was preserved in its full rigour, insomuch that the father had power of life and death over his children. From such small beginnings nations have grown to the size of

* Whether this particular be mentioned in any printed account of North America, I do not know; but I have it from the French Jesuit I mentioned above, whom I reckon a better authority in what relates to the Indians of that country than any thing we have printed.

which

which we now see them; and the whole history of mankind is nothing but a narrative of the growth of families into nations, of small nations into great, and of great nations into mighty empires. These at last become too great, and fall by their own weight. But they are never broken into so small pieces as those of which they were originally constituted: for I doubt it is a mistake to suppose, as some do, that there is a perpetual revolution and circle in human affairs. So far from that, it appears to me, that men are still going farther and farther off, not from the state of nature only, but from the original constitution of society. Ch. 4.

This progress in civil society, and the many changes and revolutions it is subject to, plainly shew, that it is not from nature, but of human institution. For *nature* is permanent and unchangeable, like its *author*: and accordingly the wild animals, who are undoubtedly in a state of nature, still preserve the same œconomy and manner of life with no variation, except such as change of circumstances may make absolutely necessary for the preservation

vation of the individual or the species ; and the variation goes no farther than that necessity requires.

C H A P. V.

Of the causes which gave rise to Civil Society.

Ch. 5. **I** Think I have shewn very clearly in the preceding chapters, that civil society, which alone could produce a language, is not from nature, or coeval with the animal, but must have had a beginning ; and the question now to be examined is, How it began ? for it is evident, that there must have been some cause of a change so great as from a *solitary*, or at least an animal *not political*, to a *social* and *political* animal. And I say, that the same cause that first produced ideas, and made men rational creatures, did also make them social and political, and in process of time produced all the arts of life ; and this cause is no other than the *necessities* of human life.

Hinc

Hinc variæ venêre artes : labor omnia viciit Ch. 5.
Improbis, et duris urgens in rebus egestas.

For not only did this want produce what is called the necessary arts of life ; but after those first wants were supplied, there arose another want very urgent likewise, I mean, the want of occupation, of pleasure, and amusement, which gave birth to the pleasureable arts ; and when the mind came to be cultivated, there arose a curiosity, and desire of knowledge, which produced the sciences.

But the necessities we are now speaking of were, either the want of subsistence, or of defence against superior force and violence. As to the want of sustenance, it appears evident, that in certain countries and climates the natural produce of the earth is sufficient to maintain man, as well as other animals, without either society or arts : but, in the first place, he may multiply so much, that the spontaneous growth of the earth, without art or culture, cannot maintain him ; or he may go to countries and climates which by nature are not fitted to support him. In either of these cases he must have recourse to society and arts.

Ch. 5. arts. It is by means of these, that man has multiplied more than any other animal of equal size, and has become an inhabitant of every country and climate; whereas every other animal has only certain countries or climates where it can subsist.

The other motive which I mentioned, as inducing men to enter into society, was self-defence; the necessity of which will appear the greater if we consider two things. *First*, That man is by nature much weaker and not near so well armed as many of the beasts of prey; and, *secondly*, That he is the natural prey of all those beasts, when they think they can master him; whereas such beasts do not prey upon one another; by which I mean, not only that a lion does not prey upon a lion, but that he does not prey upon a tiger, or wolf, or any other carnivorous beast, though of less size or strength, unless perhaps in cases of extreme necessity. But man is the common prey of them all; and some of them who have tasted of his flesh are, like the Indians above mentioned, fonder of it than of any other; which is said to be the case of the *Hippopotamus* or river-horse
in

in Egypt *. In this so disadvantageous Ch. 5.
situation, surrounded by so many enemies,
nature appears to have provided no defence for man but superior sagacity. Nor would even that have availed him in the single state; but it directed him to associate himself with others of the same species; to act in concert with them; in short, to institute civil society, and invent arts; and, among others, that great instrument of social life, *Language*, without which mankind never could have proceeded far in the invention of arts. But with the assistance of language, society, arts and sciences, it is hardly possible to set bounds to the progress of an animal, the most sagacious and inventive, as well as the most imitative of any that has been hitherto discovered; and who has from nature an instrument of art, which may be called the *instrument of instruments*, as by it he both makes and uses other instruments; I mean, the *human hand*, without which he could not, though possessed of such superior talents of mind, perform the works of art. He has already made himself the

* See Maillet the French Consul's account of *Egypt*.

Ch. 5. lord of this lower world, and acquired dominion over animals very much stronger and fiercer than he, and by nature much better armed. The face of the earth he has changed by his art and industry, and even the elements and powers of nature he has made subservient to his purposes.

Audax omnia perpeti

Gens humana. —

Expertus vacuum Dædalus aëra

*Pennis non homini datis *.*

Perrupit Acheronta Hercules labor.

Nil mortalibus arduum.

* This story of *Dædalus* is no doubt a poetical fiction, though, like other poetical fictions, it has a foundation in historical truth; for the fact appears to have been, that *Dædalus* made his escape from Crete in a swift-failing vessel of his own invention. But it is not a fiction, that Bishop Wilkins, a most ingenious as well as learned man, did try to invent an *art of flying*, and was so confident of his success, that he said, he did not doubt but that he should hear men calling for their *wings* as they now call for their *boots*.

CHAP.

C H A P. VI.

Continuation of the same Subject.—Some countries not fit to maintain Men in the Natural State. — All countries may be overstocked with Men, as well as with other Animals. — The Remedies in such a case.

THE origin of human society is a subject of great curiosity, and of great importance in the history of man. I should far exceed the bounds of my work if I were to treat of it at as great length, and with as great accuracy, as it deserves; I cannot however dismiss it without some further observations.

Ch. 6.

It appears to me, that without one or other of those two causes which I have assigned for the origin of society, there never would have been society, language, or arts, among men: and could we suppose a country naturally so fruitful as to produce, at all times of the year, food in abundance for men, however numerous; and if we could also suppose the climate of such

Ch. 6. a country so mild as not to require any protection from art against it, which is truly the case in many countries; and if we could further suppose, that there were there no animals of superior strength, with which men were obliged to contend,—I do not see how it ever could have happened in such a country, that men should have associated, and instituted civil society.

One thing at least is certain, that in fruitful countries, and benign climates, men can live very well in the natural state, and may continue a long time in that state; and I think it is equally certain, that in rude climates, and barren countries, they cannot subsist at all without society and arts. In such a country as Canada, for example, which is covered about seven months of the year with deep snow, how is it possible the Indians could live without the arts of fishing and hunting, by the first of which they support themselves in the summer, and by the last in the winter? As it is, they very often perish by hunger; but without those arts, or agriculture, and the art of preserving, as well as raising, the fruits of the earth, it is evident they could not live a year to
an

an end. For supposing that men could Ch. 6.
subsist upon herbs or foliage, as horses and
cattle can do, without feeds or fruits,
(which however I do not believe); or sup-
posing that they could be nourished by the
roots of certain vegetables, to be found wild
even in the northern countries, which, for
any thing I know, may be the case; and
supposing further, that they could dig for
them with their fingers, as the wild girl
above mentioned, whom I saw in France,
told me she did; where are leaves or herb-
age to be found in such countries for one
half of the year? and how could single
men, without instruments of art, dig for
roots in ground hardened like iron by
frost, and covered with five or six feet of
snow?

From these considerations I think we
may infer, that men never could have
lived in the natural state in such coun-
tries; that is, without society and arts;
and consequently, that in those countries
the human race never could have a be-
ginning, and that therefore they must
have been peopled from milder climates,
by tribes and colonies of men already ci-
vilized, and who brought with them arts,
by

Ch. 6. by which they were enabled to subsist in those rougher climates.

And this explains a fact in the history of man, which I hold to be certain, as both sacred and profane history agree in it, That the progress of the human race has always been, so far as we can trace it, from the east, and particularly from Asia, where, according to our sacred books, the human race first began. For Asia (I mean Asia Minor, and the more southerly parts of that great continent) is a much finer country than Europe, and has always produced finer bodies of men, and other animals, as well as better vegetables *. This of itself makes it highly probable, even if it were not attested by history, that men having first associated themselves in those milder and more fruitful regions of Asia, did from thence spread themselves into Europe, and other parts of the world, where the climate was not so propitious to the human race, and there subsisted by arts which they had imported.

But the most fruitful country may be overstocked with any animal, and parti-

* This is an observation of Hippocrates the physician, in his treatise, *De aëre, aquis, et locis*, § 3. p. 288.

cularly

cularly with man, who I believe is maintained with more difficulty, even in his natural state, than other animals of much larger size: for I hold, that he cannot subsist upon herbage or foliage alone *, but must have seeds, fruits, roots, or flesh. And it is to be considered, that man must have multiplied very much in his natural state, as he likewise does in the first stages of society †. Now when men were so multiplied that the natural fruits of the earth could not maintain them, they were under a necessity to practise one or other of the following methods; either to disperse, and go in search of other countries,

* The *Egyptians* pretended, that they had sundry aquatic plants growing in their river, which were sufficient for the aliment of man, particularly one they called the *Lotus*. If this be true, it is an exception to my rule; and is a very good argument, and as such was used by the *Egyptians*, in favour of the antiquity of the human race in *Egypt*, as being the country of all others the most proper to maintain man in his natural and *infantine* state, as it may be called, without society or arts. See *Diodorus Siculus*, *in initio*.

† This is so true, that it was the study of the antient legislators to prevent the too great increase of their citizens; for which purpose they used strange expedients, such as allowing the exposition of children, and even the unnatural passion of men for one another.

where

Ch. 6. where they might subsist more at their ease. But this in many cases might be impracticable: for the countries round them might be, and in process of time certainly would be, as much overstocked as theirs; or they might be hindered by seas, great rivers, or impassable deserts. To all which may be added, the natural aversion that every animal has to quit its native country, and the haunts to which it has been accustomed. Or, *2do*, They must prey upon other animals, or upon one another. But this, besides the danger of it, would hardly be practicable by man solitary, unassisted by arts, and without other weapons than those which nature has given him. Or, *lastly*, They must associate and provide in common what singly they could not procure. And this last method, it is natural to think, so sagacious an animal as man would prefer to the dangerous expedient of devouring one another, which I think can never be but the last resource among all animals *.

It

* What extremities men have been reduced to for subsistence, even in the first ages of society, is evident from a fact which cannot be doubted, that several of the barbarous

It would lead me much too far from my Ch. 6.
 purpose to inquire, what methods were
 first used by men associated for increasing
 their natural stock of provisions. I will
 only say in general, that I believe hunting
 must have been among the first ;

— *Cum jam glandes atque arbuta sacræ
 Desicerent silvæ, et victum Dodona negaret.*

VIRG. *Georgic.*

For, as I have already observed, the
 natural fruits of the earth were the
 first food of men. My reason for think-
 ing that hunting was the first expedi-
 ent they fell upon for supplying the want
 of those fruits is, that it is much ea-
 sier than planting, sowing, or any kind
 of culture of the ground, before instru-
 ments of art were invented. For man, by
 his natural strength and agility, with the
 addition only of a stick, which, as we
 have seen, is used even by the Ouran Ou-
 tangs, whom some authors will not al-
 low to be of our species, can master a great
 number of quadrupeds, especially if he be
 assisted by numbers ; and I remember the
 wild girl I have so often mentioned, told

barous nations, at this day, use for food the vermin of
 their own bodies.


Ch. 6. me, that with no other weapon than a bludgeon, which she called a *Boutou* *, she was able, with the assistance of the black girl her companion, to kill as much game as, together with the roots they dug up, maintained them in their travels through the woods. One natural consequence of hunting would be, that in process of time they would think of the expedient of catching certain animals alive, taming them, and breeding out of them, which would greatly add to their stock of provisions. This produced the pastoral life, which is the only means of subsistence of whole nations at this day. But it may be observed, that, unless in countries where flocks and herds can live through the winter upon the natural produce of the earth, it is impossible that men can be supported in that way, without the assistance of other arts, and particularly agriculture. And this is a good reason why the Indians of North America, not having the art of agriculture, have never attempted the pa-

* It was from this circumstance that I discovered she had been in one of the *Caribbee* islands; for in a French account published of those islands, by one *Sieur la Beaud*, I find that the *Caribbees* use that weapon, and call it by the same name.

floral life, or to tame any animals other than dogs that live upon flesh. Ch. 6.

But I have no occasion to trace any further the progress of men in the arts of subsistence; it is sufficient for my present purpose, that I have brought them together by means of the first cause of association I have mentioned, viz. the *want of the necessaries of life*; and I proceed next to examine the second reason I mentioned for the institution of society, *self-defence*.

But before I come to that, it may not be improper to observe, that this change of man from a frugivorous to a carnivorous animal must have produced a great change of character. What effect the mere feeding upon flesh, instead of vegetables, may have upon the temper and disposition of the mind, I shall not at present inquire; but it is the way of procuring this flesh-diet, by the destruction of other animals, that has produced the change I speak of. While man continued to feed upon the fruits of the earth, he was an innocuous animal, and, like others who lived in the same way, more disposed to fly from an attack than to make one. But as soon as he became a hunter, the

Ch. 6.  wild beast, which is part of his composition, became predominant in him. He grew fierce and bold, delighting in blood and slaughter. War soon succeeded to hunting; and the necessary consequence of war was the victors eating the vanquished, when they could kill or catch them *. In this state, man, if not tamed, or subdued by laws or manners, is the most dangerous and most mischievous of all the creatures that God has made; much more so than any lion or tiger, or any other the fiercest animal that roams the forest. It was in this state that Orpheus, the first civilizer of men in this western part of the world, found the savages of Greece, when he imported among them the arts he had learned in Egypt, and tamed them by religion and music.

* It is so at this day in many parts of the earth; and, I am persuaded, it was so originally among all nations. In the language of the *Iroquois* of North America, *to put on the cauldron*, is to declare war, as *Charlevoix* informs us. And though those hunters have given over eating their enemies, it is certain, there is nothing in which they delight so much as blood and slaughter.

Dictus

Dictus ob hoc lenire tigres rabidosque leones *.

Which is one of the fictions of the Greek poets, where the truth of history is easily seen through the vail of fable.

C H A P. VII.

What dangers made men associate for the sake of self-defence.

MAN, in the natural state, must stand in need of defence, either against wild beasts, against men of the same country, or, lastly, against foreign invaders. Ch. 7.

As to the first, those who know no more of the history of man than what they have learned from observing the customs and manners of their own and other modern nations of Europe, will hardly believe,

* *Silvestres homines sacer interpretisque deorum*

Cædibus et victu fædo deterruit Orpheus :

Dictus ob hoc lenire tigres rabidosque leones.

HOR. *Art. Poet.* 392.

Where the *fædus victus* is no doubt the eating one another; from which, among other barbarous customs, Orpheus reclaimed them.

that

Ch. 7. that there was a time when wild beasts disputed with us the empire of this earth: but nothing is more certain,

Tempora si fastosque velis evolvere mundi.

HOR.

And it is likewise certain, that they very often prevailed in the dispute, till art and numbers came to the assistance of our natural strength and agility. And therefore the first heroes, and greatest benefactors of mankind, next to the inventors of arts, were those men of superior strength and valour, who fought with and destroyed wild beasts. Such was Hercules of old: I mean, not the Greek Hercules, the son of Amphitryon, who came too late into the world to have much ado of that kind; but the Egyptian Hercules, several thousand years older, whose exploits the Greeks, with their usual vanity, ascribed to their hero, who was indeed originally from that country, and from thence probably had his name *. The arms which the

* He had at first another name, which I have forgot; but afterwards his parents, who were both originally from Egypt, thought proper to give him the name of the Egyptian

the later Greek fables (for they are not so old as Homer*) give to this hero, were very probably the arms of his antient name-fake of Egypt; I mean, the club, and the lion's skin, these being the only arms then known. But experience would soon discover, that it was necessary to have other and better arms against enemies so

Ch. 7.

Egyptian god. See Herodotus, *lib. 2. cap. 43. & 44.* who tells us, that, in order to settle the point of antiquity betwixt the Egyptian and Grecian Hercules, he made two voyages, one to Tyre, and the other to Thafus; in each of which places there was a temple of Hercules, both long prior to the son of *Alcmena*: from whence he very justly concludes, that these temples were erected to the Egyptian Hercules. Such was the curiosity and diligence of this historian, who had so little of the vanity of his countrymen, that in this, and several other instances, he was at uncommon pains to refute their vain lies.

* According to this poet, he wore neither lion's skin nor club, but was armed with a bow and arrows; and so he is introduced among the other spirits which appeared to Ulysses, in the 11th book of the *Odysssey*, *vers. 606.* And upon this occasion, it may be observed, that a great deal of the Greek fables and religion is posterior to the days of Homer: for in his time, neither this Hercules, the son of *Alcmena*, was worshipped, nor Castor and Pollux. And Bacchus, who became so great a god afterwards, is, I think, but once mentioned in Homer, and that in a way that does him no honour; for he is represented as running away from *Lycurgus*, the King of Thrace, and hiding himself in the ocean.

much

Ch. 7. much superior in bodily strength*; and that it was also necessary to avail themselves of their numbers, and to act together in concert, both in attacking and defending.

* Even after arms were invented in Greece, and the use of them well known, the Caledonian boar was destroyed with much difficulty, and not till he had killed a great many of the youth of Greece, as Homer informs us, *Iliad*, ix. 542. And in much later times, as late as the days of Cræsus King of Lydia, a boar laid waste the lands of the Myrians, a people of Asia, in the neighbourhood of Cræsus; and they not being able to destroy him themselves, sent to Cræsus for assistance; who accordingly sent them his son, at the head of a chosen body of hunters, *Herod. lib. i. cap. 36*. I know the mere modern reader will reject all these stories as fables, and will not even believe Pausanias, who says, that he saw the tusks of the Caledonian boar, which were preserved as late down as his time, and gives us the dimensions of them. But the learned will have no doubt of the truth of either of the stories, knowing well, that even what is called the fabulous history of Greece, is for the greater part true history; mixed indeed with many romantic circumstances and superstitious tales, which a little sagacity and critical discernment can easily separate from the truth of history. As to Herodotus, though, I know, his authority is by many thought no better than that of Homer, and the other Greek poets, yet I will venture to affirm, that whoever understands his history, and has diligently studied it, will hardly doubt of what he relates, not as a hearsay, (for he has many stories of that kind which he tells us he does not believe himself), but as a simple historical fact. But as to this article, concerning the difficulty of mens defending themselves against wild beasts in

fending. And this I hold to be one kind of self-defence that made association and a public necessary; so necessary, that Diodorus Siculus mentions no other reason for mens herding together *.

Ch. 7.

The second reason I assigned for association under this head was the violence and injustice which men had to fear from one another. For as soon as men began to multiply very much in any country, there would necessarily be an interference about provisions; about their layers, where they slept, or rested, and sheltered themselves from the weather,

in the first ages of the world, Diodorus Siculus, in his 3d book, informs us of a savage nation in Africa, that he calls *ρίζοφαγοί*, from their feeding upon roots, who, he says, not having the use of arms, could not defend themselves against lions, and would have been quite destroyed by them, if it had not been for a multitude of flies that came at a certain season of the year, and drove away the lions. It is in a situation such as that of those *root-eaters*, that I suppose men would, from the motive of self-defence, enter into political society, and invent arts of defence. And not only by such fierce beasts have countries been rendered not habitable, but also by reptiles, such as serpents; and small animals, such as mice, frogs, and sparrows, which, in several instances mentioned by Diodorus, *lib. 3. p. 114. Stephani*, have got the better of people with all the advantages of society and arts, and driven them out of the country.

* *Diodorus, lib. 1. cap. 8.*

Ch. 7.

—— *Glandem et cubilia propter ;*
and, lastly, about their females,

—— *Venerem incertam rapientes more ferarum.*

HOR.

Such interference would produce strife and contention; of which the consequence would often be wounds and death, and in which the stronger would always have the better, as we observe in the herds of other animals, where there is no other law but that of the strongest. In this way there would be great violence, oppression, and destruction of the species; to prevent which, so sagacious an animal as man would be naturally led to form a kind of public, by the strength of which the weaker might be made more powerful than the stronger, and the whole society benefited in every respect.

By what I have said here, I would not be understood to retract what I have said above in opposition to Mr Hobbes, that the state of nature was not a state of war: for I perfectly agree with Mons. Rousseau, that there are in that state much fewer occasions of quarrel than in the state of society; for, in the natural state, men can quarrel only about the necessaries of life.

life, and the gratifications of natural appetite; whereas, in the civil state, men quarrel about fame, power, pre-eminence, and all the numberless gratifications of vanity and luxury. But what I maintain is, that when men grow numerous, and the necessaries of life scanty, they must, like all other animals, prefer each himself to another, and that will of necessity produce strife and contention. But this is not the consequence of the natural state in itself, but of the excessive multiplication of the species; against which nature has provided several remedies, such as famine, pestilence, inundation, extraordinary severity of weather, and, among others, the destruction of the animals by one another, when provisions become scanty.

The third reason of this kind I mentioned was protection against foreign invaders. This proceeds upon the supposition of associations being already formed by some herds in the neighbourhood for invading their neighbours, either from mere wantonness, and a spirit of conquest, which has produced many cruel wars among men; or for want of the necessaries of life, which has obliged men very often

to leave their own country, and try to find out another. This would naturally lead the people of the country invaded to associate themselves, in order to take common measures for their defence.

One or other of these reasons appears to me to have made men first associate for the sake of self-defence; and this, joined with the want of the necessaries of life, accounts for the origin of society among men.

C H A P. VIII.

Answer to the objection, That instinct was sufficient to provide men with all the necessaries of life, and to defend them against their enemies.

Ch. 8. **I**T may be objected, That all the necessities I have mentioned, whether of sustenance or defence, might be supplied by instinct, with which I have supposed man to be originally provided by nature, as well as other animals, for whose wants we see it is sufficient; so that the reasons I have mentioned did not give rise to society;

ty; which therefore may still be from nature, and not an adventitious state, as I suppose it, introduced by the necessities of life. Ch. 8.

This objection is pretty much the same with the argument which I stated in the first book, and endeavoured to refute, tending to prove, that our ideas are from instinct*; and if it be true, as I think I have shewn, that our ideas are not from instinct, it will follow of necessary consequence, that those arts of sustenance and self-defence, which cannot be without ideas, are likewise not from instinct. I will, however, without repeating what I there said, add some further observations concerning the difference betwixt instinct and art.

But, in the *first* place, it is to be observed, that I do not deny, that nature has made sufficient provision for the preservation of the race of men, as well as of other animals: but she has not made provision for that extraordinary multiplication of the species, which makes society and arts necessary. For nature appears to me to have kept the

* Pag. 154.

Ch. 8. balance pretty even among her children; and therefore she has provided, that no species of animal should increase very much; because that could not be without prejudice to the other specieses: for this reason, when any one increases immoderately, it is either reduced by famine, and the other calamities above mentioned, or by being preyed upon by themselves or other animals; and, by these means, the equilibrium is restored. Now, this would certainly have happened with respect to our species, if it had continued in the natural state, and those arts of sustenance and defence above mentioned, had not been invented. And the question at present is, Whether those arts could have proceeded from instinct, or must have been the effect of art?

Betwixt these two there is this material difference, that instinct is a principle of action implanted in us as in other animals, by which we are directed to what is necessary for the preservation either of the individual or the species; but without any knowledge of the end, or how the means conduce to the end; and, consequently, without *will*, which never can be but where

where there is an end in view. Art, on Ch. 8.
the other hand, acts with knowledge of
the end, and of the means by which it is
attained; and consequently its operations
are voluntary, proceeding from motives
influencing the will. But besides this ca-
pital difference, there are the following.

1st, All animals are directed by in-
stinct to search for, to find out, and to
make use of the food which nature has
provided for them. But it has not direct-
ed nor instructed them to multiply that
food, and to make the earth produce more
of it than it naturally produces. In other
words, instinct does not teach us to till,
sow, or plant.

2dly, Instinct has directed us to make
the best use of all the parts or members of
our body for procuring our subsistence;
but it has not directed us to make artifi-
cial instruments, either for increasing the
quantity of food which nature has provi-
ded for us, or for bringing within our
reach food which otherwise would, by our
natural faculties, be inaccessible to us.

3dly, Nature has directed every animal
to the best use of those arms, offensive or
defensive, with which she has provided the
animal;

Ch. 8. animal; but she has not taught us either to make or to use any other; so that whenever we see an animal using adventitious aids of that kind, we may be sure that it is the effect of art. And if there were nothing else to convince me that the Ouran Outang belongs to our species, his using sticks as a weapon would be alone sufficient. Horace therefore appears to have been very well instructed by his philosophy in the progress of man, from instinct to art, and from natural to acquired faculties, when he tells us, that men, as long as they were *mutum et turpe pecus*, that is, altogether in the natural or brute state, fought, *unguibus et pugnīs, glandem et cubilia propter*; — *dein fustibus*, that is, when they came to be a little advanced towards humanity, and in the state the Ouran Outangs are at present; and then, *armis quæ post fabricaverat usus*, that is, when they were so far advanced in civil life as to invent arts *.

The

* “Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris,

“Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,

“Unguibus et pugnīs, dein fustibus, atque ita porro

“Pugnabant armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus.”

I will subjoin the rest of the passage, as it shews that

Horace's

The sum of these differences betwixt art and instinct seems to amount to this, that instinct goes directly to the end it proposes, or does not go *far* about; whereas art takes a round, and performs its operations by studying the nature of things, comparing ideas, and drawing consequences from premisses; *ex. gr.* Nothing appears to us more simple than the use of a stick for a weapon, yet the animal who uses it must know, *1st*, the nature of wood, That it is a hard body; *2dly*, That any

Ch. 8.

Horace's philosophy perfectly agrees with mine with respect to the invention of language:

“ Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent,


“ Nominaque invenêre: dehinc abstinere bello,

“ Oppida cœperunt munire, et ponere leges,

“ Ne quis fur esset, neu latro, neu quis adulter.”

Satir. III. v. 99. et seqq.

The distinction that Horace makes here betwixt *verba* and *nomina* I shall afterwards explain; but what I quoted the passage for at present is, to observe, that the progress according to Horace was, first the natural or brute state, without language or arts of any kind; then the invention of certain arts, particularly the arts of attack and defence; — then language; and lastly government and laws, and every other art of life, connected with, and dependent upon these. This system, I believe, will, upon the strictest examination, be found the true system of human nature; and a history of man would be nothing else than a commentary upon these few lines.

Ch. 8.  hard body, impelled upon another body with force, will make an impression which may very much hurt or destroy that other body; 3^{dly}, That the manner in which the human hand can make this impression in the most forcible way is, by taking a stick of a moderate length, and suitable thickness, by the one end, and in that way making the blow. All these ideas the Ouran Outang must have formed from observation and experience, before he used a stick as a weapon-offensive. Whether he be so far advanced in the art of cudgel-playing as to use it likewise by way of defence, and for warding blows, I cannot tell.

Another difference which we may observe betwixt art and instinct is, that as art is founded upon experience and observation, so it is improved by them; and it is by gradual improvements in that way that arts are perfected: but instinct, as it does not arise from experience, so it is not improved by it. And accordingly a swallow builds her nest, and a spider weaves his web, as well the first year as any year thereafter.

Thus it appears, that instinct and art
are

are in their natures different, though in their operations they sometimes seem to be the same. The bee, for example, forms her hexagon cells as accurately as if she had been instructed by Euclid; yet it is impossible to believe, that she understands geometry, and knows the rules by which she works, or even the end for which she works. It is therefore only instinct, but an instinct of an extraordinary kind, in which the wisdom of the great Author of nature manifests itself more than it usually does in the operations of brutes. Now there is not the least reason to think that we ever had such an uncommon instinct, or any other than what we observe in horses, cattle, and other quadrupeds of this country. Such instinct certainly never could have taught us to till, sow, or hunt, or to invent arms, either for attack or defence. It appears therefore evident, that our instinct could not have supplied those wants which made society necessary.

Before I conclude this chapter, I will make some observations upon the consequences which the introduction of art has had with respect to the numbers, both of men and of other animals. And, in the

Ch. 8. *first* place, as I have already observed, It is by the means of art that man has spread himself over the earth more than any other animal known, so as to be of all climates, and to inhabit countries which otherwise could not support him. *2dly*, It is by the same means that he has multiplied in the several countries much more in proportion than any other animal of the same size. But, *3dly*, This I think could not have happened without the destruction of many other animals. With respect indeed to such as we have tamed, it may be thought that we take so much care to provide food for them, which they would not have without our skill and industry, that they should multiply more under our government than in their natural state. But it is to be considered, on the other hand, what numbers we consume of them in food, and how many more we destroy of them by hard labour, and by using them cruelly or unskilfully. Besides, they do not propagate so much, and are not so healthy under our care, being housed, and kept in a way not unlike that in which we keep ourselves, as they would be in the natural state. But with respect to the wild animals,

animals, I think there can be no doubt Ch. 8.
 that they are greatly decreased by the empire which man has obtained over them: for in certain countries we have destroyed whole specieses of them, such as we found troublesome or dangerous to us; as wolves, for example, in Great Britain and Ireland, and lions in every part of Europe. What remains of them we preserve for our sport and pleasure: but though they be under the protection of the laws in all the kingdoms, I believe, of Europe; yet those laws have been so much neglected or evaded, and so many ways have been fallen upon of destroying them, that I hold the fact to be certain, that their numbers are decreasing daily, even in Europe, and much more so in other countries, where the men subsist upon them, as in North America. I am persuaded therefore, that with respect to us and the brutes, the general law of nature takes place, that no species can be increased beyond its natural proportion, but at the expence of others*.

* Man, says *Momus*, is the play-thing of *Jove*, (τὸ παίγνιον τοῦ Διὸς), or, as Mr Pope has rendered it, the standing
jest

Ch. 8. *jest of heaven.* But if Mómus, quitting his sportive vein, should assume a tone of keen satire, and virulent invective, and if M. Rousseau should lend him words, he would say, that man is the most mischievous animal that God has made ; — that he has already almost depopulated the earth, having in many countries destroyed whole specieses of animals, and continuing daily to destroy those that remain, not only to gratify his luxury and vanity, but for mere sport and pastime. “ What
 “ atonement, most pernicious *biped*, or *quadruped*, or
 “ whatever other appellation most offends thine ear,
 “ what atonement canst thou make for this so great abuse of thy superior faculties, and this destruction of
 “ the creatures of God ? None other, except to destroy
 “ thyself next, and so avenge the rest of the animal race.
 “ This thou art doing as fast as possible ; and for this
 “ only I can commend thee. When this work is accomplished, then shall the true state of nature be restored, and the real golden age return. Then shall
 “ *Astræa* visit the earth again, whose latest footsteps are
 “ now no longer to be seen : so shall the animal creation, freed from a tyrannical and capricious master,
 “ live the life which nature has destined for them, and
 “ accomplish the end of their being : so shall even man
 “ himself, if any of the wretched race yet remain, acquit providence of the imputations he has thrown upon it, and shew *that he was made upright, though he
 “ have found out many inventions.*”

CHAP.

C H A P. IX.

Objection answered, That there could be no Society without Language. — Instances of such Societies.

I Will now try to solve Monf. Rousseau's Ch. 9.
great difficulty with respect to the invention of language. He is convinced that society is absolutely necessary for this invention; but he seems to think that language was as necessary for the constitution of society. Now I will endeavour to shew, both from theory and fact, that animals may associate together, form a community, and carry on in concert one common business, without the use of speech.

For this purpose nothing else is necessary than that there should be among such animals some method of communication. If therefore there be other methods of communication, besides that of articulate sounds, there is nothing to hinder a society to be constituted without the use of speech. Now that there are other methods of communication, is a fact that cannot
be

Ch. 9.

be doubted : for there are inarticulate cries, by which we see the brutes communicate to one another their sentiments and passions ; there are imitative cries ; and, lastly, there is the expression of looks ; that is, the action of the face, and the gestures of the body. In one or other, or all of these ways, it is evident that animals may understand one another so far at least as to act in concert, and carry on some common business, which, according to Aristotle, is the definition of a political animal.

As to instances of animals acting in this way, without the use of speech, I will not insist upon such animals as the bee or ant, because I hold, that they act by instinct merely ; that is, by a necessary determination of their nature, without any will or choice, and without any knowledge of the operations of one another, or even of their own ; but I will give examples unexceptionable, of animals that act in concert, and by communication, and yet have no use of speech.

And I will begin with the beaver ; which, as I have observed already, resembles our species in this, that it is of an ambiguous nature,

nature, between the solitary and the social, without any necessary determination to either way of life; so that he sometimes lives in society, and sometimes by himself, according to the circumstances and situation in which he finds himself. In such an animal there must necessarily be choice and deliberation, not instinct merely; and therefore I think his example will apply most appositely to our species. This animal is truly political, in the common sense of the word, at least when they are in their social state; for they live in what may be properly enough called villages, consisting sometimes of twenty or five and twenty cabanes, or little houses, and these inhabited each by five or six and sometimes to the number of ten pairs; for they are all coupled in that way, male and female together. These several families compose a community or state, consisting commonly of an hundred and fifty or two hundred beavers, who work together in concert in all their public works, such as felling trees, and building the dam of their pond. And of this great community each cabane is a part, forming a lesser community, which works together in every thing relating to the cabane, such as building it,

Ch. 9.

and laying up a magazine of provisions for it: for they have property among other things appertaining to the political life; and not property belonging to the state only, which is commonly the case of the Indians of North America, but property belonging to each cabane. The construction of their dikes and cabanes, as described by Monf. Buffon, from whom I take this account *, is really wonderful, particularly that of the dike, which is a stupendous work for an animal of so small a size, and built with so much skill, that I do not think human art could build it better. They have not however that mark of humanity which I observe in the Ouran Outangs, of using any instrument besides those which nature has furnished them, viz. the members of their own body; for though they have very short fore-legs, with the feet of them shaped like a hand, having five fingers divided, with which they feel any thing, lay hold of it, and carry it to their mouths; and though they can easily erect themselves upon their hinder parts, and very often do so; yet they never use a stick, or any other instrument of art. But except in this par-

* *Histoire Naturelle*, tom. 8. p. 289.

ticular,

Ch. 9.
ticular, and that they have no use of speech, they are as much a political animal as man, only much better policed than any community of men that we know at present: for they live together, and carry on their public affairs in the greatest peace and harmony, and with the exactest observation of justice, never injuring one another, either in their persons or properties. What signs or methods of communication they use in carrying on their works Monf. Buffon does not mention, but it is certain that they must use some; and if their policy were carefully observed, I am persuaded it would be found, that there is an established government among them of one kind or another, without which I think it is impossible that the affairs of their community could be so regularly conducted.

In such a state I imagine men were, and must have been, perhaps for ages, before a language was invented. They must, I think, have been associated as the beavers are, living together in cabanes or huts *,

* The huts of the New-Hollanders are not near so well built as those of the beavers, and serve only for a cover to the head and shoulders, as I am informed by the travellers who have lately been in that country.

Ch. 9. and carrying on of concert some common work, either for their sustenance, such as hunting or fishing, or in the way of defence or attack. In short, they must have been united in the political life; for the mere herding together, without such union, would not be sufficient for the invention of so difficult an art as language, or indeed of any thing which deserves the name of art. For though I do not deny, that man, by his natural sagacity, and by experience and observation, might perhaps, towards the close of a long life, form some imperfect ideas, even without the help of political union, I think it is impossible that he could invent any thing deserving the name of *art*. But it is needless to dwell longer upon this inquiry: for, as I have already said, I do not think there is any reason to believe, that men ever herded together without acting in concert.

Of so difficult invention does this art of language appear to me, that I imagine men must previously have invented and practised more difficult arts than the fishing practised by those inhabitants of New Holland whom Dampier mentions, or
by

by the fish-eaters of Diodorus Siculus. Ch. 9.

And though those New-Hollanders have the use of speech, I can hardly believe that they have invented it, but have learned it by intercourse with some other nation ; and this I believe to be true of all the nations that have been found in a very barbarous state, and yet having the use of speech.

The next animal I shall mention living in a political state, without the use of speech, is an animal not so well known as the beaver, and mentioned only by one author, so far as I know, but an author of good credit, I mean Cardinal Polignac*, in his *Anti-Lucretius*. And he is the more to be credited in this particular, that the instance, as he confesses himself, makes against his system, of the brutes being no more than machines, according to the philosophy of Des Cartes, which he follows. This animal, he says, he saw

* This author flourished about the end of the last century, and was a man of great eminence, not only for learning, but for political abilities ; and was accordingly much employed in public business, such as embassies, and negotiations of peace. In this poem, though he refutes *Lucretius*, he has imitated his style and manner very exactly ; and I think the diction of it is the best modern philosophic Latin extant.

himself

Ch. 9. himself somewhere in the *Ukraine*, upon the banks of a river he calls *Danastris*. It is named, he says, by the Poles *Baubacis*; and is like a fox in appearance; but subsists upon herbage. They live associated in caverns under ground; and the business they carry on is, foraging in the fields, and making magazines for their provision during the winter; and it is about their fields and pasture that they quarrel and go to war. Their battles, as our author has described them, are very orderly and regular; for they have a kind of military discipline, and are formed into corps under certain leaders. But the most extraordinary circumstance he tells of them, is their manner of treating their prisoners of war, of whom they make slaves, obliging them to work in the business of foraging, and laying up provisions against winter. And particularly he says, that they make those slaves lie down upon their back, and hold up their legs, and then they pack the hay upon them, which their legs keep together, and having thus loaded these *living carts*, as our author calls them, they drag them along by the tail*. I

* *Anti-Lucretius, lib. 6. vers. 175.*

think it can hardly be doubted, but that this animal, with so much sagacity, if it had likewise the organs of speech, would in process of time invent a language. Ch. 9.

The last animal of the brute kind I shall mention living in this way, without language, is an animal they call a *sea-cat*, of which we have an account, that I think may be depended upon, from the Russian academicians in the description they have published of *Kamschatka*, which they went to visit by orders and at the expence of the Czarina. This animal is amphibious, and, so far as appears, does not form states or republics like the beaver, but lives in families, which are sometimes very numerous, amounting to a hundred and twenty, old and young: for the male keeps a seraglio, sometimes of fifty females, of whom he is as jealous as the Grand Signior is of his. They keep up a very strict family-discipline, punishing their wives severely for neglecting any point of duty, such as the care of the offspring, for which they shew great love and tenderness; and the consequence of this discipline is, on the part of the wives, very great submission to their lord and master,

Ch. 9. master, whom they endeavour to pacify when they have offended him, by every mark of humiliation and contrition; all which he receives with the utmost stateliness and fullness. They have almost all the passions and sentiments of men. They are jealous, proud, quarrelsome, and revengeful; and when they have suffered any injury, and cannot resent it, they, like Achilles in Homer *, shed tears. They are as brave as any Spartan, and will rather die upon the spot than yield, or quit their ground; and their military discipline in this point is so severe, that if any of them runs away, or even is suspected of doing so, the rest fall upon him as fiercely as they would upon an enemy, and destroy him †. Yet this animal has no use of speech, nor, so far as I know, organs proper for it: but it appears, that without it he can practise the most difficult of human arts, that of government, and of government over females,

* *Iliad* b. 1. v. 357.

† *Natur. Hist. of Kamtschatka*, p. 125. It is translated from the Russian language by James Grieve, and printed at Gloucester, 1764.

in which most men have failed ; and even the legislator of Sparta, who, as Aristotle tells us, wanted to regulate the lives of the women as he had done those of the men, but found it so difficult a work that he was obliged to give it over.

Ch. 9.

But I think it is unnecessary to give more examples of this kind from the brute creation, since it appears to me that our own species furnishes sufficient for my purpose. And, first, there are the Ouran Outangs, who, as I have said, are proved to be of our species by marks of humanity that I think are incontestable ; and they have one property more of the species than the quadruped savages above mentioned, which have been found in different parts of Europe, that they walk erect. They live in society, build huts, joined in companies attack elephants, and no doubt carry on other joint undertakings for their sustenance and preservation ; but have not yet attained the use of speech.

But should any one, after all that is said, still doubt of the humanity of the Ouran Outangs, what can be said to the example of dumb persons among us, whom nobody will deny to be capable of living to-

gether in society, and carrying on jointly any sort of business; since we see both men and women with that defect, not only capable of acting in concert with others, but of governing and directing.

And thus I hope I have removed Monf. Rousseau's chief difficulty concerning the invention of language, by shewing that society, and even the political life, which he judges rightly to be necessary for the invention of language, may exist without language.

C H A P. X.

Objection, That the law of nature, as it is treated of by modern writers, supposes men to have been originally rational and political.—Answer to that objection.

C. 10. **I** Cannot conclude this book without answering another objection, which will readily occur to those who have studied the law of nature and nations; a study that was very fashionable some years ago, but I think has become less so of late. It will be said, That, according to my system of human

human nature, it is impossible to suppose, that man, in his natural state, can be subject to any law or obligation, not being conscious of any rule of action, nor having any ideas of right or wrong, because he has no ideas of any kind. If this be so, they will say, what are we to think of those volumes that have been written within these last hundred years upon the law of nature, all supposing, that man is by nature, and in his original state, rational and social, and therefore subject to certain laws and rules, which are laid down in those authors at great length?

My short answer to this is, That those gentlemen plainly beg the question, and suppose, what I think is clearly disproved by fact and experience, as well as argument, that man, in his original state, is rational and political. I think I have shewn, that his natural state is no other than that of the mere animal; and therefore he can be only subject to that common law of the animal nature, well known by the name of *instinct*; a law much superior to all laws of human institution, or founded upon human institutions,

C. 10. tions, and proceeding from a much higher original.

As to the authorities quoted against me, the first who reduced this law of nature into a system, and gave it the form of a science, was Hugo Grotius, a name well known in the learned world. This he did in his excellent treatise *De jure belli ac pacis*, written with a most commendable intention, to try if he could establish any rule of right and wrong * among persons who may be said indeed to live in a state of nature, such as Hobbes has described, *of war of every one against every one*, and a state infinitely more terrible than the state which he supposes: for *there* only single savages fight,

———— *Glandem et cubilia propter;*

but *here* leviathans † indeed of enormous

* That such was the intention of his work, is evident from what Grotius himself says in his *προλεγόμενα*, § 3.

“ Videbam per Christianum orbem vel barbaris gentibus
“ pudendam bellandi licentiam: levibus aut nullis de
“ causis ad arma procurri; quibus semel sumptis, nullam
“ jam divini, nullam humani juris reverentiam, plane
“ quasi uno edicto ad omnia scelera emissio furore.”

† This is the name which Hobbes gives to the great corporations or political bodies we call states.

size

size take the field, having not hundreds of hands only, like the giant of the poets, but hundreds of thousands, armed with deadly weapons, with which they wage most cruel war. To speak without a figure, the destruction of modern war is so prodigious, by the great armies brought into the field, and which are likewise kept up in time of peace, and by the extraordinary waste of men by fatigue, diseases, and unwholesome provisions, more than by the sword, while the internal policy of Europe at present is so little fitted to supply such destruction, that unless the princes either fall upon some other way of deciding their quarrels, or provide better for the multiplication of people, Europe is in the utmost hazard of being again depopulated, as it once was under the Romans, but without the resource which it then had of barbarous nations to repeople it. — But to return to our subject.

In this work, Grotius understands by the *law of nature*, a law which is common to the rational and social nature *, in contradistinction to what is called *civil law*,

* *Lib. 1. cap. 1. § 10. & 12.*

which

C. 10.

which is peculiar to each society or nation of men. It is the same with the law of nations, at least in the common use of authors; though Grotius has made the distinction betwixt them, making the law of nature to arise immediately from the dictates of reason, and to be of universal obligation, without any consent or compact; whereas the law of nations is founded upon the consent of nations *. But he confesses, that the terms are used promiscuously even by the best authors †. Now, I acknowledge, that Grotius, as well as Puffendorf, Barbeyrac, and many other later writers upon the subject of the law of nature and nations, does suppose, that men are by nature rational, and were always associated in states or communities of one kind or another. But they only *suppose* it, without proving it; and it is plain, they have taken it for granted, without so much as making a question of it.

But if their authority were more decisive upon this point, I appeal from them to a

* *Proleg.* § 6.

† Cicero, in a passage quoted by *Grotius*, lib. 1. cap. 1. § 12. says, *In re consensio omnium gentium jus nature putanda est.*

much

much greater authority; I mean that of C. 10. those philosophers who formed the system of the Roman law: for it is well known to those who have studied that law, that they were really philosophers, who, being at the same time great men in the state, and intrusted with the administration of public justice, did apply the principles of philosophy, and the method of science by definition and division, to the laws of private property among their countrymen; a thing that never had been before done in any nation. In laying the foundation of their system, they have begun with the law of nature, as that from which every other law is ultimately derived. But what is the law of nature, according to them? Is it the law of the rational and social nature only, as the modern writers upon the law of nature and nations have defined it? No: it is a law common to the whole animal race. “Jus naturæ,” say they, “est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. “Nam jus istud non humani generis proprium; sed omnium animalium quæ in terra, quæ in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune. Hinc descendit maris atque foeminæ conjunctio, quam nos
“matrimonium

C. 10.


“matrimonium appellamus; hinc libero-
“rum procreatio, hinc educatio. Videmus
“etenim cætera quoque animalia, feras e-
“tiam, istius juris peritiâ cenferi.”

Thus it appears, that as we, giving an account of the origin of language, have gone back to that original state of our nature when we were no more than mere animals; so those philosophers, in giving the origin of law, have likewise gone back to the same original state, when we were subjected only to that universal law which governs the whole animal nature, and is antecedent to reason, society, and all human institutions. This is their law of nature. As to the law of nations, they define it thus: “Jus gentium est quo
“gentes humanæ utuntur; quod a natu-
“rali recedere facile intelligere licet: quia
“illud omnibus animalibus, hoc solis ho-
“minibus inter se commune fit; veluti
“erga Deum religio, ut parentibus et pa-
“triæ pareamus.—Ex hoc jure gentium
“introducæta bella, discretæ gentes, regna
“condita, dominia distincta, agris termi-
“ni positi, ædificia collata, commercium,
“emptiones, venditiones, locationes, con-
“ductiones, obligationes, institutæ; ex-
“ceptis

“ceptis quibusdam quæ a jure Civili in- C. 10.
“troductæ sunt *.”

Thus those founders of the Roman law have distinguished accurately what other writers have confounded, the law of *nature* and the law of *nations*; making the law of nature to be that which is common to the whole animal race, directing every thing that is necessary for the preservation of the race; and they mention particularly the conjunction of the male and female, the procreation and education of the offspring; and *law* here is used in the same sense as when we speak of the laws of nature which govern the inanimate parts of the creation. The law of nations, on the other hand, is not the constitution of nature, but arises from human reason, and the institution of society and political life; and it is called the law of *nations*, because it is the general law of the rational and social nature, and consequently of nations, which being independent of one another, can be subject to no other law, at least of human institution. From this law, these authors derive religion, duty to our pa-

* *Pandect. lib. I. tit. I.*

C. 10. rents and our country, distinction of property, commerce, and, in short, all the rights that men enjoy, either in war or in peace. For our authors do not, like Mr Hobbes, make war the natural state of man, but derive it from this law of nations: *Ex hoc jure gentium introducta bella, &c.* And this is the law of the rational nature, different from the laws of inanimate nature above mentioned, and also from the laws of animal nature, in so far as the word *law*, when we speak of the law of nations, is used, in the proper and ordinary signification, to denote a rule of action prescribed to a free agent, of which he is conscious, and with which he voluntarily complies.

The rules of this law of nations, as it ought to be called, I hold to be binding upon all rational men living in society, princes as well as subjects, and to be founded in nature; not indeed the original nature of man, but that secondary and acquired nature of a rational and political creature, which he himself has formed; and therefore this law is not improperly called by some later writers, a *secondary law of nature*, in contradistinction to the *primary*

primary law mentioned by the Roman C. 10.
lawyers. I hold also, that the obligation
of this law is as much founded upon
compact, as the obligation of any private
citizen to submit to the laws of the parti-
cular society of which he is a member.
For every man, by living in society, and
enjoying the protection and other benefits
of it, is understood to have agreed to sub-
mit to the general laws of the rational and
social nature, without the observation of
which, society could not subsist; and there-
fore, if a man will not submit to this law,
he must fairly do as the Hottentot did, of
whom Mons. Rousseau tells the story, that
is, throw off his cloaths, and run to the
woods and fields, renouncing all the be-
nefits of society, as well as subjection to
its laws.

And thus I have endeavoured to shew,
that though society be absolutely necessary
for the invention of language, yet lan-
guage is not necessary for the constitution
of society; and having thus prepared
matters for the invention, I proceed, in the
next book, to shew in what manner it pro-
bably was invented, and of what nature
the first languages were.

B O O K III.

C H A P. I.

What was required for the invention of Language, besides the constitution of Society.

Ch. 1. **I**N the preceding book, we have placed man in a state of society and of political union, carrying on of common consent, and with joint labour, some work necessary for defence, or the support of life. In this situation, and this only, could language have been invented. But more was necessary for the invention of so difficult an art. And, in the *first* place, The proper organs of pronunciation were indispensably required. These are given to some few animals besides man; but I believe they are in none so perfect.

2dly, They must have been a very long time in this political state; so long at least as to have improved into an art the business they were carrying on: by which I do not mean to require, that they should have been


been regular artists, knowing the causes and principles of their art, and operating by certain rules which they could demonstrate from those principles; but my meaning is, that they must have improved their rude practice at first into a better practice by observation and experience; and, in that way, have fixed a certain method of doing the thing, which, when it is done by degrees, and from observation and experience, may not improperly be called an art. For, as I have already observed, one of the great differences betwixt instinct and art is, that what is done by instinct, is performed as well at first as at last; whereas art is necessarily formed by gradual improvements. In short, before man could have invented a language, he must have been perhaps for many ages in the same state the beaver is in, as I have described it above. For the beaver, of all the animals we know, that are not, like the Ouran Outangs, of our species, comes the nearest to us in sagacity, and, as I have already observed, appears to have some other principle of action beside instinct; of which there is a proof that I have not mentioned, arising from the form of their
huts

Ch. I. huts or cabanes; which, as Monf. Buffon tells us, is not always the same; so that it would appear they have different opinions of things as well as we: whereas instinct performs every thing in the same invariable manner. I am therefore persuaded, that the beaver did, from experience and observation, the old teaching the young, learn the architecture of his dike and his hut, as we have learned our architecture and other arts.

3dly, Another thing absolutely required, as preparatory to the invention of a language, is, that men should previously have formed ideas to be expressed by language: for it is impossible to conceive a language of proper names only without general terms. Now, ideas must have been formed by an animal, such as man, carrying on any common business, and operating, not by instinct, but learning by observation and experience. For such an animal must have an idea of the end for which he acts, and of the means for attaining that end. For, as I have shewn, every animal that does not act from instinct, like the bee or the spider, must act with knowledge of the end. Besides, man, in the
state

state in which I have described him, must Ch. 1.
necessarily have had ideas, however im-
perfect, of trees and animals, and other
objects, with which he was conversant:
and he must have had more perfect ideas
of the instruments of art which he used;
especially if they were of his own inven-
tion.

Lastly, It appears to me to have required
an extraordinary degree of sagacity, to in-
vent so artificial a thing as speech; nor do
I think that there is any animal other than
man yet discovered, unless perhaps it be the
beaver, that has sagacity enough to have
invented it: for however easy the invention
may seem, now that it is discovered, and
so commonly practised; yet it was truly
far from being obvious, but, on the con-
trary, very far removed from common
apprehension. For, in the *first* place, Man,
as we have seen, does not naturally form
articulate sounds; but, on the contrary,
it is a great work of art, difficult to be
learned even after it is invented, but infi-
nitely more difficult to be invented. *2dly*,
Suppose this first difficulty got over, and ar-
ticulate sounds invented, it was by no
means an obvious thought, to apply them
to the expression of ideas, with the greater
part

Ch. I.  part of which they have no connection, at least that is easily discovered; for though there be words expressing certain sounds, which are imitations of those sounds, it is certain that by far the greater part of words are not natural signs of ideas. And how is it possible they should? for what natural connection is there betwixt the idea of a tree, *ex. gr.* the earth, the sun, the moon, and any articulation of sound? And indeed the making ideas in this way *audible*, appears to me to have been full as great a refinement of art, as the so-much-boasted discovery of making sounds *visible*, I mean the invention of alphabetical characters; and so much the more wonderful, that it was invented in a much earlier age of mankind. And it must appear still more wonderful when we consider, that it is not the only method of communication, and therefore not absolutely necessary for the purposes of political life; but that there are other methods, as we have seen, which in great part answer those purposes, and with which accordingly other animals that live in the political state, as well as man, remained satisfied. Of these other methods we are
now

now to speak more particularly, in order to try whether from these we cannot trace the progress to the invention of language.

C H A P. II.

Of the several methods of Communication in use among men before the Invention of Language.

THE only ways that I can think of by which men could communicate together, before the invention of speech, are four: *first*, *Inarticulate cries*, expressive of sentiments and passions; *2dly*, *Gestures*, and the expression of the countenance; *3dly*, *Imitative sounds*, by which audible things may be expressed; and, *lastly*, *Painting*, by which visible objects may be represented. The two first are common to us with the brutes; the two last are peculiar to man; and all the four may be said to be *natural* signs of what they express; for even the connection betwixt inarticulate cries and the things expressed by them, though it appear to be the most

Ch. 2

Ch. 2. remote, is so established in nature, that it is understood by every animal, without any previous compact or agreement.

Of those inarticulate cries there is a very great variety; and it is really surprising how many different passions, such as love, joy, anger, grief, fear, the brutes express by them; and I am persuaded, the nearer the œconomy of any of them comes to ours, the greater variety will be found in their cries, because they have the more to express by them. The Russian academicians say, that the *sea-cat* above mentioned, which has so much of human nature in it, can low like a cow, growl like a bear, and chirp like a cricket, which last is a song of triumph after he has vanquished his enemy*; and if the beaver living in a social state was accurately observed, there would be found a great variety of this kind of language among them. When the brutes are tamed, and become familiar with us, they acquire voices and tones that they had not before. Thus Porphyry the philosopher tells us, that his partridge learned to converse with him in a voice very different from what

* *History of Kamtschatka*, p. 128.

she used in communication with her fellows *; and some of them, as it is well known, may be taught to articulate. But it is evident, that all this variety of cries, though it were much greater than it really is, would not answer the purposes of human life, when it came to be enlarged and extended to many different arts and occupations, which the growing wants of men rendered necessary.

The *next* kind of expression I mentioned was that of *looks* and *gestures*, which is also very strong, and various among the brutes, and it is a language which they perfectly well understand. The only use they make of it is to express their passions and feelings; but we know certainly, from the example of dumb persons among us, that it may be used to express ideas: and we learn from history, that they may be expressed in this language with the utmost accuracy and precision; for in Rome there was an art of this kind formed, called the *pantomime* art, which was brought to the utmost perfection about the time of Augustus Cæsar †. An artist of this kind

* See before, book I. p. 136.

† See Lucian, *περί ὀρχήσεως*.

Ch. 2. could express by signs, not only every sentiment and passion of the human mind, but every idea, with as great accuracy, and as great variety too, as any orator could do by words; and it is a noted story of Roscius the player in Rome, that he used to contend with Cicero, which of them could express the same thing, he by looks and gestures, or Cicero by words, with the greatest variety and copiousness.

There can be no doubt but that, before the invention of language, this kind of expression, as well as the other by inarticulate cries, would be much used. That savage nation which Diodorus Siculus, in the passage I quoted before, calls the *Insensibles*, conversed in no other way; and the savages in North America do at this day supply the defects of their language by a great deal of action and gesticulation. But it is impossible to suppose, that this art of speaking to the eyes could be brought to such perfection among savages as it was by Roscius at Rome, or by the pantomimes in after times, who *danced* whole theatrical pieces, according to the expression in antient language; that is, represented them by gestures and movements performed to music, without one word being

being uttered *. Even in Greece, where Ch. 2.
 all the other arts of pleasure and enter-
 tainment were cultivated, and brought to
 the highest degree of perfection, the art
 of the pantomime was not carried so far
 as in Rome. For although their players
 did no doubt express a great deal by
 their action, particularly in the move-
 ments of their choruses, and their mono-
 dies, there was no such thing, so far as I
 can learn, practised among them as dan-
 cing a whole piece, or even acting a single
 monody, without speaking; at least not
 in the better days of Greece. For in the
 later times it is not improbable that they
 may have adopted the pantomimes of the
 Romans; and Lucian appears to me to

* Before the Romans had pantomimes, their actors,
 such as Roscius, played certain parts in dumb show.
 Those parts were the monodies, or *cantica*, as the La-
 tins call them, which were soliloquies spoken *in recita-
 tivo* to music. In such parts of the play the actor among
 the Romans only gesticulated, and expressed the sense by
 his action, that is, *danced*, as they called it, while an-
 other *sung*, or pronounced the words to music: so that
 it was only in the *diverbium* or dialogue that the Roman
 actor used his voice. How this strange custom of divi-
 ding the acting and speaking, such as never was practised
 in any other nation, so far I as know, came to be intro-
 duced among the Romans, Livy has informed us, *lib. 7.*

c. 2.

speaks

Ch. 2. speak of it as an entertainment among the
 ~~~~~ Greeks in his time \*.

So far from being brought to this state

\* I have often wondered, that Horace, in his epistle to Augustus, where he flatters that prince so much as to compare the arts of Rome in his time to the arts of Greece, in these lines,

*Venimus ad summum fortunæ; pingimus, atque  
 Psallimus, et luctamur Achivis doctius unctis,*

does not mention this *pantomime* art, which I believe was the only one in which the Romans of those days excelled the Greeks. And this perhaps was one of the reasons which made the people of Rome so passionately fond of it: for as to painting and music, mentioned by Horace, I cannot believe that there was the least degree of comparison betwixt those arts, as practised in Rome, and as practised in Greece, and particularly painting; for, so far as I know, the Romans never produced one good painter or statuary. And with respect to wrestling; as the first *palæstra* in Rome was, as I remember, no earlier than the days of Augustus Cæsar, I think it is hardly possible that the Romans should all of a sudden have become such expert wrestlers. As therefore he flatters Augustus so much at the expence of truth, I can assign no reason why he omitted this pantomime art, in which he might have truly said the Romans excelled the Greeks, except that he did not esteem it, either as a useful art, which it certainly is not among persons who can understand one another by language, or of any natural grace and beauty. And indeed it appears from what Lucian says in his dialogue upon dancing, that the men of gravity and correct taste condemned this mimical representation, as fit only for the lower sort of people.

of



of perfection among savages in the first Ch. 2.  
stage of humanity, I am persuaded it  
would not go the length of serving the pur-  
poses of common intercourse, where there  
was any number of wants to be supplied by  
mutual assistance: or if we could make so  
wild a supposition, as that it would be car-  
ried to the same degree of perfection as in  
the polite age of Augustus, still it is in  
fundry respects far inferior to the method  
of communication by speech; for, first, it  
speaks only to the eyes, so that it can be  
of no use but in the light; and then we  
cannot converse in that way at such a di-  
stance as by words, which alone makes it  
a very improper vehicle of our thoughts  
in carrying on any business without doors,  
such as fishing and hunting, which are  
the chief occupations of savages.

The *third* method of communication I  
mentioned was by *imitative* or *mimic sounds*,  
which, I doubt not, was practised before  
the invention of language, as it has been  
since; but the expression of it could not  
go any great length; no farther than to  
denote sounds, or objects which were dis-  
tinguished by particular sounds, such as  
beasts and birds of different kinds.

As



Ch. 2. As to the *last* method I mentioned, *painting*, or delineating any object by drawing the figure of it, it may have been used before the invention of language; but it could go no farther than to communicate the notion of visible objects; and, besides, it is of slow and difficult practice, and not at all of so ready use as language.

Of these four ways of communication, it is plain, that only two have any connection with language, viz. inarticulate cries and imitative sounds, which are both modifications of the human voice, as well as language, and could alone lead the way to the invention of language. And we are now to inquire, whether, from one or other, or both of these, that invention can be traced.

CHAP.



## C H A P. III.

*Whether there might not be a language of music singly, without any articulation.*

**B**UT there is a third modification of the human voice which deserves to be considered before we proceed further, and that is musical modulation. There is an ingenious man, an acquaintance of mine \*, that has bestowed a good deal of thought upon this subject, who conjectures, that the first language among men was *music*, and that before our ideas were expressed by articulate sounds, they were communicated by tones, varied according to different degrees of gravity or acuteness : for he considers language to be of so difficult invention, that it could not have been at-

Ch. 3.

\* The man I mean is Dr Blacklock of Edinburgh ; a person of great genius, and wonderful learning, if we consider, that with him knowledge is shut out at one of its principal entrances ; for he has been blind since his infancy. He is well known by several works that he has published, both in prose and verse.



Ch. 3. tained to at once, without trying every more obvious variation of the voice, such as that of musical tones, which we first learn by imitation of the birds; whereas articulation we could not learn by imitation. Having therefore in that way learned to sing, it was natural enough to think of applying the variation of tones to a purpose of utility as well as pleasure, namely, the communication of ideas. And he adds, that when it was found necessary to enlarge the expression of language by the addition of articulation, the tones were still preserved.

The thought, I own, is very ingenious; and thus far it is supported by fact, that I believe all the antient and original languages, without exception, have a great deal of accent or tone in them\*; and the want of such tones is but a modern cor-

\* I use *accent* in the antient sense of the word, to signify a musical modulation of the voice, by which it is made higher or lower with respect to gravity or acuteness. This is the meaning of the Latin word *accentus*, and of the Greek *τονος*. Whereas the word in English has a sense very different, denoting only the elevation of the voice upon one syllable of a word above the rest, without any change as to gravity or acuteness.



ruption of language, of which I shall have occasion to speak afterwards. Thus the Greek has its tones, by which one syllable of a word is raised above another in respect of acuteness; and the interval has been marked by their grammarians, as I shall explain more particularly in the sequel. In the Latin language likewise there are the same tones, though with some variations with respect to the syllables upon which they are placed. The Chinese, which, though an imperfect language, is certainly a very antient one; and for that very reason, it is likely so imperfect, is full of tones, infomuch that sometimes the same monosyllable signifies nine or ten different things, according to its different accents. The Indians too in North America, as I have been informed by gentlemen who have studied their languages, have tones by which they make the same word signify different things, of which they have given me instances; and particularly one of those nations, the Hurons, according to the account given us of their language by Gabriel Sagard, an author whom I shall have occasion frequently to



Ch. 3. mention in the sequel \*, supply the defects of their language, particularly the want of tenses, persons, numbers, and genders, by accents only. These facts convince me, that the variation of the human voice by tones or musical modulation was, if not prior to language, at least coeval with it; for which reason it is taken into the composition, and made a part of all original languages; and yet I dare not venture to affirm, that there ever was a language of singing merely before there was a language of speaking. And I

\* This *Gabriel Sagard* was a religious of the order of *St Francis*, who was sent on a mission to the country of the Hurons in the year 1626, and published his travels at Paris in the year 1631, under the title of *Le Grand voyage du pays des Hurons, &c.*; to which he has added a dictionary of the Huron language, with a preface to it, containing many particulars concerning that language. The book is extremely rare, and I never could hear but of two copies of it; one in the *Museum* at London, and another in the French King's library in Paris. This last I had the use of by the favour of *M. Caperonier*, the keeper of that library, who was so obliging as to allow me the privilege of taking it out of the library, and keeping it for some weeks by me. It was the perusal of this dictionary, and the account of the language prefixed to it, that first made me think of this work; in which, if the public finds any thing entertaining or instructing, they owe it to the politeness and obliging disposition of *Monf. Caperonier*, to whom I take this opportunity of returning my sincere thanks.

should



should rather incline to think that there was not. One thing at least is certain, that such a language would be altogether insufficient for the purposes even of savage life: for the music of savages is of very small compass; that of the Hurons, according to a specimen of it given by the author I just now mentioned, does not rise above a fourth, which is all the compass of the music of the birds, from which, in all probability, it was copied \*. And we know, that the ancient Greek lyre had no note above a fourth, and they had no interval so small as a semitone, which is also the case of the Huron music. There must therefore have been in such a music so little variety of expression, that I can hardly believe it ever was used as a language.

Quitting therefore this hypothesis, we must try if we can deduce language from inarticulate cries, or imitative sounds.

\* The tunes which the birds sing are very high set, that is, the fundamental note is very high, compared with any of the notes of our music. The lowest note of a linnet, for example, is much higher than any note we can sound upon any instrument. But then they rise by very small intervals; so small, as to be hardly distinguishable by our ears, never higher than a *fourth*, seldom above a *third*, as I am informed by the gentleman above mentioned, Dr Blacklock, who has the finest ear perhaps of any man living, and has observed with particular attention the music of the birds.



## C H A P. IV.

*That Language arose from natural Inarticulate Cries.*

Ch. 4. **W**ith respect to mimic sounds, I am of the same opinion as with respect to musical notes, that there never was a language entirely, or even for the greater part, composed of them; and I am confirmed in this opinion by observing, that there are no such words, at least so far as I have observed, in the barbarous languages; so that I am disposed to believe, that the framing words with an analogy to the sound of the things expressed by them,—*verba ex sono facta*,—as the grammarians call them, belongs rather to languages of art, than to the first languages spoken by rude and barbarous nations. It is therefore inarticulate cries only that must have given rise to language; and, as every thing of art must be founded on nature, it appears at first sight very probable, that language should be nothing but an improvement or refinement upon the natural



natural cries of the animal, more especially as it is evident, that language does no more than enlarge the expression of those natural cries : for such cries are used by all animals who have any use of voice to express their wants ; and the fact is, that all the barbarous nations have cries expressing different things, such as cries of joy, grief, terror, surprise, and the like. The *war-cry* of the Indians of North America is well known to those that have been among them ; and they have a cry when they return from any expedition, by which they signify, before they enter their village, what success they have had. The savage girl whom I have so often mentioned, entertained me with several such cries belonging to her nation ; and she told me, that while she was travelling through the woods with the negro girl who had escaped the shipwreck with her, as they did not understand one another's language, they conversed together by signs and cries ; and in that way they understood each other so well, that they made a shift to live upon what they could catch hunting together. These two methods of communication were undoubtedly the first  
used



Ch. 4. used by men ; and we have but to suppose a great number of our species in the same situation as those two girls, carrying on some common business, and conversing together by signs and cries, and we have men just in a state proper for the invention of language. For if we suppose their numbers to increase, their wants would increase also ; and then those two methods of communication would become too confined for that larger sphere of life which their wants would make necessary. What then was to be done ? I have shewn already, that signs alone would not do, unless they were to acquire the pantomime art, which cannot be supposed. The only thing then that remained to be done was, to give a greater variety to the natural cries. The question then is, What sort of variation was first made upon them ? And here I agree with Dr Blacklock, that as the natural progress is from what is easy to what is more difficult, they would first make the more obvious and simple variation by tones, before they distinguished them by the more difficult operation of articulation. And I am the more inclined to be of this opinion, that I observe



serve a difference of tone in the natural Ch. 4.  
cries of other animals, of which I have no  
doubt but a skilful musician could mark  
the intervals: so that, though I cannot  
agree with the Doctor, that there ever was  
a singing language, entirely composed of  
different musical notes; yet I think it is  
highly probable, that the natural cries  
were varied by tones, before they were  
distinguished by articulation.

But this variety, as I have observed,  
could not go far; and therefore another  
method of variation was to be thought of.  
And being advanced so far, it was natural  
that so sagacious an animal as man should  
go on farther, and come at last to the on-  
ly other variation remaining, namely, ar-  
ticulation: for that there was such a pro-  
gress in the formation of language, as in  
all other things belonging to man, I can-  
not doubt; and I am persuaded, that the  
most barbarous and imperfect language  
extant is at the distance of many stages  
from its first origin.

The first cries that would be articulated  
were probably those by which animals call  
upon one another, and exhort or com-  
mand one another to do certain things:



Ch. 4. for such cries are necessary in carrying on any work by joint consent, such as we must suppose men to be engaged in before a language could be invented. And the first articulation must have been very simple, the voice being broken, and distinguished only by a few vowels and consonants, but not so exceedingly diversified by various articulation as we see it is in the languages of art: for if in any thing the progress of man was slow, and from small beginnings, it must have been so in the invention of this most difficult art.

Further, as all natural cries, even tho' modulated by music, are from the throat, and *larynx*, or knot of the throat, with little or no operation of the organs of the mouth; it is natural to suppose, that the first languages were for the greater part spoken from the throat, and that what consonants were used to vary the cries were mostly guttural; and that the organs of the mouth would at first be but very little employed.

And this theory of mine is confirmed by what the above-mentioned author, Gabriel Sagard, tells us of the language of the Hurons, of which I shall make much



much use in this inquiry, because it is more imperfect, and therefore nearer to the origin of the art, than any language, so far as I know, that has hitherto been discovered. He says, that they have a form of address or salutation, which is no more than a vocal cry aspirated, that is, pronounced from the throat. It is *Ho, ho, ho*; and in calling upon one another they use the sounds, *Hi, ha, and balouet*, which are very frequent in their songs, when they call upon one another to be merry; and it may be observed, that we have in our language words of much the same signification, such as, *hollow, halloo, huzza, whurra*, and such like, which are no other but cries, calling or exhorting, a little articulated.

This author also informs us, that they have but very few consonants in their language; and particularly they want the labial consonants, such as *b, p, f*; the consonants *v, m, n*; and even the vowel *u*, because it is pronounced by the lips; and with respect to the consonants of this kind La Hontan says the same thing, and he adds, what indeed is a necessary consequence, that they never shut their lips in



Ch. 4. speaking \*; which is the case of every animal that utters only natural cries. Neither have they the lingual consonants *g* and *r*; and accordingly our author tells us, that they could not pronounce his name, *Gabriel*, otherwise than *Aieuiel*: for it seems, that though they have not the pure vocal found *u*, which I take to be that of the French *u*, they have such as come near to what is expressed by the diphthongs *eu* and *ou*, which last is also used in setting down their words. In short, the consonants they mostly use are gutturals, such as *k*, *q*, *x*; and they make very much use of the aspirate *h*, which is also pronounced from the throat; and La Hontan says, that almost all their words have a very strong aspiration †. And their language, upon the whole, seems to be little better than animal cries from the throat, of different tones, a little broken and divided by some guttural consonants. And with this account of the Huron language agrees perfectly the account

\* *La Hontan's Travels in North America*, vol. 2. p. 219.

† *Ibid.* p. 220.

which



which the wild girl I have so often mentioned, *Mademoiselle le Blanc*, as they call her in France, gave me of the language of her country; and which, for any thing I know, may be a dialect of the Huron language: for she said, it was all spoken in the throat; and that there was no use of the tongue or lips in it; and, to convince me that it was so, she pronounced some words that she remembered of it. Ch. 4.

From this account of the origin of language it appears, that the first sounds articulated were the natural cries of men, by which they signified their wants and desires to one another, such as calling one another for certain purposes, and other such things as were most necessary for carrying on any joint work. Then in process of time other cries would be articulated, to signify that such and such actions had been performed, or were performing, or that such and such events had happened relative to the common business. Then names would be invented of such objects as they were conversant with. This increase of words would make more articulation necessary. And thus the language would grow by degrees; and as it grew,  
it



it would be more and more broken and articulated by consonants ; but still the words would retain a great deal of their original nature of animal cries : and thus things would go on, words still multiplying, till at last the language became too cumbersome for use ; and then art was obliged to interpose, and form a language according to rule and method ; of which we shall endeavour in the sequel to give some account ; but in the mean time we must explain more particularly the nature of those first-invented languages which the necessities of human life produced without any art at all.

## C H A P. V.

*General Observations upon the first Languages.— Division of them into the Matter and the Form.— The nature of Articulation, and the Division of Elemental Sounds into Vowels and Consonants.*

Ch. 5. **B**Efore I enter into particulars upon this subject, I will make one or two general observations. And, *first*, In such languages



guages as I have described, being nothing but the natural and instinctive cries of the animal, a little varied and distinguished by articulation, no art or regularity can be expected. And accordingly Sagard tells us, that the Huron language is so very imperfect and irregular, that it is impossible to form a grammar of it; that is, to reduce it to any rule. *2dly*, A consequence of this is, that those languages can have no standard, or any thing fixed and established in the use of them, such as we see in formed languages; but must be differently spoken by the different families or tribes of which the nation is composed, and must also be constantly changing and fluctuating: for it is art only that gives any constancy or stability to practice; which, till the art is invented, must be various and capricious. Thus, till the *orders* were invented, and *architecture* formed into an art, every man built his house according to his own fancy; and even in nations where there appears to have been some taste of building established, as among the Goths, it is remarked in their buildings, that there are no proportions constantly observed,  
nor



Ch. 5. nor any uniformity in the ornaments, no capital of one pillar being exactly like another, nor any two doors or windows ornamented in the same manner. In music likewise, till it became an art, there could be no regularity or uniformity in the compositions, as may be seen in the music of barbarous nations. In painting also, and sculpture, till they were formed into arts, and the standard of beauty fixed, as it was among the antients, the taste of beauty would be as various as the untaught fancies and apprehensions of the several artists, as we may perceive with respect to the painters and sculptors among us who have not formed their taste upon the antient models. And in this very matter of language Gabriel Sagard informs us, that hardly any one village of the Hurons speaks the same language as another; nay two families of the same village do not speak exactly the same language.

But in order to consider more particularly the nature of those primitive languages, we must return to the division of language with which we set out, into its *matter* and *form*. And I will begin with the *matter* of the languages of savages; that



that is, the sounds of which they are composed : with respect to which I have anticipated a good deal of what I had to say, in the account I have given of the origin of them ; and I hope what I have further to say, will naturally follow from that account. But first I must say something in general of articulation ; for it is that which distinguishes language from any other sound.

The breath which comes from the lungs, and passes through the wind-pipe, is the subject-matter both of singing and speaking. In singing, this breath is modified by different contractions and dilatations of the wind-pipe, and of the *rimula*, or little hole of the *larynx*, which produce the several degrees of gravity and acuteness of sound, such as form the different notes of music. After the breath has passed the larynx, it receives a further modification by the several positions and actions of the several organs of the mouth, such as the tongue, the teeth, the palate, and the lips ; to which also we may add the throat and the nose, which have a great share in the pronunciation of some languages, and more or less in the pronunciation of all. The alteration made



Ch. 5. by those organs upon the voice is what we call *articulation*; a metaphor taken from the *articuli* or joints of the limb of any animal: for as these divide the limb into parts, so articulation breaks and divides the continuity of the voice, which otherwise would go on in the same tenor, without any distinguishable parts. And it is in this way that all the variety of sound is produced, by which men have been enabled to express their conceptions, and to mark every conception by a different sound. To analyse all this variety of sound into its several elemental parts, was a work of art of very great difficulty, which certainly was not performed by the first savages who spoke, nor for many ages after. What therefore we have to say upon this subject, we shall refer till we come to speak of languages of art. It will only be necessary at present, in order to understand what follows, to observe, that some of these elemental sounds are produced by the position or configuration of the several organs, with little or no action of them, while others are produced by the action of those organs. The first kind are called *vowels*, making a sound by themselves:



selves: for they are nothing else but the blowing of the breath with a tremulous concussion of the wind-pipe and larynx, (which is absolutely necessary in order to produce any sound), through the organs of the mouth in a certain position. The other class is called *consonants*; a name importing, that they cannot be founded by themselves without the aid of the vowels. For it is evident, that the action of the organs alone can produce no vocal sound without the expiration of the breath, tho' it may make some kind of beating or chopping, which is the sound of those letters they call *liquids*. The consonants therefore are nothing else but vocal sounds, or vowels modified and diversified by the several actions of the different organs of pronunciation.

And here we may observe how complex and difficult a business articulation is, tho' by constant practice it appears so easy. For, let us take the simplest syllable, which is that made by a single consonant and vowel, such as *ba*, or *ab*, there must be complicated together in the same enunciation, the blowing of the breath, with the tremulous concussion above mention-



Ch. 5. ed; the position of the organs necessary to produce the vocal sound; and the action of the organs, by which the consonant is founded: which action must be either before or after the position of the organs forming the vowel, according as the consonant is founded first or last in the syllable. But the business becomes much more difficult, when we compound vowels, making what we call *diphthongs*, and when we throw into the same syllable two or three consonants, as in the English word *strength*. In short, the more accurately and minutely we consider language, the greater the difficulty of the invention appears, and indeed the absolute impossibility of it, unless we suppose it to be invented by very slow degrees, from very small beginnings, and in a very long course of time.

CHAP.



## C H A P. VI.

*Of the Matter of the first Languages.—That the Words of them are long, and full of Vowels.—Answer to Objection.*

AS those who know no more of men Ch. 6.  
than what is to be seen in the several  
countries of Europe, will form very false  
judgements of human nature; so those  
who have studied only the regular languages  
of art, without having recourse to the  
barbarous languages, which are so much  
nearer the origin of speech, will be apt to  
form an hypothesis concerning the sound  
of the first languages very different from  
that which I shall endeavour to maintain,  
and for which, I hope, I have already prepared  
my readers. They will suppose, that  
the first languages, being very rude and  
barbarous, as no doubt they were, would  
be crouded with consonants, and therefore  
of very harsh sound, like some of the  
northern languages in Europe, such as the  
German, and other dialects of the Teuto-  
nic. And, 2dly, They will suppose, that  
the



Ch. 6. the first languages consisted mostly of monosyllables, or very short words; and that it would be only in process of time that they were lengthened, and in consequence of the improvement of the grammatical art, by which composition, derivation, and inflection, were introduced into language. In short, they will be apt to imagine, that what we call now the *roots* of a language, were truly the original words, and at first the only words.

These suppositions may at first sight appear not improbable; but if my hypothesis concerning the origin of language be well founded, the direct contrary of both suppositions is the truth.

And, *first*, With respect to the number of consonants in those primitive languages, it is the necessary consequence of my theory, that the words of those primitive languages must have been very vocal, being nothing else but the natural cries of the animal, a little varied and distinguished by articulation. And from what we have said in the preceding chapter, of the nature of articulation, it is evident, that the consonants, being formed by the action of the organs of the mouth, and consequently



consequently of much more difficult pronunciation than the vowels, which are founded by the simple position of the organs, it was impossible that they could be much used at first. And so difficult is the pronunciation of them, that at this day, as was before observed, there is hardly any language to be found which has the use of them all. I know none, except the Greek; which in this respect, as well as in every other, is the most perfect language that I am acquainted with\*. And those who have not learned early in life to pronounce any consonant, even such as are of most easy pronunciation, cannot afterwards, without the greatest difficulty, be taught to sound them; as appears from what La Hontan tells us of a Huron, upon whom he bestowed four days to no

\* By this I mean only to say, that the Greek has all the consonants commonly used in the languages of Europe. But I will not venture to affirm, that it has all the consonants which the human mouth is capable of pronouncing, or even all those that are actually used in the barbarous languages. I am well informed, that the inhabitants of *Otahitee*, the new-discovered island in the South sea, have a sound in their language betwixt / and r, which the gentleman who gave me the information could not pronounce, nor I believe any man in Europe.

purpose,



Ch. 6. purpose, in endeavouring to teach him the pronunciation of the labial consonants \*, such as *b*, *p*, *m*, which are the first that our children learn to articulate. But, on the other hand, the five vowels are to be found, I believe, in all languages, though not all founded in the same way in every language. For even the Huron language, though it have not, as I have observed, the pure sound of the vowel *u*; yet it has the mixed sound of it in composition with other vowels, such as the diphthongs *eu* and *ou*. And the reason is very plain upon my hypothesis, viz. that the vowels are the simplest and easiest modification of the natural cries, being a very small alteration of them, compared with what is made by the consonants; and the sound of some of them very much resembles the cries of certain animals.

If there were any doubt in this theory, which I think there is not, it is entirely removed by the fact. For all the barbarous languages that have hitherto been discovered, without exception of one, are full of vowels, with very few consonants.

\* Vol. 2. p. 219.



I have already mentioned the Huron language, the most original of any that I know; and to it I may add another language of North America, viz. the Algonkin\*, and, in general, all the languages of North America, which are dialects of either the Huron or Algonkin. The language of the Galibi, a people of South America †, affords another example: for in that language likewise the words are very vocal. A third example is furnished by the language of the Caribs, inhabiting the Caribbee islands, which appears to have a considerable affinity with the language last mentioned ‡. A fourth, by the language of

\* See a vocabulary of it in *La Hontan*, vol. 2. p. 202.

† These people inhabit a province of South America, near to the isthmus where the French have had a settlement about a hundred years, which they have cultivated and improved much since the last peace. They have been at the pains to learn the language of the natives; and they have published a dictionary of it, and a kind of grammar, printed at Paris in the year 1763, collected from the observations of several persons who have been in that country. From that work I have taken what I have said here, and shall say afterwards, of that language.

‡ There is an account of this language, and of the people who speak it, published at *Auxerre* in the year 1665, under the title of *Dictionnaire Caraïbe François*, by



Ch. 6. of the Peruvians, as appears from the specimens of it given us by an author before quoted, viz. Garcilasso de la Vega's history of the Incas of Peru. A fifth instance is the language of the Esquimaux in North America, of which Mr Dobbs has given us a vocabulary, in the accounts he has published of the attempts to discover the north-west passage. And, lastly, the specimens that have been lately published of the language of the new-discovered island of the South sea, Otahitee, shew, that this language likewise is extremely vocal.

Father *Raymond Bretton*, missionary in the *Caribbee* islands. He says, that the language spoken by the *men* in those islands is quite different from the language of the *women*. And the tradition is, that these islands were originally inhabited by a colony from Florida, but were invaded by a tribe of Galibi from South America, who destroyed all the males, but preserved the women, who still speak the language of Florida. For proof of this, our author says, that there still subsists an alliance and friendly intercourse betwixt the Caribs and Galibi. One *Davies*, who published an account of the Caribbee islands in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, gives the same account, if I am not mistaken, of the origin of that people. In this way our author accounts for the affinity which appears to be betwixt the two languages. His account of that of the Caribs is full and accurate; and I shall make a good deal of use of it in the sequel.

All



All those barbarous languages want many consonants, as well as that of the Hurons ; but even of those consonants which they have, they never found two together in the same syllable. This is observed by Garcilasso de la Vega ; who, after telling us, that the Peruvian language wants the consonants *s*, *b*, *d*, *f*, *g*, and *x*, adds, that when two of the other consonants happen to stand together in the same word, they divide them in the pronunciation into different syllables. Thus they pronounce *roc-ro*, not *ro-cro*. And I have had occasion to observe, that a black that came from a country in Africa near to the settlement of Goree, when he was so old that he never learned English well, could not pronounce two mute consonants together ; so that, instead of *stable*, he always said *table* ; instead of *sconce*, *conce*, &c.

Thus we see, the progress has been from the use of single consonants in syllables to the use of two or more. But is there not a further progress in this matter ? And was there not a time when no consonants at all were used, and when the only articulation was by vowels ? And indeed, when I



Ch. 6. consider the great difficulty in the pronunciation of the consonants, and in combining them in the same enunciation with the vowels, I think it is highly probable, that men did begin to articulate in that manner, and did not at once arrive at the more difficult articulation by consonants. There are indeed no facts to support this hypothesis; for we have not yet discovered, so far as I know, any language so much in the infantine state. But we find words in those barbarous languages that come very near to the simplest kind of articulation, such as the word *oueouelim*, mentioned by La Hontan in his vocabulary of the Algonkin language \*, and translated, *voilà qui est bien*. This word, and many others of the same kind that might be instanced, is plainly a cry articulated by two consonants only, one in the end of it, and one towards the end of it. I think it probable, that the language of those *Ouran Outangs* of Abyssinia, whom I mentioned before, is all of that kind, consisting of words articulated by vowels

\* Vol. 2. p. 203.

only,



only, or at least with very few consonants \*.

Ch. 6.  
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The next thing to be considered is, the length of the words in the primitive languages. And I say, that instead of being short, and consisting of monosyllables, they were of great length: and this too is a consequence of those languages being derived from natural cries; for such cries of almost all animals have a certain tract and extension, such as the lowing of an ox, the neighing of a horse, the braying of an ass, the roar of a lion, &c. And that we may not think man an exception from this rule, we need only attend to the dumb persons among us, who utter inarticulate cries, sometimes very loud, but always of a considerable length.

There is another reason why the words of those languages should be long, namely, that having very little articulation by consonants, and none at all at first, according to my supposition, it was neces-

* It may be observed, that there are in Greek some words consisting altogether of vowels, such as *αιω*, *ιαω*, *ιαω*, *ιω*, *ω*; which I consider as vestiges still remaining of the antient savage language, out of which the Greek was formed by men of art.

Ch. 6. fary that they should have a certain length, in order to distinguish them from one another, and give them that variety which was necessary to express various things; whereas we that have so many consonants, can by their means give a considerable variety even to one syllable, and a very great variety to two or more.

And this theory too is strongly supported by the fact; for all the barbarous languages have their words of a remarkable length. Some of them indeed have them longer than others, because all of them are not equally near to the original source; and some of them, as I shall have occasion afterwards to observe, begin to be languages of art: but all of them without exception have a much greater length of words than is to be found in the languages of civilized nations. All the languages above mentioned plainly prove this; and particularly the language of the Hurons, the words of which, as they are set down in Sagard's Dictionary, are of an enormous length. The language of the Caribs, according to the account of it given by the missionary above mentioned, exceeds even the Huron in this particular;

lar ; and Mr Dobbs, in his vocabulary of the Esquimaux language, has given us the word *won-na-we-uck-tuck-luit*, signifying *much* ; and a word but a little shorter, signifying *little*, viz. *mik-ke-u-awk-rook*. But the language of a barbarous people that Monf. la Condamine met with upon the banks of the river Amazons, exceeds all others in length of sound, of which he gives a specimen in their word for the number *three*, viz. *poetazzarorincouroac* *.

And thus it appears, that the length, as well as the vocality of the words, is a common property of all barbarous languages. Now whatever is general must have a general cause ; and let any man who is not satisfied with my hypothesis, consider what other cause he can assign.

There is an objection will occur to this hypothesis of mine, from the example of the Hebrew and the Chinese languages. The first of these is undoubtedly a most antient language, and by some thought the parent of all others ; yet it has no extraordinary length of words, and abounds

* Condam. Voyag. p. 66.

Ch. 6. with consonants ; particularly the roots of it have all three consonants and but two vowels. The Chinese is likewise a language of great antiquity ; and yet all its words are monosyllables.

I answer, first, with respect to the Hebrew, That it is no doubt a language of very great antiquity ; and, as it is likely, the parent of many others : but it does not from thence follow, that it is one of those first languages which grew out of the first attempts of savages to articulate, and were formed without any rule or art, which are the subject of our present inquiry ; but, on the contrary, if what is the general opinion of the learned in that language be true, it must be a language of very great art ; for they tell us, that the roots of it consist of triads of the several consonants variously combined. This shows evidently, that the language is the work, not of savages, but of men of art, who knew the power of the letters, and the effect of the several combinations of them ; and in that way formed the radical words of the language, from which all the rest are derived, according to certain rules : so that the language is a complete system, which
never

never could arise out of the rude and casual essays of men first beginning to speak. Ch. 6.

And as to the objection arising from the Chinese language, there is no evidence neither that it is one of those languages concerning which we are inquiring; but, on the contrary, as the language among the Chinese is so great a part of their learning, there is reason to think that it was the work of learned men; more especially as it bears none of those marks of a rude and artless language, which I shall take notice of afterwards when I come to speak of the formal part of such languages: for it is a language, so far as I can be informed, full and accurate in its expression, with all the parts of speech as distinct as in our European languages. For what reason the artists of this language stopped short in the formation of it, and did not enlarge their words by composition, derivation, and inflection, is a curious enough question, of which we may take occasion to say something afterwards; but it does not belong to our present subject.

Ch. 6.

It may also be objected, That the language of the new-discovered island of Otahitee, mentioned above, is not so remarkable for the length of its words, as for their being full of vowels, and of very soft pronunciation. As to which, I was informed by one of those gentlemen to whom the learned world, and indeed all mankind, is so much obliged for the toils and dangers they have gone through in search of knowledge, that it is far from being a barbarous language; for they have cases of nouns, and tenses of verbs, which they form as we do, the cases by prepositions, and the tenses by auxiliary verbs; and they have all the parts of speech that we have, without exception even of the adjective, which is not to be found in any barbarous language, as I shall take occasion afterwards to observe. There is likewise etymology in their language; that is, derivation and composition: and as to the length of their words, he told me, they were generally of several syllables; and he could recollect but one monosyllable in the whole language, tho' he had applied himself particularly to the study

study of it, and had made so great proficiency as to be able to speak it with tolerable ease.

C H A P. VII.

Of the Formal part of Barbarous Languages.
— *An account of it from Theory.*

I Come now to consider the *formal* part of barbarous languages; that is, the sounds of them as significant; a subject much more curious, and more worthy of the attention of a philosopher, than mere sounds in any language, but particularly in the language of savages: for as there is a necessary connection betwixt thinking and speaking, we trace there the progress of the human mind in its state of infancy; a fact of the greatest importance in the history of man, but of which there can be no other record except the languages of barbarous nations.


In treating of this subject I will follow the same method that I have followed with respect to the material part of such languages.—I will begin with the theory:

Ch. 7. Not that I pretend to have discovered *à priori*, and from speculation merely, what I am to deliver upon this subject; for as I should have known nothing of the original state of man, without having studied the *manners* of barbarous nations; so I should have been equally ignorant of the origin and progress of language, if I had not studied the *language* of barbarous nations: but because the method of science requires, that we should begin with the principles and causes, and from them deduce the facts, though the order of investigation and discovery be just the reverse: and if it shall appear, that from the facts the theory naturally arises, and that again the theory explains and illustrates the facts, it is hoped very little doubt will remain of the truth of my system.

Whatever is expressed by language, may be reduced to two general heads; things themselves, and the relations or connections of things. We will begin with the things considered absolutely in themselves, and as unconnected with one another. And, in this view, they are either *substances*, and their *properties*; or *actions*, and their *circumstances*; or, in the grammatical

grammatical language, they are either nouns substantive, and adjectives, or they are verbs and adverbs. I will begin with substances, and their properties. And in treating this matter I require only one *postulatum*, which certainly will be granted me, That men never would give a name to that of which they had no idea; and if they had not a separate idea of any thing as distinguished from other things, they would not give it a separate name.

That there can be no language without ideas, is evident; and it is as evident, that there can be no ideas without abstraction. We have therefore thought it necessary, in this philosophical inquiry into the nature of language, to explain at some length the doctrine of abstraction; and however foreign to the purpose it might appear at the time, we hope it will now be found of use in explaining the nature of those primitive languages. We have there shewn, that this operation of abstraction is performed in a greater or less degree of perfection; that when it is most perfectly performed, every quality of the individual is considered separately by itself: then it is considered, what of those qualities

Ch. 7.  lities it has in common with other individuals, and what it has peculiar to itself. When the mind perceives what is common in any subject, then it is said to *generalize*; and when it unites together the qualities in any subject that are common to other subjects, and makes *one* of them, then it recognises the species, and is said to have the *idea* of the thing; and that idea is *perfect*, if it takes in all that is common to that thing with other things of the same species, and nothing more.

That savages should perform accurately this double operation, of first separating and then uniting, and should in that way form those perfect ideas which only men of science form, must be allowed to be a thing impossible. They will no doubt have some general notion of the species, such as we have seen even brutes have; and consequently some obscure perception of the difference betwixt what is common to the species and what is peculiar to the individual, and making no part of the idea of the species; but they will not make this distinction accurately, so as to take nothing into their idea but what belongs only to the species. To be
convinced

convinced of this, we need only recollect, Ch. 7.
that all our ideas arise from perceptions of sense, and that the sense presents every thing to us as it exists in nature ; that is, with all its qualities, both those belonging to the species, and those which are peculiar to the individual. Now, can we suppose, that the savage, in forming his idea of the species, will take in only what belongs to it, rejecting all the qualities of the individual, which are often more striking and obvious to the sense than the specific differences ? If we could conceive his notion to be so correct, then no doubt the name he would impose would be the proper name of the species ; but as it is impossible to suppose in a savage such justness of thought as can only be the effect of much thinking and observation, it is evident that the name with which he marks any thing must denote, beside the qualities common to the species, some that belong only to individuals. Thus he will not denote a bear by a name signifying only that species of animal, but he will use a word signifying a *great bear*, or a *small bear*, a *strong bear*, or a *weak bear*, or any other quality of the individual bear that

Ch. 7. that affects his senses or imagination most. They will not have a word denoting a house, or a hut, in general, but they will have a word signifying a *great* or a *little* but, or *my but*, or *your but*.

Thus it appears, that at first there would be no name of any substance considered abstractly by itself, because there would be no such abstract idea of it; but the word expressing any such substance would always denote something more than the substance itself. And as to the qualities of substances, the matter is still clearer; for it is impossible to conceive, that savages should have any idea at all of qualities abstracted from the substance in which they are necessarily inherent. It is evident, therefore, that the words of those primitive languages, expressing qualities, would only denote them as they exist in nature; that is, inherent in the subjects to which they belong: so that the names of qualities would be blended with the names of substances.

When I was upon the subject of ideas, I observed, that some were more general, and some less general; and accordingly in all the languages of civilized men there
are

are terms more or less general. Thus *animal* is a more general name than *man*, comprehending under it, besides man, all other specieses of animals. In like manner, *animated body* is more general than *animal*, — *body* than *animated body*, — *substance* than *body*; and there the progression ends, *substance* being one of those universals of the highest order, known by the name of *categories* *. The question is, How far our savage will proceed in this ascent? That he will go up to the top of the ladder, must appear impossible †. But how

* See book 1. c. 6. p. 67.

† To remove all doubt in this matter, it may not be improper, by way of addition to what I have said upon this subject in my first book, to state a little more particularly the steps by which the mind rises from *sense and matter*, where it begins, to those ideas of *highest abstraction*. In the first place, by comparing together the several individuals of a species, and abstracting what is common to them all from what is peculiar to each, we form the idea of what the logicians call the *lowest species*; as, for example, of *man*. Then we compare this species with other specieses of animals, and by separating what is peculiar to each species, from what is common to them all, we form the more general idea of *animal*. In the same manner, from particular specieses of vegetables we form the general idea of *vegetable*. Then, comparing together the animal and vegetable,

Ch. 7. how far will he proceed? Will he go the length of *animal* in the instance given? I think not; and my reason is, that the wants

we observe what is peculiar to each; and separating that from what is common to both, we in this way attain to the still more general idea of the *τὸ ἐμψυχον*, or *animated body*. From thence, by the same process, we ascend to *body*, and from *body* to *substance*; where, as I have said, the progress ends. — And with respect to *accidents* or qualities of substances, there is the same progress from the lowest species to the highest *genus*; as, for example, from extension in particular objects we rise to the idea of extension in general, or *quantity continuous*. In the same manner, from particular numbers of things we get the idea of number in general, or *quantity discrete*; and, by comparing those two kinds of quantity together, we attain to the general idea of *quantity*. In this way we ascend in the series both of *substances* and *accidents*; and these two comprehend the whole of things. That it is impossible a savage should go far in this progression must appear evident, if we consider, 1st, That such ideas are formed by repeated abstractions, which carry us much farther from sense and matter than we can suppose the unpractised intellect of savages to go. 2^{dly}, The formation of such ideas requires a more extensive knowledge, and more enlarged views of things, than it is possible for savages to be possessed of.

And here we have got to a summit, from which we may see the whole extent of human knowledge, according to the doctrine of the Pythagorean and Aristotelian school: for those philosophers did not stop at the categories, which, according to the account I have given of them, are all specieses of things formed and complete of their kind. See *Ammon. in Categor. fol. 47*. But they inquired further, whether

wants of life, from which we are to deduce all the improvements of the human mind, would only make it necessary for him

Ch. 7.

whether there were not certain things in nature, which were not themselves categories, but the principles or elements of categories: for they conceived, that the specieses of things were not at once formed by nature, but that there was a progression in the formation of them from what was imperfect to what was perfect; that is, from the elemental principles to the things themselves. Of this kind of elements they found the *point*, the *monad*, and the *instant*, to be; none of which belong to the category of quantity, being neither magnitude, number, nor time. See *Ammon. ubi supra, fol. 46.* But they are the *principles* of all the three; the point being that of magnitude, or quantity continuous; the monad, that of number; and the instant, that of time. Besides these, there is one elemental principle much more general, being the foundation, or *substratum*, as we may call it, of all the categories, I mean *matter*; the several categories being different forms, which, joined to this universal matter, constitute the whole visible world. But how does this union happen? how do matter and form join together to produce the several substances and their qualities? Or, in other words, How are things generated? The answer is, By *motion*. Here then is another *universal*, which is not a category neither, but may be said to be the road or passage to all the categories, as no species of thing here below can exist without motion, *Ammon. ibid. 47.* Matter then must be moved, and must undergo some change, before it can receive those forms which constitute the nature of things. If so, it must have in itself the capacity of being moved, which, when brought into exertion, is what we call *motion*, as I

Ch. 7. him to have an idea of the several species of animals with which he was conversant, not to form a more general idea comprehending

have explained in a former note, p. 16.; and, according to Aristotle, is in the body that *is moved*, not in what *moves*; and therefore he has defined a *natural body* to be that which has in itself the *principle of motion*. And this naturally leads us to a still higher order of being. For if there be motion, there must be a mover. And what can this mover be? It cannot be body, which is only passive of motion, and may communicate it by impulse to other bodies, but cannot begin it. What then is it that moves or begins motion? My answer is, That it is not matter or body. It is therefore an immaterial substance, and this substance I call *mind*. Of which, if we require a definition, I think the best that can be given is, that it is a substance which has in itself the power of *moving*; and in this way it is properly distinguished by Aristotle from body; which, as I have said, he has defined to be that which has the power of motion, that is, of *being moved*.

But neither did this philosophy stop here; but they inquired further, whether every mind had *originally* in itself this power of moving; and they found, that there was but one mind that had this power originally and independently in itself, and that all other minds had it by derivation from this first mind, which therefore is the first cause, the author of all motion, and of all generation and production of every kind, and which Aristotle, in the conclusion of his *Physics*, has proved to be eternal and unchangeable, immaterial, and without parts.

This philosophy, so noble at least in appearance, and so extensive, which pretends to lead us from the perceptions of sense, by gradual removes, from matter, to the
most

comprehending them all. Such an idea Ch. 7.
would come only in process of time, and
after his sphere of life was so much enlarged, and reasoning so far advanced, as
to make it necessary for him to distinguish betwixt animals in general, and the
vegetable or inanimate nature; and it
would not be till all the necessaries of life
were supplied, and till men had found
leisure to philosophise, that they would
find out those remote likenesses which
constitute such ideas as those of *body, substance, matter, space*, and the like. And
thus it appears, that the ideas of savages,
and by consequence their language, would

most general and abstract properties of material things, such as are at a great distance from particular objects of sense; and from thence to conduct us to the principles or elements of those general properties, and which are still more removed from matter and sense: and when we have gone thus far, supposes us capable of apprehending that which is not abstracted from matter, or existing in matter, such as the universals we have been speaking of; but what, by its nature, is entirely separated from matter, or, in one word, *mind*: and from mind in general, leads us to the contemplation of the supreme mind, and first cause of all things.—This philosophy, I say, which, from what is *lowest* in nature, conducts us to what is *highest*, and ends in the sublimest theology, should at least excite the curiosity of speculative men among us to look a little more into it, and see whether it answers to this idea that I have endeavoured to give of it.

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Ch. 7. at first be confined to the lowest specieses, unless where it happened that the specific differences of such specieses were not so readily to be distinguished. In that case it is natural to suppose, that they would leap over the lowest specieses, and ascend at once to the genus immediately above them. Thus, *ex. gr.* they would have the idea of a tree, before they had the ideas of the different specieses, such as ash, oak, beach, &c.; but where the specific differences are obvious, as in the case of such animals as man, horse, dog, &c. it is impossible to suppose that they would not form the idea of those several specieses before they formed the more general idea of animal.

The last thing I have to observe, with respect to the names of substances and their qualities, is, that many substances, as well as their qualities, have a similitude one to another; and therefore they are expressed in the languages of art by words which have likewise a resemblance: which resemblance is produced by derivation or composition. These make a considerable part of the grammatical art, known by the name of *etymology*, but which we cannot

not suppose the savages to be possessed of. Ch. 7.
The consequence of this will be, that every thing, however like to another, will be expressed by a word quite different; which will occasion a great multiplication of words entirely new, that are saved by the two artifices above mentioned, of composition and derivation; and it will make all the words of the language unconnected with one another; so that there will not be what we call roots in it, nor any thing like a system of a language. And what will occasion a further multiplication of words in such a language, is the necessity of denoting the same substance joined to a different quality by a different name, and the same quality joined to different substances, also by a different name. Whereas, in languages of art, the same substance, with how many soever different qualities, is always known by the same name; and likewise the same quality is expressed by the same word, whatever different substances it is joined with.

I come now to speak of actions and their circumstances. With respect to which, accurate abstraction considers four things separately: *1mo*, The action itself; *2do*,
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Ch. 7. The agent; 3^{tio}, The subject of the action, or that which *suffers*; and, *lastly*, The manner in which the action is performed. Let us take, for example, the verb signifying to *beat*, there is first the action of beating, then the agent or person who beats, then the person or thing which suffers, or is beaten, and, *lastly*, there is the manner of beating, whether quickly or slowly, severely or gently, &c. But all these exist together in nature, and therefore the savage considers them all in the lump, as it were, without discrimination, and so forms his idea of the action, and according to this idea expresses it in words. Whereas, in languages formed by rule, all those things are expressed by different words, or by variations of the same word, if that can be conveniently done. Further, there are some necessary adjuncts of the action, such as time. This too, though inseparably joined with it in nature, accurate abstraction separates, and expresses either by a different word, or by a certain variation of the same word: but this the savage likewise throws into the lump, and expresses all by the same word without variation, or by a word quite different.

ferent. There is also the disposition or Ch. 7.
affection of the mind of the speaker, with
respect to the action affirming or denying
it, commanding it, or wishing it. These
dispositions, in regular languages, are ex-
pressed, either by different words, or by a
variation of the word denoting the action;
whereas, in the languages we speak of,
they are either not expressed at all, or by
a word altogether different. And this will
produce a further increase of words not
necessary: for as there is no word express-
ing the action simply by itself, if there be
the least change in any circumstance of
the action; nay, if there be but an alte-
ration in person, number, or time, or in
the disposition of the mind of the speaker
with respect to the action, there must be a
new word. For as they have no ideas of
those circumstances separate from the ac-
tion, they can have neither separate words
to express them, nor variations of the same
word, even if they knew that great secret
of artificial languages, I mean inflection.

The last thing I proposed to consider
was, the expression of the relation or con-
nection of things, and of the words ex-
pressing them, with one another; which

Ch. 7. makes what we call *syntax*, and is the principal part of the grammatical art, being that for the sake of which all other parts of grammar are intended, and without which they would be of no use *: for the end of grammar is to produce speech or discourse. Now, let ever so many words be thrown together of the most clear and determinate meaning; yet if they are not some way connected, they will never make discourse, nor form so much as a single proposition. This connection of the parts of speech in languages of art is either by separate words, such as prepositions and conjunctions; or by cases, genders, and numbers, in nouns; and in verbs, by numbers and persons, and also by voices and moods, such as the infinitive and subjunctive, which, in the more perfect languages, are all expressed by inflection or variation of the principal word. But in less perfect languages, the most of them are denoted by separate words. Now, as every kind of relation is a pure idea of intellect, which never can be apprehended by sense, and as some of those relations,

* See *Theodor. Gazæ Grammat. Græc. part 3. initio.*

particularly

particularly such of them as are expressed by cases, are very abstract and metaphysical, it is not to be expected, that savages should have any separate and distinct idea of those relations. They will therefore not express them by separate words, or by the variation of the same word, but will throw them into the lump with the things themselves. This will make their syntax wretchedly imperfect, and very much resembling the language which they used before they had words; I mean, the language of *signs*. For we may observe, that the greatest defect in the language of our dumb persons is the want of signs of connection betwixt the ideas which they express by their gestures. And we may observe the same defect in the language of our children while they are learning to speak: for though they have the words, they do not know how to join them together in syntax.

This is my notion of the nature of the first languages, deduced, as the reader will perceive from my philosophy of the human mind, laid down in the first book of this work. And we are now to examine whether this theory is supported by fact.

C H A P. VIII.

*The preceding Theory illustrated by Examples
from the Barbarous Languages.*

Ch. 8. **T**Here are only three barbarous languages, so far as I know, of which we have any particular account published that can be depended upon. The three are those I mentioned above; the *Huron*, the *Galibi*, and the *Caribbee*; of which we have dictionaries, and grammars also, so far as it is possible to make a grammar of them, given us by men of letters who had studied them. The *Huron* is the rudest and most imperfect of the three, and therefore it is from it chiefly that I shall take my examples.

And, in the *first* place, There is no such thing in this language as derivation or composition: so that, whatever analogy words may have in their signification, they have none at all in their sound. The *Hurons* therefore have not attained to that art by which a language is connected together, and the number of different sounds
very

very much abridged. The consequence of which is, that if their sphere of life were not very narrow, there would be such a multiplicity of words entirely different from one another, that the memory would be overburdened, and the language become too bulky and cumbersome for use *.

Ch. 8.

2dly, Substances are commonly not expressed by themselves, but in company with their qualities, and often with actions concerning them, as shall be afterwards observed. Even the common relations of father, mother, uncle, aunt, are

* There is so little connection betwixt the words of their language, and so little art or regularity in it, that the addition of a negation changes the word entirely. Thus there is one word which signifies, *a thing is handsome*; another quite different, signifying, *it is not handsome*. There is one word which signifies, *Thou hast beaten him*; another quite different, which expresses, *I have not beaten him*. There is a word which signifies, *I know it well*; another, altogether unlike it, signifying, *I do not know it*. And any the least change of circumstance makes the expression quite different. Thus the word which signifies *wounded with a hatchet*, is quite different from the word which denotes simply *wounded*. *In the but*, is expressed by a word quite different from the word signifying *but*; and there is a word different from either, which signifies *my but*. Nay, there is a word which signifies *two years*, altogether different from that which signifies *one year, four years, or ten years*.

not

Ch. 8. not expressed simply by themselves, but with the adjuncts of *mine*, *thine*, *his*, and by words entirely different one from another.

3dly, There is no such thing in the language as a quality expressed without the particular substance in which it is inherent: for there is not in the whole language one adjective, that is, a word denoting a quality inherent in some undetermined subject; far less have they abstract nouns, as they are called, derived from adjectives, such as *goodness*, *badness*, and the like. They have not therefore a word which expresses *good* or *bad*; but they have words which signify *you are good*, or *you are bad*.

4thly, In actions, they do not commonly make the distinctions above mentioned, betwixt the *action*, the *agent*, the *subject* of the action, and the *manner* of it; but very often express all together by the same word. And hence it is, as our author observes in his preface, that they have a great many words which are so many sentences. Thus they express by one word, *There is water in the bucket*; by another word quite different, *There is a great deal of*

of water; by a third, different from either, *You have overturned the water in the fire*. But by one and the same word they express, *Thou shalt be very glad of it*, and *Thou art very glad of it*. Their verbs commonly express the action with the subject of the action, and but very few denote the action simply by itself. Thus there is no word which signifies simply *to cut*, but many that denote *cutting fish*, *cutting wood*, *cutting cloaths*, *cutting the head*, *the arm*, &c. In like manner, they have no word that denotes the simple idea of *giving*; but there are two or three pages in our author's dictionary filled with words signifying *to give* different things. This again multiplies their words so much, that, if it were not for the reason above mentioned, their language could not serve the ordinary purposes of life.

5thly, As to tenses, numbers, and persons, our author tells us in his preface, that they commonly do not distinguish them otherwise than by the accent or tone; and in the same way they distinguish, whether the verb affirms or interrogates. The different tenses, therefore, numbers, and persons, are commonly expressed

Ch. 8. pressed by the same word ; or if they are expressed by different words, it is by words altogether different, and unconnected with one another. Thus, *I have said, Thou hast said, He hath said*, are all expressed by words quite different ; — *I have said it*, by a fourth word, not at all like any of the other three ; and *I have said to him*, by a fifth word, likewise entirely different.

6thly, There is not in the Huron language, nor in either of the other two, so far as I can discover, any word denoting a higher genus, such as *animal* or *vegetable*, and far less *matter, space, being*, or such like metaphysical entities. This is observed by M. la Condamine of the language of the savages that he saw upon the banks of the river Amazons, who have words of such an enormous length ; and it is true of all the barbarous languages without exception. In what I have said above, I hope I have sufficiently explained the reason of this so general property of those languages.

Lastly, With respect to syntax, they appear to have none at all ; for they have not prepositions or conjunctions. They have no genders, numbers, or cases, for
their

their nouns, nor moods for their verbs. In short, they have not, so far as I can discover, any way of connecting together the words of their discourse. Nor is this a peculiarity in their language; but it is the same in the languages of the Galibi and Caribbees, as we are informed by the authors who have given an account of those languages, though neither of them be so rude and imperfect as the Huron. Those savages therefore, though they have invented words, use them as our children do when they begin to speak, without connecting them together; from which we may infer, that syntax, which completes the work of language, comes last in the order of invention, and perhaps is the most difficult part of language. It would seem however, that persons may make themselves understood without syntax. This I think can be done no other way but by the arrangement of the words, (which is a considerable part of the syntax in modern languages that have not cases), by accents or tones, or by gestures and signs. The Hurons, and I believe all the barbarous nations, have a great variety

Ch. 8. of tones ; they have also much action in their speaking ; and there can be no doubt but that the position of the word will commonly determine what other word in the sentence it is connected with.

And thus I think it appears from fact, as well as theory, that those primitive languages are natural cries, a little varied and distinguished by articulation, signifying things as they are conceived by savages ; that is, mixed together as they are in nature, without being divided into certain classes, commonly known by the name of the *parts of speech*, and without being connected together in syntax.

CHAP.

C H A P. IX.

Progress of the Barbarous Languages towards Improvement. — Account of Languages that are not barbarous spoken by Barbarous Nations ; — such as that of the Garani, — of the Algonkins, — of the Goths, — of the Albinaquois. — This last too artificial.

BUT although the Huron language be, Ch. 9.
as I have said, the most rude and imperfect of any that have come to my knowledge, yet even in it we can see beginnings of improvement ; which are the more to be attended to, that they are so many steps of the progress of the human mind in the art of thinking.

And, in the *first* place, as the great defect of all barbarous languages is, the expressing different things by the same word, without abstracting and separating them one from another ; where-ever we see any one thing expressed by a distinct word, it is to be reckoned an improvement of the people in the faculty of thinking, and by

Ch. 9. consequence of their language : for if they had not first formed a separate idea of the thing, they never would have expressed it by a separate word. I have observed already, that they are not so far advanced in abstraction as to divide the quality from the substance in which it is inherent, and to express it by a distinct word ; but they have made an abstraction less violent, and with which it was natural they should begin ; I mean, of the substance from the qualities ; and considered the substance as existing by itself, without any particular quality, and have given it a separate name. This, I think, must necessarily have been the first abstract idea that was in any degree perfect, formed by men ; and accordingly the Hurons have come the length of forming some such ideas, and giving names to them. For example, they have a word which denotes *trees* simply ; others which denote certain specieses of trees, of fruits, and of animals ; others that denote works of art, without the addition of any quality.

2dly, In generalization they have begun to go beyond the lowest species, not only in trees, but in animals : for though they have

have not a word, as I have already observed, to express the genus *animal*, yet they come pretty near it, having a general word which denotes *the quadrupeds of the forest*, and another which denotes *the tame quadrupeds*, such as dogs and cats.

3dly, They have made some progress in that most artificial part of speech, the *verb*; for, in the *first* place, they have carried abstraction so far in some few instances, that they have abstracted the action from the agent, and from every circumstance accompanying it, and have invented a word to express it simply by itself. Then they have made the distinction of the three persons; and in some few of their verbs this distinction is marked by a variation or inflection of the word, as in the expression, *I am hurt*,—*Thou art hurt*,—*He is hurt*, the same word, with a different inflection in the beginning, expresses all the three persons. This indeed is uncommon; but it is not so uncommon that one of the persons should be distinguished from the rest by a variation of the word; as in the word which signifies *to sneeze*, the second person of the present is distinguished from the first person

Ch. 9.

Ch. 9. son by the addition of the letter *s* to the beginning of the word. Thus the first person, *I sneeze*, is *atsonsta*, and it is the same with the third; but the second person is *satsonsta*. And in this very verb there is a mood, namely the infinitive, viz. *atshonsta*, denoting the action by itself, without any person. I have found too one verb, and but one, where there is a distinction of the time by a variation of the word; it is the verb signifying *to say*, in which the present, *I say*, is distinguished from the perfect, *I have said*, by a different form of the word.

But these are all improvements that have been made upon the language: for the original state of it, as is evident from what still remains of it, was as I have represented it, and still continues so with respect to the cases of nouns, and the syntax; which inclines me to believe, that these two parts of language are of most difficult invention.

There is one thing concerning these Hurons which deserves our notice; that although they are but very little advanced in the arts of life, and their language particularly is, as we have seen, so imperfect,

perfect, yet they have a *decimal* arithmetic such as we have; for they count to *ten*, and then turn back again as we do. Our author has given us the names of the principal numbers up to two thousand, which I have set down below for the entertainment of the curious, and at the same time to serve as a specimen of their language *. Whether their arithmetic goes

* 1, Escate; 2, Teni; 3, Hachin; 4, Dac; 5, Onyche; 6, Houhahea; 7, Sotaret; 8, Ateret; 9, Nechon; 10, Affan; 11, Affan-escate-escarhet; 12, Affan-teni-escarhet; 13, Affan-hachin-escarhet; 14, Affan-dac-escarhet; 15, Affan-onyche-escarhet; 16, Affan-houhahea-escarhet; 17, Affan-sotaret-escarhet; 18, Affan-ateret-escarhet; 19, Affan-nechon-escarhet; 20, Teni-quivouffan; 21, Teni-quivouffan-escate-escarhet; 30, Hachin-quivouffan; 40, Dac-quivouffan; 50, Onyche-quivouffan; 60, Houhahea-quivouffan; 70, Sotaret-quivouffan; 80, Ateret-quivouffan; 90, Nechon-quivouffan; 100, Egyo-tivoiffan; 200, Teni-tevoignavoy; 1000, Affen-attevoignavoy; 2000, Teni-tivoiffan-attevoignavoy. — And their arithmetic goes no farther; at least our author says nothing more of it.

I will also give the names of numbers among the *Algonkins*, another nation in North America, from the Baron *Hontan's Voyages*, vol. 2. p. 217. 1, Pegik; 2, Ninch; 3, Nissoue; 4, Neou; 5, Narau; 6, Ningou-touaffou; 7, Ninchouaffou; 8, Nissouaffou; 9, Changuaffou; 10, Mitaffou; 11, Mitaffou-achi-pegik; 12, Mitaffou-achi-ninch; 13, Mitaffou-achi-nissoue; 14, Mitaffou-achi-neou; 15, Mitaffou-achi-narau; 16, Mitaffou-

Ch. 9. goes farther our author does not say; but I imagine it does not, as I do not think their sphere of life does require any further

fou-achi-ningotouaffou; 17, Mitaffou-achi-ninchouaffou; 18, Mitaffou-achi-nissouaffou; 19, Mitaffou-achi-changaffou; 20, Ninchtana; 21, Ninchtana-achi-pegik; 22, Ninchtana-achi-ninch; 23, Ninchtana-achi-nissoue; 24, Ninchtana-achi-neou; 25, Ninchtana-achi-narau; 26, Ninchtana-achi-ningotouaffou; 27, Ninchtana-achi-ninchoaffou; 28, Ninchtana-achi-nissoaffou; 29, Ninchtana-achi-changaffo; 30, Nissouemitana; 31, Nissouemitana-achi-pegik, &c.; 40, Neoumitana; 50, Naranmitana; 60, Ningoutouaffou-mitana; 70, Ninchouaffou-mitana; 80, Nissouaffou-mitana; 90, Changaffou-mitana; 100, Mitaffou-mitana; 1000, Mitaffou-mitaffou-mitana.

From this account, I think it is evident, that in the language of the Algonkins, they have two words denoting the number *ten*, viz. *mitaffou*, and *mitana*; and therefore it is an error of Hontan, or of his printer, when he makes the name of *twenty* to be *ninchtana*; for it should be *ninch-mitana*; that is, *twice ten*, in the same manner as *nissoue-mitana*, *thrice ten*, and so on, till we come to a thousand, which is *ten ten-times and ten-times*; that is, the *cube* or *third power* of *ten*.

For the further entertainment of the curious, I will subjoin an account of the arithmetic of the inhabitants of the new-discovered island of *Otahitee* in the South sea, furnished me by Mr Banks, whose travels in search of knowledge do honour to the age in which he lives, as well as to his country. The Otahitans count to 10, and then turn back, as the Hurons and Algonkins do. The names of the cardinal numbers are as follows. 1, *Tahai*; 2, *Rua*; 3, *Torou*; 4, *Ita*; 5, *Rima*; 6, *Whe-*
nu;

further use of numbers ; and I observe, that men in that state of human nature very seldom go farther in any thing than the necessities of human life require. The people of Kamfchatka go no farther than the number *twenty*, the number of their toes and fingers, and then they ask, *What shall we do next* * ? And the arithmetic

nu ; 7, Hetu ; 8, Warow ; 9, Iva ; 10, Ahourou. When they have got thus far, they turn back as we do, and say, *ma-tahai*, that is, *one more*, or 11 ; *ma-rua*, 12 ; and so on, till they come to 20, for which they have a new word, *tahai-taou*, that is, *one score*. Then they proceed, not by *tens*, but by *scores*, saying, *tahai-taou-tahai*, *tahai-taou-rua* ; that is, *one score and one*, *one score and two*, and so on, not stopping as we do, and turning back at 30, but going on, and saying, *one score and ten*, *one score and eleven*, *one score and twelve*, and so on, till they come to forty, which they call *rua-taou*, that is, *two-score*. Then they go on, counting in the same way, till they come to *torou-taou*, that is, *three-score*, or 60 ; and so they go on till they come to *ten score*, which they call *aou-manna*. Then they go on in the same manner till they come to *ten times ten score*, that is, 2000, which they call *mannu-tine* ; and then they go on till they come to ten times that number, or *twenty thousand*, which they call *torou-tine* ; and after this they have no new name for any number, though Mr Banks believes they may count farther.

* This fact is taken from the *Annual Register* for the year 1764, p. 4. where there is an account given of the inhabitants of *Kamfchatka*, taken from the Russian discoveries in that country.

Ch. 9. of the Caribbees, we are told, goes no farther than that of the Cyclops in Homer, viz. to the number *five*; and yet these people have made greater progress, as we shall see presently, in the art of language, than the Hurons. This I think makes it very probable, that the Hurons have learned their knowledge of numbers from some other nation more advanced in the arts of life: and it is not unlikely that the Caribbees have got their language in the same way; for there have been strange migrations and mixtures of nations at different times; and indeed there is hardly any thing that we can conceive to be possible that has not happened in a long course of time*.

The language of the Galibi, according to the account of it given in the grammar and dictionary before mentioned, is much less imperfect than that of the Hurons; for they have come the length of dividing speech into parts, as we do. They not

* This is an observation of Herodotus, *lib. 5. c. 9.* where he mentions a colony of Medes in the middle of Scythia. This no doubt is a very extraordinary thing; but, says he, πάν γενοίτο ἂν ἐν τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ; an observation that could be made only by a man who had studied as much as Herodotus the history of *mankind*.

only mark the different persons in their verbs by a variation of the word, but they have also distinct names for them; so that they have pronouns; and they have even adjectives. They have likewise those pegs or nails in the structure of language which we call conjunctions. But they have very little of composition or derivation. They want cases altogether, as well as the Hurons; and their syntax, except that they have conjunctions, and some prepositions, is as imperfect. Ch. 9.

The Caribbee language has an affinity, as I observed before, with that of the Galibi; but from the account given of it by the missionary above mentioned, it appears to be more imperfect, though not so imperfect as that of the Hurons; for they have some kind of derivation and composition, and more tenses for their verbs than the Hurons: but they often express a whole sentence by a word; which is not the case of the Galibi language.


So far therefore we may see the progress of the art of language among the Galibi and Caribbees, and even among the Hurons; but we are not to imagine, that even among the nations that are accounted bar-

Ch. 9.

barous, the art of language has not gone farther: for there is a people that they call *Garani*, in the country of Paraguay in South America, of whose language I have seen a Spanish dictionary and grammar, printed at Madrid in 1639, written by a Jesuit, and dedicated to the Virgin Mary. It is very accurate, and the work of a learned grammarian; and from the account he gives of this language, it is a regular-formed language, as much as any that is spoken at present in Europe, and preferable to them all in this respect, that it has declensions of nouns by inflection, and conjugations of verbs, expressing likewise by flexion the tenses, numbers, persons, and voices. And they have a peculiarity in the first persons plural of their verbs, such as is not to be found in any other language that I know, but is likewise in the language of the people of Brazil, as I was informed by Mons. de la Condamine at Paris, to whom I was obliged for the use of the grammar and dictionary of the *Garani*: for they have a first person plural *inclusive*, that is, including both the person who speaks, and the person to whom he speaks; and another *exclusive*, that is, excluding the person

son to whom you speak; both marked by different inflections of the word. In French, they make the distinction by the expression *nous autres*, which is the *exclusive* plural; and in English, by a greater circumlocution. This is an accuracy of thinking, which shews them to be far advanced in the grammatical art, and makes me have the same conjecture concerning them that I mentioned with respect to the Galibi. For I think it is impossible that they who have made so little progress in the other arts of life, should have invented so complete a language; and as they could not have learned it from any of the nations presently in their neighbourhood, I think it is very probable, that, some time or other, by one of the many changes and revolutions that have happened in this earth, they have been connected with some more civilized nation, from whom they have learned to speak.

There is another language, from the name of which we should expect nothing but rudeness and barbarity, and yet it is a great work of art, such as may be compared even to the Greek, and in many respects is preferable to the Latin. The language

Ch. 9.  guage I mean is the *Gothic*, the parent of all the different dialects of the Teutonic, such as the German, the Dutch, Swedish, Danish, Icelandish, and of the English among the rest. There is only one book of it extant, and that but a short one, viz. a translation of the four gospels, which is preserved in the university of Upsal in Sweden. There are also preserved some fragments of the epistle of Paul to the Romans. From these remains, small as they are, we discover that it is a complete language in itself, having its roots all of its own growth, from which it forms the rest of its words by derivation and composition; and it is copious enough to express every thing in those translations by words of its own, without borrowing one from the original Greek, as I have been assured by a gentleman learned in language, and who has studied this very diligently. It has all the several parts of speech distinguished from one another, and among others the adjective of three genders. It forms the cases of its nouns by flexion, and has five declensions as well as the Latin; in all which, there are four cases, distinguished from one another

ther by the difference of termination, viz. the nominative, genitive, dative, and accusative. It has an article of three genders, as the Greek has, and also a dual number in the two first pronouns, and in their verbs. These have four moods, as well as the Latin verbs, formed by the change of termination, and three tenses, with the variety of persons and numbers, all formed in the same way. And, lastly, it has prepositions, conjunctions, and a regular syntax *.

The last language I shall mention deserves particular notice, being the most artificial, if not the most perfect language of any that I have hitherto mentioned. It is the language of the *Algonkins*, once a great and flourishing nation in North America, till they were almost entirely destroyed by the Iroquois. It is one of the two mother-tongues in that part of the world, the Huron being the other; and all the other languages of North America are dialects of one or other of these two. La

* See *Edward Lye's Saxon and Gothic Dictionary*, lately published, with a grammar of these languages, by *Owen Manning*.

Ch. 9. Hontan says, that the Algonkin is the learned language of Canada, as much esteemed there as the Greek and Latin are in Europe *, and he has given us some account of it, but a very imperfect one. I have had occasion to be better informed concerning it by the French Jesuit whom I mentioned before, who had a much better opportunity of knowing it than the Baron Hontan, for he was seven years missionary among the Albinaquois, a nation of Indians who speak a dialect of this language, of which he was perfectly master, as otherwise he could not have discharged the duty of his mission. What he told me of it was in substance as follows.

Although it be, as I have said, a very artificial language, as will afterwards appear, it still retains several marks of a primitive language, though much farther removed from the origin of the art than the other mother-tongue of North America. For example, it has not that part of speech we call an adjective, that is, a word denoting a *quality*, existing in an indefinite subject ; but they supply it by the

* Vol. 2. p. 220.

verb, as if in English I said, instead of *a* Ch. 9.
wise man, a man who is wise; or, to bring
it nearer to the idiom of their language,
as if, instead of saying in Latin, *vir sa-*
piens, I should say, *vir qui sapit*.

2do, They have no word to express the
action simply and absolutely; *ex. gr.* they
have no word denoting the abstract action
of *doing*; but it must be doing some par-
ticular thing, or kind of thing. In like
manner, they have no word to express
simply *going*; but they have one denoting
going by land, and another expressing *go-*
ing by water. And there is in all their
verbs a distinction, which shall be after-
wards explained, whether the subject of
the action is definite or indefinite: so that
the verb always comprehends in some sort
the subject, and never denotes the action
simply and abstractedly.

3tio, They have no possessive pronouns,
but only a primitive one, which they like-
wise use for a possessive.

4to, They had not originally in their
language any abstract nouns, that is, sub-
stantives expressing abstract qualities of
substances, though they have now got

Ch. 9. such words, as shall be afterwards explained.

5^{to}, They have not yet got words expressing abstract relations, such as *father* or *son*; but they have words which express *my father*, or *my son*.

These are the marks of rudeness and simplicity in their language. But the following shew a great deal of art and contrivance. For, In the first place, as to the sound of their language, they have a great deal of variety, using all the letters we use, except only the *f* and the *v*, which none of the North-American languages use: whereas the Huron, besides wanting the *f*, has none of the labial consonants. Then they have several aspirates, and also long and short syllables. And Mr Roubaud mentioned some words signifying different things, which are only distinguished one from another by the length or shortness of the syllables. Further, the language is far from being harsh, or of unpleasant sound: but, on the contrary, is sweet and flowing; for you very seldom find in it two consonants together; and by elisions, where it is necessary, they prevent the gaping of vowels upon one another.

With

With respect to the words considered as significant, they use those three great artifices of language which I have so often mentioned, viz. composition, derivation, and inflection. Ch. 9.

With respect to composition, they have as much of it as any other language, and by far the greater part of the words are composed of verbs and adverbs, (the adverb being a part of speech much used by them), expressing in a very ingenious manner the nature of the thing signified. Derivation also is used by them as in other languages; and particularly they have a great number of derivatives from the third person singular of the present of the verbs, by which they express the abstract action of the verb, as from *curro*, *cursus*.

As to inflection, they have more of it than any other language I have heard of. For not only in that way do they form the cases of their nouns and the tenses of their verbs, but they form verbs expressing so many different modifications of the action, that it is difficult to ascertain the number and variety of them.

With respect to the cases of their nouns, they have three formed by different inflec-

Ch. 9. tions, viz. the nominative, accusative, and ablative, if the noun be *noble*, that is, if it expresses a *living thing*, or *what belongs to a living thing*: but if it be *ignoble*, that is, expressing an *inanimate thing*, it has only two cases, a nominative and accusative.

The verbs, in the first place, form their tenses by inflection: I mean their present and their past; for as to the future, they form it as we do, by auxiliaries, such as *shall* and *will*. They have two forms of the perfect, both distinguished by inflection; the one denoting, that they themselves saw the action that is past, and that therefore it may be depended upon as certain; the other expressing, that they have it only by report.

The voices and moods they form also by inflection; by which I would be understood to mean, an alteration of, or an addition to, the final syllable of the word.

As to the persons of their verbs, they form two of them, viz. the first and second, by prefixing to the verb the pronoun; but as there is only one other person, they say that needs no mark of distinction; and therefore they give you only the simple tense of the verb, without
any

any thing prefixed. They have, like some Ch. 9.
other of those barbarous languages which
I have observed, two first persons plural,
distinguished by inflection; the one in-
cluding the person to whom the speech is
addressed, as when we say, *we are all men*;
the other excluding him, as when an Eng-
lishman, speaking to a Frenchman, says,
we Englishmen do so and so. This in French
is denoted by the expression, *nous autres*.

But besides what is commonly expressed
by inflection of verbs, the Albinaquois de-
note in that way the subject of the action,
or the noun that is governed by the verb,
whether it be noble or ignoble, and also
whether it be in the accusative or the ab-
lative; so that the verb is truly *declined*,
as well as the noun, and agrees with the
noun it governs, much in the same way
that noun and adjective agree in the learn-
ed languages: and further, they express by
inflection a distinction not known in any
other language that I am acquainted with,
whether the subject of the action be a
definite and particular thing, or an inde-
finite.

But besides all this, they express, by in-
flexion of or addition to the termina-
tion,

Ch. 9. tion, the various modes of the action: and in this way they create derivative verbs almost without number. Thus they have not only frequentative verbs, like those of the Latin, and verbs which denote that the action is reflected upon the actor, something like the Greek middle verbs; but they have verbs which denote the possibility of doing or suffering the action, in place of whom it is done, whether in my own place, in your place, or in the place of a third person; and, in like manner, for whose behoof, &c. And further, by the addition of a syllable, they express whether the action is to be considered as a great action, or contrarywise; and whether a sad or doleful one; and, lastly, they have a derivative verb which expresses the negation of the action.

By this variety of expression, the forms of their verbs become almost infinite, so that Mons. Roubaud reckons, that from a single present of a verb there may be some hundreds of different forms derived, and many more if the verb be noble; and as the different forms are commonly expressed by addition of syllables, this makes their verb run out into a prodigious length of
of

of word. He gave me for example the verb *neteberdan*, which signifies, *I govern* Ch. 9.
some indefinite thing; and he showed me more inflections and changes of that verb than I could well number, besides very many more which he could upon recollection add. I observed, that in all those changes the two syllables *-teber* always remained invariable, and they were the only part of the verb that did so; from whence I was apt to conclude, that these syllables denoted the action of the verb absolutely and simply. But he said, there was no such thing in the language, and that *-teber*, though it may be called the theme or radical verb, had no signification at all by itself.

He assured me at the same time, that this almost infinite variety of their verbs was all according to the exactest rule and strictest analogy, without those irregularities and anomalies to be observed even in our learned languages. And if you once know the rules by which those different verbs are formed, you may form as many of them as you have occasion for with great facility. One day, in conversation with a savage of his mission, he observed
to

Ch. 9. to him the great order and regularity of his language, with which he seemed to be much surpris'd, as a thing he had never before attended to. He said, the invention of a language appeared to him an extraordinary thing, and wondered who had invented his language. You Europeans, says he, have much more wit than we; but has any of you invented a language?

The women among them, as they are their historians, who preserve the memory of their families and genealogies, so they may be also called the keepers or preservers of their language: for they really understand so much of the grammatical art, that they not only know the rules of speaking, but can render a reason for them; while the men are contented to learn from them the practice, without troubling themselves much about the reason for it.

Mr Roubaud, observed while he was among them, that the missionaries had made considerable alterations in their language, not only by giving them new names for things, but by introducing new forms of speech; and particularly, that they had taught them to form from their verbs abstract substantives; that is, substantives

stantives expressing the abstract quality, Ch. 9.
such as we form from our adjectives, as
from *good*, *goodness*, and the like. And he
suspects, that they have learned in like
manner from the missionaries to form
verbal nouns, *i. e.* substantives expressing
the action of the verb abstractedly, as from
curro, *curfus*; and his reason for thinking
so is, that they do not use this way of
speaking in conversation among them-
selves, but only with the missionaries.
And this, and other alterations which the
missionaries have introduced, makes the
language they speak with one another so
different from what they speak with the
missionaries, that he was often at a loss
to understand them conversing with one
another.

From this account of the language of
the Albinaquois I am disposed to con-
jecture, that in the progress of language,
which I imagine has been very long, there
has been invented a language too artificial,
such as this of the Albinaquois, and such
as it is said the Armenian language is *,

* See Dr Smith on the formation of languages, p. 452.
where he says, that the Armenian language has no less
than ten cases.

Ch. 9. before a language of complete art was formed, which is always as simple as the nature of the thing will permit. First there was a language altogether rude and barbarous, such as we have described; then was formed a language of art; but by very slow degrees, as we have also seen. Before the art was completed, there was an intermediate stage of a language, too intricate and complex in its structure. And in this respect I imagine the invention of language resembles the invention of machines. At first a machine is contrived very clumsy, and answering very ill the purpose for which it is intended; then art falls to work with it, and makes it better; but so complex, and with so many springs and movements, that it is not easily used. But art still proceeding, and observing the defects and inconveniencies, at last devises a way of simplifying the machine, and making it perform its operations with as few powers and movements as possible: and this is what I call the perfection of art. To this perfection the language of the Albinaquois is not yet arrived: but I cannot doubt, that if the Albinaquois were to cultivate arts and sciences as much
as

as the antient Greeks did, and among other arts the art of language, they would come at last to simplify their language, and make it perhaps as perfect as the Greek.

C H A P. X.

Several questions concerning the first Languages.—What words of them were first invented, or what names of things.—Whether they have any Radical Words.—Whether there be only one primitive Language.

IT may be asked concerning those primitive languages, What words in them were first invented? My answer is, That if by *words* are meant what are commonly called *parts of speech*, no words at all were first invented; but the first articulate sounds that were formed denoted whole sentences; and those sentences expressed some appetite, desire, or inclination, relating either to the individual, or to the common business which I suppose must have been carrying on by a herd of savages, before language was invented. And in this way

C. 10.
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C. 10. I believe language continued, perhaps for many ages, before *names* were invented *. For that the first articulate cries expressed the names of things, I can no more believe than that the neighing of a horse,

* And now I will give the explication I promised of the passage above quoted from Horace.

“ Donec verba quibus voces sensusque notarent,

“ Nominaque invenêre.” —

Where Horace makes a distinction betwixt *verba* and *nomina*, which has not been explained by any commentator, so far as I know; but which, if rightly understood, agrees perfectly with my system; for by *verba* he means, as I understand him, those articulate sounds expressing only appetites and desires; and this I think he has sufficiently explained himself by the description he has given of them, — *quibus voces sensusque notarent*; importing, that the first words marked the inarticulate cries formerly used, which I understand to be meant by *voces*, and by consequence the inclinations and feelings of the mind expressed by those cries, which I take to be the meaning of the word *sensus*: for that word in Latin does not denote *ideas*, or the operations of the intellect, but the movements of that part of our mind which is the seat of desire and inclination, and is called by the Greek philosophers the *orectic*, (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν). If the words be understood in this sense, (and I do not see in what other they can be understood), Horace very properly places the *verba* first, as being undoubtedly first invented; and then the *nomina*, which came next in order, and which undoubtedly signify the names of things, not whole sentences expressing some desire or volition.

or

or the lowing of a cow, is a name for any thing. C. 10.

If it be further asked, What names were first invented? My answer is, The names of the objects that they were most conversant with, and had most frequent occasion to name. Thus we see the Hurons first gave names to trees, and to those animals that they hunted or tamed.

It is an ingenious conjecture of the author before quoted *, and I think a very probable one, that the first names of objects were proper names denoting the individual; but afterwards, by being applied to objects of the same kind, on account of their resemblance, they became general names of the species. For the natural progress of the human mind, with which language always keeps pace, is from individuals to generals; and therefore, as individuals must necessarily have been first known, it is likely that they were first named.

The radical words in a formed language may be said, in one sense, to be the first

* Dr Smith on the formation of language, in the beginning.

C. 10.

words of the language, and accordingly are called *primitives*. But such words are far from being the first invented words: for the barbarous languages having no composition or derivation, can have no roots; but they belong only to artificial languages, and are the invention of the grammatical art, to make the words of a language connect and hang together, and to save the too great multiplication of them, as shall be afterwards shewn. And in general, it is in vain to seek for any thing like art in the truly primitive languages; which being produced by the necessities of life, and used only to serve those necessities, had at first no rule or analogy of any kind: so that, whatever we find like art or regularity in them, we are sure is an improvement of the original jargon.

There is another question concerning language that has been much agitated, namely, Which is the truly primitive language from whence all the others are derived? But first I think it ought to be determined, whether there be any one primitive language. Upon the supposition indeed, that language could not have been
invented

invented by man, but was revealed from heaven, it is evident, that this revealed language is the only primitive one, and that all the other languages of the world are only dialects of it, more or less pure. And then the question will be, Whether that first language is yet extant? or, if it be lost, What language now remaining comes the nearest to it? But, on the other hand, supposing language to be the invention of man, (and it is upon that supposition I proceed), I see no reason to believe, that it was invented only by one nation, and in one part of the earth; and that all the many different languages spoken in Europe, Asia, America, and the new world that we have now discovered in the South sea, are derived all from this common parent. And accordingly I have all along spoken, not of one primitive language, but of primitive languages in general. At the same time, I am far from being of opinion, that every nation has invented the language it uses: on the contrary, I am persuaded, that so difficult an art as language has not been the invention of very many nations; but having been once invented, and being of its nature
of

of long duration, as well as easy communication, it has been propagated to countries very distant from those where it was first invented. But the duration and propagation of language is a curious subject, which deserves to be considered and explained at some length; after which, we shall be better able to judge whether one language could be spread all over the face of the earth.

C H A P. XI.

Of the duration of Language, and the facility of its propagation.—Of the Celtic, and the great extent of country over which it is spread.—Of the Teutonic, and its propagation.—Of the Greek and Latin, and their connection with the Teutonic.—That the Latin is the same Language with the antient Pelasgic; and of the affinity betwixt the Latin and Hebrew;—also betwixt the Latin and Hetruscan.

C. II.

AS language is among the first arts invented by men, so it is among the last that are lost. It cannot be totally and at once lost, except by the total destruction

tion of the nation, either by some natural calamity, like that of the Atlantic island sinking, as it is said, into the sea, or by the extirpation of war. In this last way the Celtic language was lost in England, when it was conquered by the Saxons, and preserved only in the mountains of Wales, which were not conquered by them. But in the case of most other conquests, the language of a country has not been totally lost, but mixed with that of the conquerors; and out of that mixture a corrupt language produced. This was the case of the conquest of the several provinces of the Roman empire by the northern nations. In Italy, for example, the language that took place after it was subdued by the Lombards, was a mixture of Latin and the language of that people, which is the present Italian. In France, after the conquest of the Franks, the language was mixed of Latin, of Tudesque, or Teutonic, which was the language of the Franks, and of what still remained of the antient language of the country, viz. the Celtic; and of those three languages the modern French is composed *, but principally of Latin.

* See *Monf. Bullet's* preface to his Celtic Dictionary.

C. 11.

But it has sometimes happened, that the conquered retained their language entire, and that even the conquerors adopted it. This was the case when the conquered nation was much more numerous than the conquerors. For example, when the Normans conquered England; as they did not, like the Saxons, extirpate the people, and as they were but a small number, compared with the body of the English nation, English continued to be the language of the country, notwithstanding that the Norman was the language of the court and of the law, and that the Normans, for many years after the conquest, were possessed of all the great baronies, and held all the offices of dignity and trust in the kingdom; yet, under all those disadvantages, the English language stood its ground, and at last prevailed over the Norman, and came to be the general language of the country. In like manner, and for the same reason, the Tartars, tho' they have conquered China thrice, and are now, and have been for many years, in possession of it, have not established their language there; but, on the contrary, the Chinese is not only the language of the country,

country, but even of the court, and of all C. 11.
 kinds of public business. The Romans
 likewise, when they conquered Greece,
 did not make their language triumph there
 as well as their arms; not only for the
 reason I have mentioned, viz. the small-
 ness of their numbers; but for another
 reason, as I imagine, namely, the greater
 excellency of the Greek tongue, which
 made it in time prevail even over the lan-
 guage of their conquerors. This happen-
 ed after the seat of the empire was remo-
 ved to Constantinople: for though Latin
 continued to be the language of the court
 at Constantinople, and was the language
 of the law for more than two hundred
 years after, down to the time of Justinian
 the Emperor, who compiled a great body
 of law in that language, which is the Ro-
 man law that we use at this day; yet the
 Greek at last prevailed, insomuch that
 within less than a hundred years, they
 were obliged to translate Justinian's col-
 lection into Greek *. And when Constan-

* This translation is what is called the *Basilica*; and has been much used by *Cujatius*, and other learned lawyers, in explaining and correcting Justinian's collection.

C. 11. tinople was taken by the Turks, the Latin was as much lost in the Eastern empire, as the Greek was in the West.

For the reason last mentioned, the very reverse has happened in some instances, (such is the variety of human affairs in the matter of language, as well as in every thing else), and the language of the conquerors, though few in number, has become the language of the conquered nation. Thus, when the Incas of Peru conquered the several provinces of that country, they introduced, with their other arts, their language, which the people learned instead of the barbarous jargon that they spoke before *; and the same, I am persuaded, was the case of the barbarous inhabitants of Greece when they were conquered, or rather tamed and civilized, by the Pelasgi.—But of this I will speak more hereafter. The Romans too endeavoured to make their language universal through the whole *orbis Romanus*; and in some of the provinces, particularly in Gaul, they did make the Latin the pre-

* *Garcilassa de la Vega's* Royal Commentaries of Peru, lib. 7. c. 1. p. 249.; c. 3. p. 253. et seqq.

vailing language. But still the Celtic continued to be spoken, at least among the lower sort of people; and it is for this reason that, as I have just now observed, the French has at this day some Celtic in its composition. C. II.

And not only is language the longest lived of all the arts of men, but it may be said to live even after its death: for by the writing-art languages have been preserved many hundred years after they ceased to be living. In this way the learned languages of Greek and Latin continue still to be the admiration and delight of the scholar; and the Hebrew, which has ceased to be spoken these two thousand years, (for it appears to me that the genuine Hebrew was lost among the Jews as a living language during the Babylonish captivity), is still to be understood. And what is yet more extraordinary, some languages, even without literary monuments, have been preserved in the countries where they were spoken, long after they ceased to be spoken. This happens by the names of places; for in this way the Celtic is preserved, both in France and Spain, without any written monuments:
and

C. 11. and indeed there are very few such monuments of that language to be found any where. As language therefore is the most lasting of all the memorials of men, so of language itself the names of places are what last the longest.

Another observation I will here make concerning language is, that it is not only most permanent and durable, but it is of those arts which men easily carry about with them, and perhaps is that of all others which is the most easily communicated, especially to those who have been in the use of speaking any other language; for to a mute savage it would, I believe, be of very difficult communication. It is by this property of language that the same languages have been propagated to so many parts of this earth: for where-ever the people who spoke them went, there also the language would go. Now as in the early ages of the world the migrations of nations, or of colonies from them, were very frequent, it happened in that way that languages were very far spread: so that there is nothing more certain, than that every country has not invented a language

guage for itself; but, on the contrary, C. II.
there is the greatest reason, as I have said, }
to believe, that language has been the in-
vention but of few countries, and that
from those countries it has been propa-
gated to many others. It is of this pro-
pagation of language that I am now to
speak; and I will begin with the language
of the Celts, who certainly, if not the
most antient, were among the most an-
tient inhabitants of Europe.

The Celtic, if I can believe the accounts
I have heard of it, is spread over a great
part of the world, and is to be found in
places so remote from one another, as
shews, that there must have been a most
extraordinary intercourse and communi-
cation among men in antient times. The
French Jesuit above mentioned, from
whom I got my information concerning
the language of the Albinaquois, told me
as a fact which he himself could attest,
that one of his mission having lost his way
in the woods, and strolled into the coun-
try of the Esquimaux, staid long enough
there to learn the language of that people;
after which he came back again to his
country-

C. 11. countrymen; and happening one day to go aboard a French ship at Quebec, he found there among the sailors a *Basque*, that is, a native of the country at the foot of the Pyrenean mountains on the side of France, whom, by his knowledge of the Esquimaux language, he understood very well, and the Basque likewise understood him, so that they conversed together. Now the language that the Basques speak is undoubtedly a dialect of the Celtic; and it is now discovered, that the Esquimaux language is the same which is spoken by the natives of Greenland. So it appears, that the Celtic was not only the antient language of France, Spain, Britain, and Ireland, but that it has spread itself over the northern parts of Europe and America.

And further, with respect to this language, I am informed by a gentleman from the highlands of Scotland, who was some years in Florida in a public character, that the language of the natives there has a great affinity with that dialect of the Celtic which is spoken in those highlands; and particularly, that their form of salutation,

tion, by which they ask you, *Are you well?* C. II.
is the very same *.

Those who would desire to know more
of this very antient language, and of the
many

* It seems very extraordinary how the Celtic language should have found its way from Europe, or the northmost parts of America, to a country so very remote as Florida, through so many nations, who, so far as we know, speak languages altogether different. But there is a fact related by one *Herbert*, a Welchman, that will account for it. This *Herbert* was a great traveller in the last century, and has published a book of travels, in which he has taken occasion to relate, that a dispute having happened about the succession of the kingdom of Wales in the twelfth century, the party that was worsted, with their prince at their head, embarked, and went in search of a country where they might live quietly; and, having directed their course westward, after a long navigation they landed somewhere in the gulf of Mexico, and made a settlement there. After which a part of them having returned to Wales, came back again with more ships, and a greater number of men, in order to reinforce the colony, which had been much weakened by the attacks of the natives. This, our author says, is recorded by several Welch historians; and he speaks of it as a fact that cannot be contested. And indeed the truth of it is strongly supported by the affinity which the gentleman above mentioned observed betwixt the language of Florida and the Celtic, of which the Welch is a dialect: for it would appear, that this colony of Welch, after having in vain tried to support themselves against the natives, have mixed and incorporated themselves with them, and at last been totally lost in them. There are other proofs of the fact alledged by our author,

C. II. many languages that are supposed to be derived from it, may consult M. *Bullet's* memoirs of the Celtic language, published

such as the names of capes and promontories in Florida, and of beasts and birds, which he affirms to be Welch. And a further proof of some European nation having made a settlement in Florida many years ago, is a fact that I have from information which I think I can trust to, that there are regular rows of trees to be found in that country, carried on in straight lines for a great way.

All this, I know, will appear incredible to those who are prepossessed with the opinion, that Columbus and Americus Vespucius were the first discoverers of America and the adjacent islands. But the fact truly is, that before this discovery by the Welch, America had been found out by some Norwegians from Greenland: for the Norwegians having made a settlement in Greenland in the end of the tenth century, some adventurers from thence, in the beginning of the eleventh, discovered North America, and made a settlement somewhere, as it is conjectured, about the mouth of the river St Lawrence; where having found the vine growing, they from thence called the country *Winland*. This is recorded in the annals of Iceland, which was first peopled from Norway, and from whence the colony came that made the settlement in Greenland. See a *History of Denmark*, published by one *Mallet*, in French, in 1765. In short, it appears from the whole history of mankind, that wonderful migrations of people have happened in different ages of the world, and by that means languages have been propagated to countries very remote from those where they were first spoken.

in

in French, in three volumes in folio, at C. II.
Basancón, in 1759.

The Teutonic also is a language very far spread. It is at present the language of all Germany, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland; and the English is a dialect of it. The parent of this language is the Gothic; of which, besides some inscriptions, there is only extant a translation of the four gospels, preserved in the university of Upsal in Sweden, and some fragments of the epistle of Paul to the Romans. But we know it was once the language, not only of the Goths, but of the Vandals, the Lombards, and the Jepidæ: for Procopius, a contemporary historian, tells us, that all those nations spoke the same language *. Now, as the Goths, and in general all the conquerors of the Roman empire, came from the ancient Scythia and Samatia, that is, the north-east parts of Europe and north-west of Asia, comprehending all the country now known by the name of *Tartary*, and a considerable part of Muscovy and Siberia, it is evident, that, some time or

* See *Procop. de bello Vandalico*, lib. 1. cap. 2.; and *Grot.* preface to his translation of Procopius.

C. 11. another, the Gothic must have been the language of all that great tract of country. And accordingly there are still remains of it there to be found. For there is so great a resemblance betwixt the language presently spoken in Persia * and the Teutonic, that it is impossible it can be accidental. And Busbequius the German, who in the sixteenth century was sent ambassador by the Emperor to Constantinople, relates †, that he there conversed with two men from Crim-Tartary, and found, that the language there had a great affinity with the German. For proof of which, he has given us their names of numbers, which are plainly Teutonic; and also several other words, out of many more, that he heard, which any man who knows English may understand. And not only have they those vestiges of the language of the Goths still remaining in the east; but their characters, I mean the Runic letters, are to be found there. For Strahlemberg, the Swedish officer, who has written an ac-

* That country is at present inhabited by a Tartar nation; and such were the Parthians, who possessed themselves of it some time after the death of Alexander the Great. See *Herodian's History*.

† *Epist.* 4. p. 136.

count of Siberia and Tartary, relates, that he found Runic inscriptions in the deserts of Tartary *.

C. 11.

If it could be further proved, that the Celtic, and Teutonic, or its parent the Gothic, were originally the same language, which is the opinion of M. Bullet above mentioned, it would, I think, establish this proposition, That there was but one language antiently spoken all over the north, north-east, and west of Europe, and the northern and western parts of Asia. Now, I should think it might be discovered with pretty great certainty, whether there was any affinity betwixt the Celtic and Teutonic, by comparing the most antient remains of the Celtic, which I believe the poems of Ossian are, with the most antient remains of the Teutonic, such as the Edda, and other old Icelandish poems, and with what is still more antient, the remains of the Gothic. This would be a very fine field of criticism, by which I think a great discovery might be made, not only in the matter of language, but

* See Mallet's History of Denmark, book 1. cap. 13. P. 345.

with

C. 11. with respect to the history of mankind :
 for if it could be proved, that the Celtic
 and Teutonic languages were originally
 the same, it would go far to prove, that
 the two races of people were likewise the
 same originally.

That Greece was inhabited in very an-
 tient times by a race of people that came
 from the East, and particularly from Asia,
 is a fact that I think cannot be contro-
 verted. The Pelasgi, who, if not the first
 inhabitants, were at least the first who in-
 troduced civility and arts into Greece, and
 established rule and government there *;
 we can shew from good authority, came
 originally from Asia, where some of them
 were at the time of the Trojan war, into
 Greece †. And besides the testimony of
 authors,

* 'Οι δὲ Πελασγοὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δυναστευσάντων ἀρχαιοτάτοι
 λεγόνται. Strabo, lib. 7.

† This fact is proved by no less authority than that of
 Homer, who, in what relates to geography and the inhabi-
 tants of the several countries he speaks of, may be accounted
 a most authentic historian. He reckons the Pelasgi among
 the Trojan auxiliaries, *Iliad*. 2. vers. 840. and speaks of
 them as very numerous; for he mentions them in the plu-
 ral number, *φύλα Πελασγῶν*. And as to their migration from
 Asia to Greece, we know, that the people passed from
 the one continent to the other two several ways; either
 by

authors, we have still a stronger proof from the names of places, by which we can

C. II.

by sea, and then they commonly took the island of Crete in their way; or they passed the Hellespont, and came into Greece by land through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. Now, it appears, that the Pelasgi came into Greece both ways; at least it is evident from Homer, that they were in Crete about the time of the Trojan war, *Odyss.* 19. *vers.* 172. *et seqq.* And by the same authority it is proved, that they were at that time, or had been, in Thessaly: for he mentions a tract of country there, which he calls Πηλασγικὸν Ἄργος, *Iliad.* 2. *vers.* 681. in contradistinction to the Argos in Peloponnesus. And it is to be observed, that he dignifies the Pelasgi with an epithet which he bestows upon no other nation, though very frequently upon individuals: for he calls them δῖοι Πηλασγοί, *Odyss.* 19. *vers.* 177. The reason his commentator Eustathius gives for this epithet is, that they were the only people in Greece who, after Deucalion's flood, preserved the use of letters. That they had the use of letters before the people of Greece, and brought them first into that country, I have no doubt; but as they brought with them likewise many other more necessary arts of life, and taught them to the savages of Greece, that of itself was a sufficient reason for Homer's giving them this title of superiority and excellence. But further, by the assistance of Herodotus, the most antient, and, I think, the most diligent and accurate Greek historian that is preserved to us, we can trace their progress all the way from the Hellespont into Peloponnesus; for he speaks of them as having been once settled near the Hellespont, the same Pelasgi, he says, who afterwards inhabited Attica. Then he mentions them as dwelling in Samothracia, and there instituting the Samothracian mysteries.

C. 11. can trace their progress all the way from Asia into Greece, through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly *. Now, as they came

mysteries. Next, he speaks of them as possessing that part of Thessaly called *Phthiotis*, which no doubt is the Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος above mentioned of Homer. This was in the time of Deucalion. The third generation after that they inhabited, says Herodotus, the country under the mountains, Olympus and Ossa, called *Hestiaiotes*. From thence being driven by the Cadmeans, they moved to the country near to Pindus in Macedonia, and took the name of *Macedonians*. From thence to Dryopis, and from Dryopis they came into Peloponnesus, where they took the name of *Dorians*, lib. 1. cap. 56. & 57. And not only are the Pelasgi to be in this manner traced from Asia, but there are other nations, or, as I rather believe, other tribes of the same nation, to be found upon the road from thence. Thus the Ἕλληνες and the Ἀχαιοί, at the time of the Trojan war, inhabited that part of Thessaly where Achilles reigned, and are mentioned by Homer as his subjects, *Iliad*. 2. vers. 684. But these, we know well, in after times spread themselves all over Greece. The *Hellens* particularly came to be the governing people in Greece, and at last gave their name to the country and the people. And even in Homer's time we see that the *Achai* had got into Peloponnesus; and were so powerful there, that he calls by their name, as well as by the name of *Danai*, the whole Greeks.

* Homer tells us, that there was in Asia a Pelasgic city of the name of *Larissa*, *Iliad*. 2. vers. 841. There was a city of the same name in Macedonia, another in Thessaly, one in Attica, and a fourth in Peloponnesus. For it seems, that the Pelasgi from Larissa in Asia gave the name

came from the East, there is all the reason C. II.
 in the world to believe, that their language
 was some dialect of the Gothic, Celtic,
 or whatever other language was spoken in
 the western parts of Asia, or eastern parts
 of Europe; and as I shall show, that the
 antient Greek and Pelasgic were the same
 language, what is here said of the Pelasgic
 must be understood likewise of the Greek.
 I know, that the vanity of the genera-
 lity of the Greeks made their language,
 as well as themselves, the growth of
 their country. But the more learned
 and wise of them were above this vulgar
 prejudice; and particularly, Ephorus the
 historian *, and Plato the philosopher,
 acknowledged,

name of their mother-city, as was very natural, to the
 new cities which they founded in the different countries
 where they settled. Thus Helenus, in Virgil, built in
 Epirus,

— *parvam Trojam, simulataque magnis*
Pergama.

VIRG.

For the same reason, they called the rivers and moun-
 tains in the new country by the names of those in the
 old. Thus there was an Olympus in Thessaly and in
 Peloponnesus; and, in like manner, there was an Eu-
 rotas in Thessaly and in Laconia. See, upon this sub-
 ject, *Salmas. De Hellenist. part 2. p. 361.* where he gives
 more examples of the like kind.

* This Ephorus, as Polybius tells us, was a very di-
 ligent inquirer into the origin of nations and cities, and

C. II. acknowledged, that the barbarians were more antient than they : and if so, their language must have been more antient too. And accordingly Plato admits, that there are many words in the Greek language which they got from the barbarians ; and particularly the words *πῦρ* and *ὕδωρ*, denoting *fire* and *water*, and many others *, he says, are Phrygian. And there is the highest probability, that their names for the other two elements came from the same source.


Now if it be admitted, that the Greek wrote a book upon the subject. He says, not only that the barbarians were more antient than the Greeks, but that Greece, in antient times, was inhabited by various barbarous nations. With him agrees Strabo, who mentions several of those antient inhabitants of Greece, such as the *Caucones*, the *Leleges*, and the *Dryopes*, besides the *Pelasgi*, p. 494. After this, how ridiculous must the vanity appear of some of the later Greeks, particularly of Diogenes Laertius, who, in his *proœmium*, scruples not to assert, that Greece was the native country, not only of philosophy and arts, but even of the human race !

* *Cratylus*, tom. 1. p. 410. edit. Serrani ; where he says, that the word *κυνες*, signifying *dogs*, is also a Phrygian word. Now as the dog appears to be among the first animals that were tamed by men, and is to be found in countries where there are hardly any other tame animals, as in North America, the name of this animal must be supposed to have been among the first words of the language of every nation where the animal is found.

derives

derives from the Phrygian, or any other language in Asia, such words as the names of the elements, which must have been among the first names in every language, it is, I think, a convincing proof that the whole language must have come originally from that country ; and the name of one of those elements, viz. $\pi\upsilon\rho$, is clearly the same with the German or Teutonic name for that element, *fyr*, or *fire*, as we call it in our dialect of the Teutonic, the π being only changed, as is very common, into its aspirate ϕ , marked by the character *f*. C. II.

Another set of capital words in every language are the names of numbers, which must have been coeval with every language, as it is impossible to conceive, that a nation should practise the art of language, or indeed any art, without the use of numbers. And accordingly we find in the most barbarous and imperfect languages, such as the Huron, the names of numbers. Now it appears to me evident, that those names in the Teutonic, the Persian, the Greek, and its most antient dialect the Latin, are the same words, with less variation than could be expected in dialects spoken by nations living in countries

C. 11.  so remote from one another, and that must have come off from the parent-stock at times so different *.

Those words also which denote the relations of consanguinity among men, such as *father*, *mother*, *brother*, must have been among the first words in every language. Now it appears, that these names are the same in all the four languages, I mean, the Teutonic, Persian, Greek, and Latin: for as to the Greek names *πατήρ* and *μήτηρ*, or *mater*, as it is in the Latin, we may know from our own dialect of the Teutonic, that they are the same in that language; and the Persian *bader* and *mader* are evidently the same. And the Latin word *frater*, or *φρατήρ*, the old word in Greek, from whence a word still in use, *φρατρία*, is clearly the same word with the German *bryder*, the Persian *brader*, and our word *brother* †.

Since therefore such capital words as the names of the elements, of numbers, and of such near relations, are common to the Greek, Teutonic, or Gothic, and Persian, besides a great many other words of which

* See the proof of this in that very learned work of Salmasius, *De Hellenistica*, p. 384.

† See *Salmas. ubi supra*, p. 394. *et seqq.*

we can still trace the resemblance *, one of three things, I think, must necessarily be true, Either the Greek must be derived from those other languages; or, *secondly*, those other languages must be derived from the Greek; or, *lastly*, they must be all dialects of the same parent-language. That those other languages are not derived from the Greek, is confessed by the Greeks themselves, when they admit, that the barbarians are more antient than they, and that they borrowed many words from them; and without such admission it is evident, from the account I have given of the migrations of the Pelasgi, that the first who imported arts into Greece, and, among other arts, as may be supposed, the art of language, were a people who came from the east. And to me it appears evident, both from the reason of the thing, and from history, that not only all arts and sciences came from the east, but even the race of men who peopled Europe, and brought with them those arts, and, among others, language, without which they could not subsist in the ruder climate and more barren soil of Europe, as I have

* See many others of them mentioned by *Salmas. ubi supra.*

shewn,

C. II.
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C. II. shewn in the preceding book. It remains, therefore, either that they are all three dialects of the same mother-language, or, what I think more probable, the Greek is immediately derived from the Teutonic or Gothic. But whichever of these two is the truth; or even if we should suppose that the Teutonic, or its parent the Gothic, is derived from the Greek; if the affinity betwixt those languages be such as I am endeavouring to shew it is, and if the Celtic be originally the same language with the Gothic, it follows of necessary consequence, that the same language, or dialects of the same language, were spoken over the greatest part of Europe, and a great part of Asia.

As to the Oriental languages, it is certain, that the Hebrew, Phœnician, Syriac, Chaldaic, and Arabic, have all such an affinity, that either one of them must be the parent-language of the rest, or they must be all children of some common parent; and if it could be proved, that they are connected with the Greek, or Gothic, or its offspring the Teutonic, we should in that way extend the language which I suppose to have been spoken in Europe, and over the north of Asia, into Asia Minor, Syria,



Syria, Phœnicia, Arabia, and Chaldea. C. II.

And this connection betwixt those Eastern and Western languages the learned in the Hebrew have endeavoured to make out by comparing that language with the Greek, and particularly with the most antient dialect of the Greek, viz. the Latin. That the Latin is a dialect of the Greek, is well known to every scholar; and that it is the most antient dialect now extant, is evident from the following considerations: *1mo*, There are preserved in the Latin language many words which we are sure were antiently Greek words, though now obsolete in that language \*. *2do*, The termination in the canine letter *r* is much used in Latin, and was also very frequent in the antient Greek; but in place of it the Greeks in later times substituted the *s*, as being a pleasanter

\* Thus *porcus* was antiently a Greek word for a hog; and *ληνος* or *λανος* was the old word for *lana*, wool; in place of which they afterwards used the word *ἐρίον*, vide *Salmas. De Hellenist.* And the antient name of the Greek nation, which was lost in their own language even before the days of Homer, was preserved in the Latin; I mean the name of *Γραικοί* or *Γραιοί*, by which they were called long before Hellen the son of Deucalion gave them his name. See *Prideaux in marmor. Arund. p. 131.*



C. II. found \*. 3<sup>to</sup>, Even the inflection of nouns and verbs appears to have been the same in the antient Greek as it is now in the Latin †. 4<sup>to</sup>, The Latin alphabetical characters

\* This appears from a decree of the Spartan senate, preserved to us by *Severinus Boëtius* in his treatise of music. This decree is against one Timotheus, a musician, who had made some alterations upon their lyre; and in it the musician is called *τιμοθεος*, instead of *τιμοθεος*; *μιλησιος*, instead of *μιλησιος*; and we have *ταρ ακοαρ*, in place of *τας ακοας*; and through the whole decree, in place of the final *ς*, which was used in later times, there is a *ρ*.

† In the cases of nouns this is evident: as, for example, of *ανεμος*, or *animus*, the Ionic genitive is *ανεμοιο*, (afterwards contracted into *ανεμου*), which very probably was of old *ανεμοι*, and, leaving out the first vowel of the diphthong, *ανεμι*, as in Latin. And accordingly in the dative plural it is *ανεμοις*, in Latin *animis*; and in the accusative the Latins use the lowering letter *m* for the termination, and say *animum*, which it is very probable the antient Greeks did likewise; but they afterwards softened the *m* into *n*, and said *ανεμον*. And with respect to the verbs, whoever compares the present of the indicative of the Latin verb *lego*, with the same tense of the Greek verb *λεγω* in the Doric dialect, will find hardly any difference, except that the Latins, in place of the diphthong *ei*, use the simple vowel *i*, throwing aside, as in the former instance, the first vowel of the diphthong. Then the Greeks terminate the third person singular with a vowel, whereas the Latins terminate it with the consonant *t*. And, lastly, the Greeks in like manner terminate their third person plural with a vowel, for they say *λεγοντι*, afterwards softened into *λεγουσι*, whereas the  
 Latins



characters we know are the same with the antient Greek. “Formæ literis C. 11.  
 “Latinis, quæ veterrimis Græcorum,” says Tacitus in his *Annals*, lib. 2. And Pliny says the same thing, appealing to a monument that was extant in his time: — “Veteres literas Græcas fuisse easdem  
 “pene quæ nunc sunt Latinæ, indicio erit  
 “Delphica tabula antiqui æris, quæ est  
 “hodie in palatio, dono principum Mi-  
 “nervæ dicata.” *Nat. Histor. lib. 7. c. 58.*

Now these old Greek letters were no other than the Pelasgic letters, of which Diodorus Siculus speaks, lib. 3. p. 236. edit. *Wesseling*; and in which he says Linus and Orpheus wrote their poems. These appear to have been used by the Pelasgi, before Cadmus brought into Greece the Phenician letters, from which the modern Greek alphabet is undoubtedly derived. As therefore the Latin alphabet is the same with the antient Greek alphabet, it may be presumed, that their language also is the same, or nearly the same, with the antient Greek language. For I believe it has very seldom happened, that two nations speaking languages entirely

Latins say *legunt*; which we can hardly doubt was likewise the antient Greek termination.



C. II.

different, have used the same alphabetical character. But, *lastly*, there is the greatest reason to believe, that both Greeks and Romans got their language, as well as their characters, from the Pelasgi. With respect to the Greeks, one part of that nation, viz. the Dorians, were, as Herodotus informs us, Pelasgi, and therefore no doubt spoke the Pelasgic language; and as to the Ionians, who made the other half, we have already seen, that all the Greeks were first taught the arts of life by this wandering people: and, among other arts which they introduced among them, it is highly probable their language was one; for allowing that the Greek savages had then some use of language, yet as the Pelasgi were the governing people among them, and gave them both laws and religion \*, it is natural to think, that they would adopt the language of their governors, and of a people so much superior to them in every thing; especially if

\* Herodotus tells us, that the Pelasgi were the first people in Greece who sacrificed and prayed to the gods; and it was from them, says he, that the Greeks or Hellenes learned the names of the several gods. They also instituted the *Samothracian* mysteries, the most antient in Greece, *lib. 2. c. 51. & 52.* In short, it is evident, that the Greeks got from the Pelasgi, religion, government, and, in general, all the arts of life.



we consider that it must have been a language much better than the jargon they spoke. Nor is this mere conjecture; for we are told by Herodotus, that while the Pelasgi were the governing people in Attica, the inhabitants there spoke the Pelasgic language \*. And we cannot doubt that

C. II.

\* *Lib. i. c. 57.* It is true Herodotus in this passage says, that the Athenians, after they had driven out the Pelasgi, unlearned their language, and learned in the place of it the Greek or Hellenic. But how a whole nation could change its language, without other conquerors coming among them in the place of the Pelasgi, and teaching them their language, (which was not the case), he has not explained; nor do I think it is possible to explain it. But Herodotus here proceeds upon the supposition that the Hellenic and Pelasgic languages were different, and that the Pelasgic was a barbarous language; of which the only proof he gives is, that two Pelasgic cities which he names, one in Italy, and the other near the Hellespont, spoke a barbarous language, that is, a language different from the Greek of his time. But this does not prove, that their language may not have been the original language of Greece, if we consider how much the Greeks had at that improved and polished their language; whilst those two cities, living in the midst of barbarous nations, though they preserved their language, cannot be supposed to have made any improvement upon it. I am persuaded, if Herodotus had heard the Latin of those days spoken, he would likewise have pronounced it a barbarous language, though it certainly be a dialect of the Greek, but a very antient one. But what evidently shews that Herodotus is mistaken



C. II. that this was the case in the other parts of Greece, where they were the masters. Thus it appears, that the Ionian Greeks, as well as the rest, got their language from the Pelasgi. And with respect to the Romans, it is certain that this same people, the Pelasgi, were among the most antient

taken in this hypothesis of his concerning the difference of the two languages, is what he tells us himself, that one half of the Greek nation, viz. the Dorians, were a Pelasgic nation. Now though the Athenians may have changed their language after the Pelasgi left them, it is impossible to suppose that the Pelasgi would also change theirs; and yet it is a thing that cannot be doubted, that the *Doric* is the same language with the *Ionian* or *Attic*, only a different dialect. And if any further proof were necessary, Herodotus himself has also furnished it; for he tells us, that the Pelasgi not only taught the Greeks the names of their particular deities, but first gave them the general name of θεοι, lib. 2. c. 52.; and he informs us for what reason they gave them that name. Now θεος is certainly as much a Greek word as any, tho' it be likely that the old Pelasgic word was *deus*, as it is in Latin; but the later Greeks thought that the change of the *s*, that is, the middle letter betwixt the *r* and the *e*, into the aspirate, made the sound fuller and better. In short, it appears, that though Herodotus was in other respects much above the vulgar prejudices of his countrymen, he could not part with that favourite notion of theirs, That the *Ionians*, of which race he was himself, and whom he considers as the genuine Hellenes or Greeks, were *aborigines* in Greece, and that their language, as well as themselves, was of the growth of the country.


inhabitants



inhabitants of Latium and the adjoining country, of whom there is any memory preserved; and we cannot doubt that they carried their arts with them into Italy, as they did into Greece, and among others their language: and as we cannot suppose the savages that inhabited Latium in those days to have been less barbarous or ignorant than the savages of Greece, I think it can be as little doubted that they likewise learned every thing from the Pelasgi. It therefore appears to me to be as evident as any thing of so remote antiquity can be, that the Latin language is a dialect of the antient Pelasgic, and consequently of the antient Greek, which, as I have shewn, was the same with the Pelasgic. It is therefore in this most antient dialect of Greek that we are chiefly to seek for the affinity betwixt the Greek and Hebrew. And this I find is the opinion of a man very learned in language, Thomassin in his preface to his Glossary; for whose opinion in this matter I have the greater regard, that he confesses he was once of another opinion, and believed that there was a greater conformity betwixt the Greek and Hebrew, than betwixt the Latin

C. II.  
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C. 11.  tin and Hebrew; but had changed that opinion upon a more diligent and accurate study of the three languages.

As I do not understand the Hebrew, I cannot pretend to judge for myself of the affinity betwixt the two languages. But, besides the multitude of words agreeing both in sound and sense, which are common to the two languages, and of which there is a large catalogue to be seen in a work published not long ago, intitled, *Græca et Latina lingua Hebraizantes* \*; in all which, I cannot suppose, that so many learned men are mistaken; there are three things that I observe: 1<sup>st</sup>, That the names of the gods in Latin, such as Minerva, Neptune, Venus, Ceres, and which undoubtedly were their names in the antient Pelasgic, though disused by the later Greeks, are allowed by all the learned in those matters to be of Phenician or Hebrew origin †. And the general name which both the Greeks and Latins gave to

\* It is published at *Venice* in the year 1764; the author's name *Ogerius*.

† *Vid. Bochart. Geograph. Sacr.—Selden. de diis Syriis.—Vossius de Idololatr.—Huetii Demon. Evangelic.*



the gods, viz. θεός, or *Deus*, is of Hebrew extraction: for, as Herodotus informs us, *lib. 2. cap. 52.* it is derived from the Greek word θεω, of which they afterwards made τῆθημι, denoting, that the gods arranged and put every thing in order. Now, θεω, in this sense, is plainly a Hebrew \* root, as

C. II.

\* The common derivation of the word θεός, and it is given, if I am not mistaken, even by Plato in the *Cratylus*, is from θεω, *curro*, importing, that the first gods among the Greeks were the celestial bodies, from whose motion the general name of *gods* was derived. But I am persuaded Herodotus's etymology is the true one. For there is no evidence that the religion which the Pelasgi taught the Greeks was of that kind: but, on the contrary, if we can believe Herodotus, it was the religion of Egypt that the Pelasgi imported into Greece, which was very different, at least at that time, from the religion of the antient Germans and Persians, who worshipped only the celestial bodies and the elements. For Jupiter, whose worship the Pelasgi introduced into Greece, from whence he is called by Homer, Ζεὺς Πελασγικός, was certainly neither sun nor moon, nor any of the stars or elements, but a human personage, whose birth the Greeks, with their usual vanity, ascribed to their own country, and particularly to Crete, from whence, it is likely, that the Pelasgi brought the worship of him to Greece; though it cannot be doubted, but that he was originally of Egypt, the parent-country of the religion of the Greeks. And what I have said of the human extraction of Jupiter, applies equally to all the gods of Greece: for, as Herodotus tells us, they were all ἀνθρωπογενής.



C. II. I am informed, with a Greek termination, signifying, *disposuit, designavit, determinavit, &c.* which perfectly agrees with Herodotus's etymology \*.

2dly, The names of the several countries and islands of Greece are undoubtedly of Phenician or Hebrew extraction; and the name of the most antient race among them, according to Herodotus, I mean the name *Ἰαῶνες*, or *Javans*, by which name we are told the barbarians did antiently call all the Greeks, and by which the Orientals at this day call them, is undoubtedly a Hebrew word: for *Javan* is the name of the son of Japhet, who was one of the sons of Noah †.

Lastly, The similarity of termination betwixt the Hebrew and the Latin, or old Pelasgic, is to me a convincing proof of

\* Herodotus's words are, *Θεὸς προσωνομασαν σφίσις ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ὅτι κόσμῳ θεντες τα πάντα πραγματα καὶ πασας νῆμας ἔχοντες*; that is, they disposed, assigned, and distributed every thing. As to the meaning of the Hebrew word, I refer the reader to a very learned and ingenious work published at Cambridge by one *Samuel Squire*, in the year 1741, intitled, *An Inquiry into the Origin of the Greek Language*, p. 148.


† See the above-mentioned Inquiry into the Origin of the Greek Language, p. 144. & 151.



the affinity of the languages. For understanding of which, it is to be considered, that there are three marks of affinity betwixt languages. The *first* is, The similarity of the sound of words signifying the same thing in both languages; *2dly*, The similarity of termination in particular; and, *lastly*, Similarity of flexion, in forming cases, genders, numbers, and tenses. If the words have only the first kind of resemblance, the connection betwixt the two languages is remote; and all we can say in such a case is, that either the one language is derived from the other, but has undergone much alteration since it came off from the stock; or that they are both derived from the same parent-language, but, like streams from the same fountain, have divided; and, wandering far from the source, have assumed very different appearances. But if, besides this first mark, the two languages have likewise the second, the connection becomes much greater: for the termination of words is a characteristical mark, either of likeness or of difference betwixt languages. Thus the English and Italian having such different terminations, the one ending its words

C. 11.



C. II.  mostly in consonants, the other in vowels, we readily conclude them to be languages of different lineage and extraction; whereas the Dutch, German, Swedish, and other dialects of the Teutonic, terminating their words mostly in consonants, we conclude them to have been originally from the same stock with the English \*. But if the third mark of resemblance likewise concurs, and if the flexion is the same, or nearly the same, then we pronounce, without hesitation, that they are either the same language, or dialects of the same language, very near akin to one another. But if the resemblance of the flexion is not so obvious, it is only the learned in the grammatical art, who have observed attentively the changes which languages undergo in passing from one people to another, that will discover the two languages to have been originally the same. In this way the Latin is discovered to be a dialect of the Greek. Whereas the later dialects

\* One of the most distinguishing marks of difference betwixt the dialects of the Teutonic, and the Greek or Latin, is, that those dialects terminate a great many of their words with asperated consonants; whereas the Greek and Latin terminate none in that way.



of that language, such as the Ionic, At-  
tic, Doric, and Eolic, are known, at first  
sight, to be dialects of the same language,  
as readily as the dialects spoken in the dif-  
ferent provinces of the several kingdoms  
of Europe are known to belong all to the  
same language.

C. II.  
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To apply these general observations to
the Hebrew and Latin: They have the
first mark of resemblance in a great many
words; and it is likely it would have been
found in many more, if there were as ma-
ny books extant in Hebrew as there are
in Latin. But in Hebrew there is only
one book, which cannot be supposed to
contain all the words of the language, if
it were a much larger book than it is.
And indeed it is evident from the way that
the roots of this language are composed,
that it contains but a small part even of
them *. As to the flexion, it is, to be
sure, very different in the two languages.
But we are to consider, that flexion is the

* The radical words to be found in the Bible do not
exceed fifteen hundred; whereas the combination of the
several consonants in triads will produce above ten thou-
sand. See the book above quoted, *De Græcæ et Latinæ
linguæ cum Hebraica affinitate*, p. 53.

C. II. chief part of the grammatical art; and therefore, when we see two languages differing in flexion, we are not from thence to conclude, that they are languages originally different, but that after they were divided from one another, and came to be spoken by different nations, those nations followed different rules of art, in cultivating and improving their several languages; so that, from the same materials, languages were formed in appearance very different, though originally the same. For flexion, or *analogy*, as it is commonly called, gives what may be called the *form* to languages; and makes them appear so different, that it is only the critical eye that can see the resemblance. But by the means of the termination, the relation betwixt the Hebrew and Latin appears evident: for, according to the hypothesis of some of the learned in the Hebrew, all the words in that language terminate in consonants; and it is not disputed but that by far the greatest part of them terminate in that way. Now a great part of the Latin words end in consonants; nor is there any of the simple consonants (I

(I mean such as are not aspirated) that C. II.
does not terminate some one Latin word.
For as to *f*, it is an aspirated consonant,
approaching in sound to the Greek *φ*; and
as to the *g*, though no word terminate in
it, it is very near of kin to the *c*, which
terminates several words, and indeed may
be accounted the same sound; and accor-
dingly, in the antient Latin monuments
c is commonly used for *g*, as in the *Dui-*
lian inscription, *leciones* is written for *le-*
giones, and *exfociont* for *effugiunt*; and in-
deed, from its order in the alphabet, we
may know, that it answers to the Greek *γ*.
As to *p*, though it is not used in the end
of any word as the Latin is written at
present, yet we know, that, according to
the old orthography, it was frequently u-
sed for *b*, to which it is so near akin, even
in the end of words. Thus they said *ap*
for the preposition *ab*, which is just the
Greek *ἀπὸ*, without the final vowel. And
as to the *q*, it is used for the Greek *κ*, with
some variation, it is likely, in the sound,
which it is not easy to explain. And in
the old Latin, there are still more words
to

C. II. to be found terminating in consonants. In the present Latin there are but few words which end in *d*; but there were more in the old Latin; for in the Dui-
 lian monument, instead of *populo* we find *populod*; instead of *sententia*, *sententiad*. On the other hand, in the Greek language, as we have it at present, there is no noun terminating in a mute consonant, as Aristotle has observed*; nor indeed any word, so far as I can recollect, unless the preposition *ἐν*. But even this preposition, before a vowel, is written *ἐν*; and as it was so pronounced by the Latins, I should incline to think, that *ἐν* was likewise the Greek word, and the *σ* was only elided, for the sake of better sound, when a consonant followed it. Nor does any of the liquids terminate words in Greek, except *ν* and *σ*, as Aristotle likewise has observed; and but very few end in *ρ*, as I had occasion to observe before.

But I am persuaded it was not always so among the Greeks; and that while their dialect was nearer to the old Pelas-

* *Poëtic*, c. 21.

gic, before they began to soften the sound of it, and to vary the terminations of it by inflection, they had as many words ending in mute consonants as the Latins. Thus, as I observed before, I cannot doubt, but in place of λεγοντι, they said of old λεγοντ, as the Latins say; in place of μελι, μελ; and instead of απο they used the Latin preposition απο or απο. And yet, notwithstanding the difference of termination betwixt the Greek and Hebrew, some learned men * are of opinion, that the Greek resembles the Hebrew more than the Latin. But besides the resemblance of termination, which, as I have observed, is a strong mark of affinity betwixt two languages, it is natural to think, that the old Pelasgic would undergo less change in Italy, and be less cultivated and improved, than it was in Greece, and consequently have the greater resemblance to the Hebrew.

I have insisted the more upon this likeness of termination betwixt the Hebrew and Latin, that I think it has not been

* See Ogerius *De linguæ Græcæ et Latinæ cum Hebræica affinitate*.

sufficiently

C. II. sufficiently attended to by learned men ; but it appears to me so strong a mark of resemblance, that it is very near as clear a proof of the Latin being derived from the Hebrew, as of our English being derived from the Gothic : for the flexion in these two last-mentioned languages is very different ; and it is as much by the likeness of the termination, as by the similarity of the sound of the words in other respects, that we know them to be so near akin.

If any more arguments were wanting to prove the affinity betwixt the Latin, or old Pelasgic, and the Hebrew, this alone, I think, might suffice, that as the Pelasgi came from Asia, they must have spoken some Asiatic language. Now we know, that the dialects that were spoken in that part of Asia, such as the Syriac, Phenician, and Chaldaic, are all connected with the Hebrew.

If the reader is satisfied of the connection betwixt the Hebrew and the Latin, it will follow of consequence, that the Hetruscan language is also connected with the Hebrew. For it is evident, from the monuments of that once great and powerful nation still extant, particularly the

Tabulae

Tabulæ Eugubinae *, that their language was the same, or a dialect of the same language with the Pelasgic or Latin; and the connection betwixt it and the Hebrew may be accounted for in the same way as the connection betwixt the Hebrew and the Pelasgic, namely, from the origin of the people, who came from Asia, as well as the Pelasgi, being originally Lydians, as Herodotus has informed us. C. ii.

And thus it appears, that not only the northern parts of Asia, but the southern parts adjoining to the Mediterranean sea, and Greece, and Italy, and we may say all Europe, once spoke the same language, or dialects of the same language.

But what shall we say of the parent-country of all arts and sciences, at least to this western part of the world, I mean Egypt? What was the language spoken there? Was it peculiar to them? or was it borrowed from any of their neighbours?

* See with respect to these tables the *Museum Hetruscum* of Gorius, and the Collection of Hetruscan Antiquities, lately published in so splendid a form by Mr Hamilton, vol. 1. p. 48.

or did their neighbours borrow from them? This is a matter of curious inquiry, and well deserves a chapter by itself.

C H A P. XII.

Of the Antiquity of the Egyptians.—That the Pelasgi got their Language from Egypt, and brought it into Greece.—That the Athenians were a Colony of the Egyptians.—That Egypt was a country very proper for propagating or for inventing a language.—No Universal Language now existing.

C. 12. **I**T cannot, I think, be doubted, that the Egyptian nation was of very great antiquity, compared at least with any nation in Europe: for nothing is more certain in antient history, than that Egypt was a great kingdom, flourishing in arts and sciences, religion, and policy, while Europe was inhabited, if at all inhabited, only by savages. The only nation in Europe in antient times that had any pretensions to antiquity was the Greek: but
the

the wiser even among them considered themselves as children, and of yesterday, compared with the Egyptians. Plato says, that they had no memory of any thing beyond a thousand, or at most two thousand years before his time; whereas, if we can believe that most diligent and accurate historian Herodotus, the Egyptians had not only traditions, but records, viz. their sacred books, that went back above eleven thousand years before that time. And besides those books, they had a chronological record, such as I believe was never found in any other nation, I mean the statues of the high-priests of Jupiter in Thebes, of which Herodotus saw himself to the number of 345, who succeeded one another from father to son, (for the priesthood in Egypt was hereditary), from the reign of their first king down to Herodotus *. And Plato speaks of pieces of

* *Lib. 2. c. 143. et seqq.* They were colossal statues of wood; every high-priest having set up one for himself during his life. They had been shewn before to Hecataeus the historian, when he was bragging of the antiquity of his family, and reckoning up fifteen ancestors, and the sixteenth a god: for the Greeks were vain of the antiquity of their families, as well as of their nation. The computation

C. 12. of music among the Egyptians, ascribed to Isis, which he says were above ten thousand years old *. What number of years the learned and religious reader will think proper to abate of this account, I cannot take upon me to determine; but thus much I may say, that unless we believe Egypt to be a nation of very high antiquity, we must reject the authority of all antient history, sacred as well as profane.

Further, we are sure, from the best authority, that Egypt was a country of learning in very early times, as early as

here of the 11,000 years by generations, three of which Herodotus reckons make 100 years: but from what he says a little below it appears, that they had the years of the reigns of their several kings exactly set down in their sacred books; for he says, they reckoned from Bacchus, who was one of the youngest of their gods, fifteen thousand years, down to Amasis, the last of their kings before the Persian conquest; and this they said they were sure of, αἰεὶ τε λογιζόμενοι, καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπογραφομένοι τὰ ἔτη; the meaning of which words, I think, clearly is, that they always computed and set down in their books the years of every king's reign at the time of his death. There are other curious things to be gathered from this passage, which is one of the most remarkable in the book, but they are not to our present purpose.

* *Lib. 2. De Legibus, p. 657.*

the days of Moses, who, we are told, was C. 12.
 instructed *in all the wisdom of the Egyp-*
tians *.

Lastly, It is a fact, which I think likewise cannot be denied, that all religion and policy, arts and sciences, came originally from Egypt into the different parts of Europe: and they appear to me to have been conveyed and propagated in two several ways, and by two several nations; by the Phenicians by sea, and the Pelasgi by land. Of these last, and of their intercourse with Egypt, I have said something already, and shall presently say more. And as to the Phenicians, they once dwelt upon the Red sea, as Herodotus informs us, nearer to the Egyptians; and, if they were not a colony of theirs, had certainly a close intercourse with them, in consequence of which they learned to circumcise themselves, as the same author tells us †. And it appears they were so much connected with them

* *Acts of the Apostles, chap. 7. v. 22.* The word in the original is σοφία; which I do not understand to mean *prudence* in the common affairs of life, for which the proper Greek word is φρονεσις; but knowledge in the most hidden secrets of nature, and the highest philosophy.

† *Lib. 2. c. 104.*

C. 12. as to be admitted to a participation of their religion and worship: for we are told likewise by Herodotus *, that they carried upon the prows of their gallies an image of the god Vulcan, such as that which the Egyptians worshipped in the *adyta* of their temples.

These things being premised, we are now to inquire, Whether the art of language, as well as other arts, may not have come to the Western world from Egypt? and whether that language, which I have shewn was universal over Europe, and a great part of Asia, was not originally the language of Egypt?

If such was the case, the nations who spoke this language must have had some way or other a communication with Egypt; and all or most of them had that communication, if we can believe the history of the Egyptians, of which Herodotus has given us so exact an account. For, not to mention the conquests of their god Osiris, their king Sesostris traversed, with a great army, almost all the world that was then known, and left monuments

* *Lib. 3. c. 37.*

of himself in several countries, some of C. 12.
which were still remaining in the days of
Herodotus. Among other monuments he
may have left his language in several
places, as he certainly did in Colchis,
where he left a colony, who, at the
time Herodotus wrote, lived according
to the manners of the Egyptians *,
and spoke their language. And if it
be further true, that they planted a co-
lony, not only there, but in many other
parts of the world, as Diodorus informs
us they pretended, in that way we can
account for all the languages I have men-
tioned being dialects of the Egyptian: for
that the Egyptians learned their language
from any of those other nations, there is
not, I think, the least proof or probabi-
lity.

But if we should disbelieve every thing
that the Egyptians have said of themselves,
it is impossible that we can reject what the
Greeks have told us of their intercourse
with that nation, unless we have a mind
to reject at the same time all antient hi-

* *Lib. 2. c. 104. et seqq.*

story.

C. 12. story. Now, according to the Greek accounts, they had a communication with Egypt, not only by the means of Greek travellers into that country, in which way I do not think their language was brought into Greece; but chiefly by the means of strangers from that country, who came and settled in Greece, and became governing persons, and founders of states there. Of this kind I hold Deucalion to have been, and Inachus the first king in Greece, as Danaus and Cecrops certainly were; and likewise Cadmus, who, though he came into Greece immediately from Phenicia, was originally from Egypt. But besides those patriarchs of the Greeks, as I may call them, it appears to me, that the Pelasgi, the first civilizers of Greece, and whose language I think I have proved was the origin of the Greek language, were either some colony of the Egyptians, or, by intercourse with them, had learned, not only their religion and arts, but their language.

It is certain that the Pelasgi were the first civilizers of Greece; and I think I have shewn, that, among other arts which they brought into Greece, they introduced their

their language. Further, it is evident, C. 12.
that they came from Asia; and as to their
intercourse with Egypt, we are told by
Herodotus, that they brought into Greece
from Egypt the names of the gods.
And if Herodotus had not told us so,
from what other country than Egypt could
they have brought the gods of Egypt?
And it further appears, that they not only
knew the popular religion of the country,
but were initiated into their mysteries:
for it was from Egypt that they brought
the Samothracian mysteries, the most an-
cient and most respectable of all the Greek
mysteries. These mysteries were in ho-
nour of the Cabiri *, most venerable de-
ities of Egypt, into whose temple none was
permitted to enter but the priest †. The
conclusion that I draw from these facts is,
that the Pelasgi were either one of the
many colonies that came out of Egypt, or
were so intimately connected with the E-
gyptians as to have learned their language,
as well as their religion and arts.

This conclusion, I think, must appear

* *Herodot. lib. 2. c. 51.*

† *Ibid. lib. 3. c. 37.*

C. 12. extremely probable, especially as it is not contradicted by any antient author; for none of them has said any thing concerning the origin of the Pelasgi. But the evidence becomes much stronger, and indeed amounts to a proof as clear as can be expected in matters of such remote antiquity, if we attend to what Herodotus has said, That the Dorians were Pelasgi; and that the leaders of the Dorians were from Egypt*. Now what language can we suppose those Egyptian leaders to have spoken other than the Egyptian? And is it to be believed, that the Dorians spoke a different language from their leaders? For suppose they had spoken a different language when those leaders came among them, it is natural to think, that the same thing would have happened to the Dorians, as Herodotus tells us happened to the Athenians when the Pelasgi governed Athens, namely, that they would adopt the language of their governors. And as to the later Egyptian strangers, such as Danaus or Cadmus, that came into Greece after the Pelasgi were established there, they must have understood, and been able to speak, the lan-

* *Herodot. lib. 6. cap. 53.*

guage of the country; otherwise, I think, it is impossible that they could have got such an ascendancy over the people as to become kings and rulers among them, not by force, which it is certain they did not use, but by persuasion *.

C. 12.

Thus, I think, I have proved, that one race of the Greeks, viz. the Dorians, spoke a dialect of the Egyptian language. But what shall we say of the other race, the Ionians, whom only Herodotus will allow to be the true Hellens or Greeks? I say, in the *first* place, that the Doric, and Attic, or Ionic, are clearly dialects of the same language; so that if we admit the Doric to be Egyptian, it is impossible we can deny the Attic to be so likewise. And as to the notion of the Pelasgi or Dorians having changed their language after they came into Greece, and adopted the language of the people whom they governed, I have endeavoured to shew, that it is without foundation, and contrary to all probability. But, *2dly*, Suppose we should

* See this argument very well handled by Squire, in his Inquiry, which I quoted before, into the origin of the Greek language, *sect. 3. p. 173.*

C. 12. admit this to have happened, however improbable, and that the Attic or Ionic is the true original Greek language which the Pelasgi learned after they came into Greece; I say, that the language of Athens, the principal city of the Ionians, was originally Egyptian; because the Athenians were an Egyptian colony. This is a curious fact of antient history, not commonly known; and as it belongs to our subject, I will state the evidence of it at some length: in doing which I am assisted by a French dissertation on the subject, lately published by the society of antiquarians in London.

And, in the *first* place, if we can believe the Egyptians themselves, there is no doubt of the matter. For, as Diodorus Siculus informs us *, among many other colonies which they pretended to have settled in different parts of the world, they said the city of Athens was one; and they were so particular as to name the *nome* or district in Egypt from whence this colony came, viz. the district of *Saïs*. And accordingly Plato tells us †, that the

* *Lib. 1. cap. 28. edit. Wesseling.*

† *Tom. 3. p. 21. edit Serrani.*

Saïtes considered the Athenians as related to them ; and on that account treated Solon with great kindness when he came among them, and instructed him in antient history ; telling him, among other things, the story of the Atlantic island, which Plato has related in the *Timæus*. The Egyptians further, according to Diodorus *, said, that Erechtheus, who is commonly reckoned the sixth King of Athens, was an Egyptian ; and did, on account of that relation of the Athenians to the Egyptians, import into Attica, from Egypt, a quantity of corn in a time of great drought, which had produced a famine in Attica, and for this service was made king of the country. This account of Erechtheus must be allowed to be at least more credible, than the story which the Greeks told of him, that he sprung out of the earth † ; and was so far confirmed by the Athenians themselves, as the same Diodorus tells us, that they admitted there was a great scarcity of corn in Attica in the reign of Erechtheus, and that then Ceres came a-

C. 12.

* *Ubi supra.*† *Herodot. lib. 8. cap. 55.* Ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ταυτῇ Ερεχθεὺς τῷ γηγενεὺς λεγόμενός ἐστιν υἱός.

mong

C. 12. mong them, and gave them corn; the meaning of which fable, the Egyptians said, was, that Erechtheus, along with the corn, brought with him from Egypt the mysteries of that goddess, and established them in Eleusis in Attica, from whence they were called the *Eleusinian mysteries*. Now, if it be admitted, that there was at that time an importation of corn into Attica, I think it could hardly be from any other country than Egypt, which, by its nature, could not suffer famine from the want of rain, the cause, as it is said, of the famine at that time in Attica, and, as Diodorus tells us, in almost every part of the known world, except Egypt. It must therefore, I think, be allowed, that the Egyptian story is at least a probable one, and agreeable to what the Athenians themselves relate.

Further, that the Athenians were a colony of the Saïtes, was the opinion of Theopompus, a very learned Greek historian, whose diligence, and the expence, as well as the pains he was at to inform himself of facts, and particularly concerning the origin of nations and cities, Dionysius the Halicarnassian

licarnassian very much commends *. The C. 12.
 work of Theopompus is lost; but the fact
 is related by Eusebius in his *Præparatio E-*
vangelica, lib. 10. cap. 10. p. 491.; and also
 by Proclus the philosopher, in his commen-
 tary upon the *Timæus* of Plato, p. 30.; who
 informs us at the same time, that Callif-
 thenes and Phanodemus averred the con-
 trary of this, viz. That the Saïtes were a
 colony of the Athenians; and he men-
 tions Atticus, a Platonic philosopher of
 later times, who says, that Theopompus,
 through envy, inverted the story. And
 he adds, that in Atticus's time there came
 certain persons from Saïs to Athens to re-
 new their relation and connection with the
 Athenians †.

From all these accounts, one thing ap-
 pears to be evident, that there was a con-
 nection betwixt the Saïtes and Athenians,

* *Dionys. Halicarn. Epistol. ad Pomp. de Historicis*,
 p. 131.

† As this work of Proclus is not in the hands of every
 body, I have excerpted the passage, which runs thus:—

Τῆς δὲ Ἀθηναίης Καλλισθένης μὲν καὶ Φανόδημος πατέρας τῶν Σαϊτῶν ἰσορῶσι
 γενέσθαι. Θεόπομπος δὲ ἀναπαλιν ἐποίησεν [leg. ἀποίησεν] αὐτῶν εἶναι φησιν.
 Ἀττικὸς δὲ Πλατωνικὸς, διὰ Βασκανίαν, φησι, μεταποιῆσαι τὴν ἰστορίαν τὸν
 Θεόπομπον· ἐπ' αὐτῷ γὰρ ἀφικέσθαι τινὰς ἐκ τῆς Σαίως ἀνανευμένους τὴν πρὸς
 Ἀθηναίης συγγίνειαν.

and

C. 12. and that either the Saïtes were a colony of the Athenians, or the Athenians of the Saïtes. Now, I think the learned reader cannot hesitate a moment in chusing which of these alternatives he should believe: for though it be certain, that the Egyptians sent out many colonies, and particularly that many Egyptians came into Greece, there is not the least proof or probability, that any colony ever came from Greece into Egypt, nor indeed from any other country in the world, so far as we know, except from Ethiopia, which I hold to have been the parent-country of the Egyptians, who, coming from thence, first inhabited the *Thebais*, or Upper Egypt, and then spread themselves over the *Delta*, after that country was formed by the river.

Further still, not only does it thus appear in general, that the Athenians were a colony of the Saïtes, but I think we know particularly, at what time, and by whom this colony was settled in Athens. For it appears to me, that the colony was led by Cecrops, the first king of Athens, some time after the Ogygian deluge, which had desolated Attica. Whether

ther this deluge was the same with that of which Solon was informed by the old Egyptian priest of Saïs, and which, at the same time that it destroyed Attica, overwhelmed the Atlantic island *, or whether it was another, posterior to this, I pretend not to determine. C. 12.

That this first Athenian king was an Egyptian, is a fact that I think incontestable †; though the Athenian mythologists made *him* likewise the offspring of the earth ‡. And it appears also certain, that

* See Plato in *Timæo*, tom. 3. p. 21. Serrani.

† See Johannes Tzetzes, *Iliad*. 5. cap. 18. — Suidas in voce CECROPS. — Scholiast. in *Plutum Aristophanis*. — Isaacus Tzetzes ad *Lycophron*. — And Cedrenus *Compend. Historiarum*.

‡ *Apollodor. Bibliothec. lib. 3.* This was a common fable among the Greeks, invented either to conceal their ignorance, or to disguise the true origin of their nation, and to make the world believe that they were the produce of the country which they inhabited. This, we know, was in particular the vanity of the Athenians, who considered all the other inhabitants of Greece as foreigners in the country where they lived, and themselves only as *indigenæ*, and truly natives. Upon this topic their orators never failed to expatiate in the funeral orations which they pronounced upon those of the Athenians who fell in war. See what Plato has said upon this subject in his *Λογος ἐπισταφιος*, in the *Menexenus*.

C. 12. he came from Saïs in Egypt *. And that he came after the Ogygian deluge, and found Attica inhabited by men, who lived in a state of the greatest barbarity, copulating promiscuously like beasts, appears also to be certain †: for it is agreed, that he first instituted marriage among the Athenians; and for this reason he is distinguished by the epithet *διφύης*, as Tzetzes has very well explained the word in his various history ‡. The case appears to have been, that the country of Attica having been quite desolated by the Ogygian deluge at the time that Cecrops arrived with his colony from Saïs, which it is computed was a hundred and eighty-nine years after that deluge, according to Africanus's chronology, as quoted by Eusebius, was then inhabited by savages,

* *Joh. Tzetz. loco supra citato.*

† *Euseb. Chron. et præp. Evangel.*

‡ *Johannes Tzetz. Iliad. 5. cap. 18.*; where he tells us, that before Cecrops, the mothers of children were only known; so that the children were *μονοφύης*; whereas, after the institution of marriage, both parents being known, they became *διφύης*. And in this account of the name, Athenæus, *lib. 13.* and Justin the historian, *lib. 2, cap. 6.* agree with Tzetzes,

who

who lived without government, arts, or civility; and who therefore must be supposed to have learned every art of life from Cecrops and his followers; and, among other arts, that of language. C. 12.

Diodorus, though his vanity as a Greek made him unwilling to believe that the principal city of Greece was an Egyptian colony; yet, as a faithful historian, he has fairly given us the arguments which the Egyptians used to convince the Greeks of the truth of the fact. They said, that there was a great conformity betwixt the religious and civil institutions of the people of Saïs, and those of the Athenians. And, among other particulars, he mentions the division of the people of both cities into three classes of the same kind *.

But, among other arguments, they used one which appears to me most convincing in matters of such remote antiquity, because it is drawn from the most antient of all the monuments of men, I mean the names of places. For the Egyptians said, that the colony came from a town in the district of Saïs,

* *Diodor. lib. 1. cap. 28. edit. Wesseling.*

C. 12. called *Asty* *; and this name they gave to the new city that they founded in Greece. In support of this argument, they said, what no doubt was true, that the Athenians were the only people in Greece that gave that name to their city †: for the word *ἄστυ* is not the general name for a city in Greek, except among the poets, but a name peculiar to the city of Athens, and no doubt a foreign word, which the Athenians preserved without altering it, or giving it the usual Greek

* The words of Diodorus are, Καὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων φασιν (Αἰγυπτιοὶ) ἀποικίαν εἶναι Σαΐτων τῶν ἐξ Ἀιγυπτῶ καὶ περὶ τῆς οἰκησότητος ταύτης φερεῖν ἀποδείξεις· παρὰ μόνοις γὰρ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὴν πόλιν Ἀστυ καλεῖται, μετεννεγμένης τῆς προσηγορίας ἀπὸ τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἄστεος, lib. 1. cap. 28. Of these last words, it may be thought the meaning is, that *ἄστυ* was another name for the city of Saïs. But though that interpretation would equally serve my purpose, I hold the proper meaning of the words to be, that the name of *ἄστυ* given to Athens was transferred from the *ἄστυ* among them, as it may be literally rendered: an expression which so clear a writer as Diodorus would not have used, if he had meant to say, either that *ἄστυ* was a general name for a city in the Egyptian language, or that this city of Saïs, besides that name, was likewise called *ἄστυ*. The meaning therefore of the passage clearly is, that as there was a district of the name of *Saïs*, as well as a city, (see Plato in *Timæo*), *ἄστυ* was the name of some other city or village in that district, from which this Athenian colony came.

† Not only the Athenians themselves called their city by that name, but also the Latin writers. See *Corn. Nepos, Temistocl. cap. 4. & Terent. Eunuch. &c.*

termination.

termination. For Aristotle has told us *, C. 12.
 that there are only five nouns in Greek
 which terminate in this vowel υ, of which
 αςυ is one; and I am persuaded they are
 all foreign words, that had not been na-
 turalized by getting a Greek termination.

But besides all these arguments, there
 is one that arises from the manners and
 institutions of the Egyptians, and the state
 of their country, which to many may ap-
 pear more conclusive than any that I have
 hitherto mentioned. It is a fact that can-
 not be disputed, that Egypt, in antient
 times, I mean before the Persian conquest,
 was the most populous country then
 known in the world †. Nor indeed can
 any man, from what is to be seen in Eu-
 rope, have any idea of the populoufness
 of this country, such as it is described to
 us by antient authors. For, not to men-
 tion the number of cities and great villages,
 which are said to have amounted to eigh-
 teen thousand, Herodotus tells us ‡, that
 in one of their many processions, that to

* *Aristot. Poëtic. cap. 21. in fine.*

† *Diodor. Sicul. lib. 1. cap. 31. edit. Wesseling.*

‡ *Lib. 2. cap. 60.*

C. 12. the city of Bubastis in honour of Diana, there would be sometimes seven hundred thousand men and women, besides children, as he was informed by the natives. And the account he gives of the race of the fighting men shews us, that the numbers of the whole people must have been prodigious for a tract of country which is not near so large as what now goes by the name of *Egypt*; for it comprehended no more than what was overflowed by the river; so that a great deal of the country now called *Egypt* was then known, either under the name of *Arabia* towards the east, or of *Libya* towards the west. The fighting men, he says, all together, were four hundred and ten thousand in number when Egypt was in its most flourishing state. So that, according to the ordinary computation, of one fourth of the whole number of people being able to bear arms, the number of this class of men in Egypt must have amounted to one million six hundred and forty thousand. Now, the race of fighting men was, as Herodotus tells us, but one of seven classes into which the people were divided; and if their number was so great, what must the number

number have been of husbandmen, shep- C. 12.
herds, sailors, and artificers of every kind,
not to mention the priests, who were in E-
gypt a very numerous race * ? What
enabled Egypt to maintain such numbers
was the nature of the country, where the
land was not only more fruitful than the
land of any other, but the river abounded
exceedingly with fish, and also with herbs,
which served for the sustenance of man.
Their policy too and manners very much
encouraged propagation: for every man
in Egypt had as many wives as he chose,
except the priests, who married only one.
Nor was exposition of children allowed a-
mong them, as in Greece; but they were
obliged to bring them all up, even such
as they had by female slaves, and without
distinction, whether they were lawful
children, or what we call *bastards*. And
lest we should think it impossible that they
could rear so many children, the same
author informs us †, that it was done at
no cost, the children for the greater part

* Herodot. lib. 2. cap. 165. seqq. Diodor. lib. 1.
cap. 73. & 74. p. 84.

† Diodor. Sicul. lib. 1. c. 80. p. 91.

C. 12. going about naked, and feeding upon reeds and other aquatic plants which grew in their river and marshes.

In such circumstances, it was of absolute necessity, that they should ease themselves of their superfluous numbers by sending out colonies; a fact of which I could have had no doubt, though it had not been vouched by any history or record. And I imagine, that the warlike expeditions of Osiris and Sesostris were undertaken, rather with a political view of easing themselves of their superfluous numbers, than of making conquests: for it does not appear that they retained, or attempted to retain, any of the countries that they over-ran, but only settled colonies in them. I therefore consider Egypt as a hive that cast off swarms from time to time, which spread themselves all round on every side, carrying with them their religion and their arts, and, among other arts, that of language. And it appears to me, that those swarms did not only settle in the West, but also in the East. For the Egyptians themselves said, that the Babylonians and Chaldeans were a colony from them

them *. And indeed I think it is highly C. 12.
 probable, that the Chaldeans, who were
 the priests and philosophers of the Baby-
 lonians, brought with them their religion
 and sciences from Egypt. For, besides the
 resemblance which Diodorus has obser-
 ved betwixt them and the Egyptian
 priests, there is, with respect to religion,
 a circumstance of surprising conformity
 mentioned by Herodotus, which, I think,
 could not have been accidental †; and as
 there is not the least reason to believe that
 the Egyptians borrowed any thing from
 any other country, unless it be Ethio-
 pia, the country from whence, as I have
 said, they probably came, we must sup-
 pose, that the Chaldeans took it from
 them.

* *Diodor. Sicul. lib. 1. cap. 28. p. 32.*

† He says, that in the temple of Jupiter Belus at
 Babylon, whose priests the Chaldeans were, none was
 permitted to pass the night, except a woman, who was
 chosen for that purpose, and had no intercourse with
 man. The same, he says, was practised in the temple
 of Jupiter in the Egyptian Thebes; and in both temples,
 there was a couch for the god, upon which they said he
 reposed during the night: ἐμοι ὁ πίσα λεγοντες, says our au-
 thor, *lib. 1. cap. 182.*

C. 12.

Further, it is a fact which cannot be doubted, that when the Greeks under Alexander the Great came into India, they found every where there monuments both of Bacchus, or Dionysius, and Hercules; and especially of the first, who, the Indians said, came from the west with a great army, conquered the country, taught them agriculture and the use of wine, and other arts of civil and social life *. Now, there is no man who knows any thing of antient history, that can believe that this conqueror of India was Bacchus the son of Semele, or Hercules the son of Amphytryon. And I think there can be little doubt who they were, when we find the history of two countries so remote as Egypt and India agreeing in the same story: for the Egyptians related, that their Bacchus, whom they called *Osiris*, (with whom their Hercules was contemporary), over-ran all the world known at that time with a great army, civilizing men, and teaching them the arts of life where-ever he came; and particularly, that he was in India, where he built several cities, and, among others,

* See *Strabo*, lib. 15. p. 1008. & 1038. — *Arrian*. *Indica*, cap. 5. — and *Expedition*. *Alexandri*, lib. 5. c. 1.

a famous one, called *Nysa*, and left besides many other monuments of himself*. And there are at this day remarkable vestiges in India to be found of Egyptian manners and customs; particularly the veneration of the cow †. And I am disposed to believe, that the arts and sciences, of which it is certain the Indians have been in possession for many ages, have risen from seeds sown there by the Egyptians ‡.


Now, if we can believe that the Egyptians sent out their colonies as far as India, or if we only believe that they went the length of the Euxine sea, where the Colchians dwelt, whom Herodotus positively affirms to have been an Egyptian colony, we can hardly doubt of their sending colonies to Greece; a country so much nearer to them, and to which they had so easy access, both by sea and land.

Thus I have endeavoured to shew, that even upon Herodotus's supposition, of the Pelasgic being a barbarous language, alto-

* *Diodor. Sicul. lib. 1. cap. 19. p. 23.*

† See, upon this subject, *La Croze, lib. 6. Histor. Christ. Indor. p. 430.*

‡ See *Du Pons's* account of the language, philosophy, and sciences of the *Bramins* of India, in 26th vol. of the *Lettres edifiantes et curieuses.*

C. 12.  gether different from Greek, and that the Attic language was the only true Hellenic, there is the greatest reason to believe, that the Attic itself was originally an Egyptian dialect, which came with an Egyptian colony into Attica. And upon this hypothesis, I think, we may account for the possibility of that change of language which Herodotus says happened in Attica after the expulsion of the Pelasgi. These Pelasgi possessed Attica before the arrival of Cecrops. This Herodotus very plainly intimates, when he tells us, that while the Pelasgi were masters of what is now called *Greece*, the Athenians were Pelasgi, and were called *Cranai*; then, under Cecrops their king, they were called *Cecropidae*; then, under Erechtheus, a succeeding king, their name was changed into *Athenians*, &c. * Now, if it be true, as I have endeavoured to shew, that the Pelasgi spoke the Egyptian language, as they were at that time long from Egypt, it must have been a dialect of it different from that which was newly imported by Cecrops, and perhaps from a different part of the country. The Athenians therefore, in

* Herodot. lib. 8. cap. 44.

place of the old Egyptian of the Pelasgi, C. 12.
may have learned a more modern dialect of it from this king and his followers. For though it be almost impossible, that a whole people having once learned a regular-formed language, and been in use to speak it for some time, should unlearn it, and acquire another quite different; they may change one dialect of the same language for another, as we see men among us get free of their provincial dialect, and learn one more courtly and polite.

If the arguments that I have used to prove, that both races of the Greek nation were originally from Egypt, do not appear so convincing to the reader as they do to me, there are not wanting other proofs, and these more direct, of the Egyptian and Greek languages being originally the same. And, first, if it be true, as I have endeavoured to shew, that there is a resemblance betwixt the Greek and the Hebrew, and if it be also true, that there is such a similarity betwixt the Hebrew and Egyptian as could not be accidental, it will follow of necessary consequence, that there must have been a connection betwixt the Egyptian and Greek. Now, that

C. 12. that there is such a similarity betwixt the Hebrew and Egyptian, is evident from the scattered remains of the Egyptian in the writings of the antients, which have been carefully collected by learned men, particularly Bochart and Thomassin, and compared with the Greek. Some of these words are preserved in the sacred writings, and particularly the name *Moses*, which it is said Pharaoh's daughter imposed upon the child that she drew out of the river *, is, as I am certainly informed, a Hebrew word, signifying what it is said in the text to denote, viz. *the being extracted, or drawn out*. And the name also which Pharaoh gave to Joseph †, is likewise thought, by learned men, to be a Hebrew word, signifying *an interpreter of secret things* ‡.

Another proof more direct still is, the conformity which is at this day to be found betwixt the Greek and the *Coptic*, that is, the remains of the old Egyptian, which still

* *Exodus, ch. ii. v. 10.*

† *Genes. ch. xli. v. 45.*

‡ See *Squire's Inquiry, p. 171.*

continue

continue to be spoken in Egypt. This conformity appears so great to the learned Kircher, that he thinks the one must be derived from the other; but he says it is difficult to determine whether the Greek be derived from the Egyptian, or the Egyptian from the Greek *. But this appears to me to be a question very easily determined: for even the vanity of the Greeks never pretended, that the Egyptians had borrowed any arts from them of any kind, much less this most necessary art of life. Nor do I know that any other nation ever boasted of the Egyptians being obliged to them for any invention, except the Ethiopians, who, as I have said, were originally the same people. C. 12.

Other arguments might be used to shew the conformity betwixt the Egyptian and the antient language of Greece; some of which Mr Squire, in the Inquiry above quoted, has very well enforced; such as the authority and ascendant which single Egyptian strangers gained over the people of Greece, and which it is hardly possible to con-

* *Squire's Inquiry*, p. 175.

C. 12. ceive how they should have gained, if they had been entirely ignorant of the language of the country: and how should those many Greek strangers that travelled into Egypt in antient times, such as Orpheus, Musæus, Linus, Homer, &c. have been so successful in learning and importing into Greece the religion and arts of Egypt, if they had been obliged to undergo the drudgery of acquiring a language quite different from their own, as well as of learning those arts? But I think enough has been said already to make it highly probable, and indeed as certain as any matter of such remote antiquity can be, that Egypt was the parent-country, at least with respect to Europe and the western parts of Asia, of language, as well as of other arts.

But was this language, so far spread, invented in Egypt, as well as derived from thence to the several countries where it was spoken? This is a question that cannot, like the one we have been speaking of concerning the propagation of languages, be decided by history and facts, but is a matter of argument and probable conjecture. One thing, I think, cannot be

be denied, that Egypt, of all the countries in this part of the globe, is that where it is the most likely a language of art should have been invented. In any country where any common business was carried on by men, a barbarous jargon, such as we have described, may have been invented; and, I am persuaded, many such were invented in different parts of the world: but without the closest intercourse of social life, it appears to me impossible, that an art of such refinement as the art of language could have been discovered. Now, such intercourse there is not among savages that subsist by hunting, fishing, or the natural fruits of the earth. It is to be found only among men that subsist by agriculture, and live in cities, under regular forms of government. Now, the Egyptians were certainly the first people in the neighbourhood of Europe who lived in that way, being obliged to do so by the nature of their country. For, as their land was under water a considerable part of the year, they could not subsist by hunting or pasturage, nor without agriculture, at least in any great number; and it was necessary for them to have ci-

C. 12. ties or villages, such as we know those of Egypt were, raised upon mounds of earth, in which they might live in the time of the inundation. This nature of their country, it is admitted, gave birth to geometry among them, and, I am persuaded, to many other arts. They were likewise the first people, so far as we know, that were civilized, and lived under a regular government. For these reasons, I think it is probable, that they first invented the art of language, as well as the art of noting it by alphabetical characters, and every other art and science of which we are in possession. And accordingly it is recorded in the Egyptian annals, that *Teuth*, or *Hermes*, as he was called by the Greeks, invented the grammatical, as well as the writing art; giving a form to language, and imposing names upon things that had none before *.

But

* *Diodor. Sicul. lib. 1. cap. 15. p. 19.* His words are, Ἐπὶ γὰρ τῆς (Ἑρμυ) πρώτου μὲν τὴν τε κοινὴν διαλεκτὸν διαρθρωθῆναι, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνωνυμῶν τυχεῖν προσηγορίας. From which it appears, that there was a language used in Egypt before *Teuth*; but he first distinguished it properly by articulation, and gave names to things. For before him, it would seem, that the Egyptians used only *verba quibus*
voces

But was this language, which I suppose C. 12.
may have been invented in Egypt, and
carried to so many different countries,
propagated all over the earth? Are we to
believe that the Huron, the Algonkin, the
Caribbee, and all the many different lan-
guages spoken in North and South Ame-
rica; the language of Otahitee, and the
other islands or continents that may be in
the great Pacific ocean; the hissing lan-
guage of the Troglodytes in Abyssinia; or
the muttering jargon of those savages
mentioned by Condamin upon the banks
of the river Amazons, spoken, as he says,
in drawing in the breath; or the language,
if they have any, of the men with tails in
the island of Nicobar, are all dialects of
the same parent-language, which I suppose
to have been invented in Egypt? This
might be credible, if there were any hi-
story or tradition of all the world being
peopled by colonies from that country,
or if there were any such conformity

voces sensusque notarent, but had not invented *nomina*,
or names; at least not names for every thing. See also,
concerning this Teuth, Plato in *Philebo*, p. 18.; et in
Phædro, p. 274.; *Plutarch*, tom. 2. p. 738.

C, 12. of those languages last mentioned, either with one another, or with the language of Egypt, as is to be found in the other languages above mentioned; if, for example, they agreed in religious terms, in words expressing numbers, or relations of persons, or any other capital words of necessary and frequent use. But the fact is, that so far as we know of those languages, they differ totally from one another, particularly in the names of numbers. Of these I have given specimens from the Huron, the Algonkin, and the Otahitee language, all differing extremely from one another; and it is impossible, I should think, to connect them with the same names in any of the languages that I suppose to be derived from Egypt. I have given also the name of the number *three* used by those savages upon the banks of the river Amazons, which he must be an able etymologist indeed who can derive from any Hebrew root; and I think I may say the same of the Esquimaux words expressing *much* and *little*.

I cannot therefore carry the propagation of language further than I have done. I think it probable, that all the languages
spoken

spoken in Europe, all Asia, if you will, C. 12.
and some part of Africa, are dialects
of one parent-language, which probably
was invented in Egypt. But I am not
warranted to go further, either by the
reason of the thing, by historical facts, or
by any thing I can discover in the lan-
guages themselves. Some, I know, are
very fond of the system of an universal
language; but when they come to prove
it by facts, and by the languages them-
selves, I think they fail very much; as
may be seen from that dictionary of uni-
versal language which Mons. Bullet has
subjoined to his Celtic dictionary. What-
ever therefore we may believe of there ha-
ving been once but one language upon the
face of the earth, we must, I think, allow,
that it is now either totally lost in a great
part of the earth, or so depraved and cor-
rupted as no longer to be known.

C H A P. XIII.

Changes to which Language is liable; — especially in its passage from one people to another. — Examples of that kind. — General Observations upon Etymology, and the derivation of one Language from another. — Conclusion and Recapitulation.

C. 13. **A**Lthough language be of a nature so durable, that I doubt whether there be an example of a language of art being totally lost; yet it is extremely mutable as to its form and fashion; as mutable, I believe, as any thing belonging to man. Words, says Horace, are as liable to change and decay as the leaves of trees:

*Ut sylvæ foliis pronos mutantur in annos;
Prima cadunt: ita verborum vetus interit
ætas,*

*Et juvenum ritu florent modo nata, vigent-
que.*

Debemur morti nos nostraque.

HOR. *Ars Poët.*

Thus

Thus the languages spoken in the several nations of Europe only three hundred years ago, are so different from the present, that if we can understand them at all, it is only by the help of learned critics who have composed glossaries and dictionaries of them. Nor is there any way of fixing and giving a standard to a language, otherwise than by written records, that is, by books, one or more, which are allowed to be perfect in their style and composition. Thus, though there can be no doubt that the Greek language underwent many variations before the days of Homer, his poems fixed the standard of it; so that there was no considerable variation of it from his time down to the taking of Constantinople by the Turks; that is, for the space of about three thousand years: for we have at that time books written in Greek with as much purity of style, and almost as much elegance, as any written in any preceding period. The English language, in like manner, was in a constant state of fluctuation down to the reign of James VI. when it was fixed by the translation of the Bible, which is the standard of our language as well
as

C. 13.

C. 13 as of our faith; and every variation that has been made from it is, in my opinion, for the worse. And to give one example more, the standard of the Arabic was in the same manner fixed by their religious record, the Koran, which is held to be so perfect in its style and composition, that it is used by the Mahometan doctors, as a proof of the divine mission and inspiration of their prophet, who being an illiterate man, they say, could not otherwise have composed such a book. And by this method of record, as I observed before, the life of a language is perpetuated, and it still exists after it ceases to be a living language; and perhaps in greater purity, and with less hazard of corruption, than while it continued to be spoken.

But if a language is thus liable to change while it is in the mouths of the same people, how much more altered must it be when it is derived to different tribes and nations, living perhaps in parts very remote from the mother-country of the language, under the influence of different climates, customs, and manners, and mixing with other nations speaking different languages? In such a case, to distinguish the
the

the mother from the child, or even to perceive any connection betwixt the two, is a matter of great learning and nice discernment. It is in this that the art of that part of grammar we call *etymology* consists; and if, in tracing the progress of a language from one nation to another, the derivations appear sometimes to be forced and far-fetched, we must not therefore reject them. The French, Spanish, and Italian, are undoubtedly derived from the Latin; and yet how different are the words in those languages from the Latin words? The author of the Mechanism of language, whom I quoted in the beginning of this work, has given us fundry examples of the surprising change that words have undergone in their passage from the Latin into those languages: I will add some few more. Who would think that the French words *Vendredi*, *noël*, and *careme*, or *carême*, as they write it now, came from the Latin words *Venus*, *natalis*, and *quadragesimus* *; yet nothing is more certain: for *Vendredi*

C. 13.

* These examples are furnished me by *Ogerius*, the Italian author above mentioned, who writes upon the affinity of the Greek and Latin with the Hebrew, p. 84.

C. 13. is from *Veneris dies*, by cutting off the termination *-is* of *Veneris*, transposing the *r* and *e*, and inserting a *d* betwixt the *n* and *r*; and then by cutting off the termination *-es* from the word *dies*. *Noël* is formed from *natalis*, by striking out the *t*, changing the two *a*'s into *o* and *e*, and taking away the termination *is*; which last is commonly done in the words which the French have taken from the Latin. Thus, in place of *ventus*, they say *vent*. And from *quadragessimus*, *carême* is derived, by cutting off in like manner the termination *us*, changing the *qu* in the beginning of the word into the consonant *c* of like sound, and abridging the rest of the word, by throwing out the consonants *d* and *g*, and the vowels *a* and *i*.

I will give one example more, from our English language. Who would think that the word *stranger* was derived from the Latin preposition *ex*? and yet there is no genealogy of a word more certain: for, from *ex* comes *extra*; from *extra*, *extraneus*; from *extraneus*, the French word *estranger*, (for so they spelled it of old); and from *estranger* comes our English word *stranger*, by throwing out the initial *e*, as happens

happens in several words, particularly the word *escuage*, from which comes the English word *scutage*, signifying the assessment which a knight who was armed with a *scutum*, or shield, paid for the dispensation of personal service. C. 13.

It would be beside the purpose of this work to dwell longer upon the particulars of etymology and derivation, and the changes which a language undergoes in its passage from one nation to another. What I have further to say upon this subject will be more proper when I come to speak of the corruption of language, which will be the subject of the last part of my work. I will therefore conclude this part with two or three general observations.

And, in the *first* place, We are to distinguish betwixt a dialect of a language and the corruption of a language. The Attic, Ionic, Doric, and Eolic, are all dialects of the original Pelasgic or Hellenic, but none of them corruptions of it. Neither is the Latin a corruption of the Greek, but a dialect; only it is a dialect that came off very early, and was not so much cultivated and improved as the other dialects above mentioned. It there-

C. 13. fore has not all the numbers, voices, and
~~~~~ tenfes of thofe dialects, nor that variety  
of inflection and copioufnefs of found in  
which the Greek language fo much excels  
all others that I know. It appears to me,  
from comparing the remains of old Latin  
yet extant with the later Latin, that the  
Romans, when they came to be a great  
people, and to apply to arts and fciences,  
polifhed and improved their language up-  
on the model of the Greek, by clearing it  
of the ruft of the antient Pelafgic, or of  
what mixture of a more barbarous lan-  
guage there may have been in it. And  
this I take to be what Plutarch means  
when he fays, that the later Latin was  
much liker the Greek than the antient.

On the other hand, the French, Spanifh,  
and Italian, are clearly corruptions of the  
Latin, by which the analogy, that makes  
fo great a part of the art of language, is  
loft, and the words almoft all made inde-  
clineable.

It is not eafy, merely by a comparifon  
of the languages, to fay, whether the worft  
of the two be the corruption of the other,  
or the original language out of which it  
is formed and improved by the addition  
of



of proper terminations and flections. Thus C. 13.  
it would be difficult to determine, whether  
the Pelasgic, Hebrew, or Egyptian, was  
a corruption of the Greek, or whether  
they were the parent-languages out of  
which the Greek was formed, if we did  
not know from history, that those lan-  
guages were much more antient than the  
Greek. In the same manner, it would  
not be easy to decide, whether the English,  
or any other dialect of the Teutonic pre-  
sently spoken in Europe, was a corruption  
of the Gothic and Saxon, or whether the  
Gothic and Saxon were an improvement  
of the English, if we did not know from  
history, that the most antient of them is  
the most perfect: for the Gothic is a more  
perfect language than the Saxon, having,  
as I have shewn, almost as much variety  
of termination and flection as the Greek,  
and the Saxon is more perfect than the  
English. The case, therefore, with re-  
spect to those dialects of the Teutonic, is  
just the reverse of what has happened with  
respect to the Greek and Latin, which are  
improvements of their parent-languages:  
whereas the English, and other dialects of  
the



C. 13. the Teutonic, are so many corruptions of theirs.

Another observation is, That in judging of the affinity of languages, we are to have little regard to the vowels, but chiefly to consider the consonants. For, as I observed when I was explaining the nature of articulate sounds, it is the consonants which break and distinguish the voice most, and make the principal part of articulation. The consonants therefore may be said to be the bones and sinews of a language, while the vowels are little more than the vehicles of breath by which they are enunciated. Accordingly, in the Hebrew, many learned men are of opinion, that no points or marks of vowels were originally used. And the fact undoubtedly is, that at this day the Arabians, in common writing, use no such marks, but only in transcribing the Alcoran, or any of their antient poems, for which they have a particular esteem, in order to prevent all possibility of mistakes. In the different dialects of the Greek, we see how the vowels are changed; and in the same dialect the cases and tenses, and, in general, the declension of their words is



is in a great measure by change of the vowels. Nor does the change of the vowel appear to me to be so material a thing in the Greek language, as the change of the time, or quantity of it: for we often see one short vowel changed for another, or one long vowel for another, in the different dialects; but seldom a short for a long, or a long for a short. C. 13.

But the change even of consonants does not often make so great a change of the word as might be expected: for consonants of the same organ are easily interchanged. Thus *b*, *p*, *v*, *f*, being all labial consonants, are frequently interchanged in many languages \*. And in Greek, *γ*, *κ*, *ξ*, *χ*, which are all

\* *β* and *μ* are consonants of different kinds, the one being a mute, the other a liquid; yet as they are both of the same organ, being both labial, though the *β* be pronounced by the opening and explosion of the lips, the other, by closing them with a beat or chop, they too are interchanged. Thus *μῆρος* is a Greek word, which signifies *fatum*, from whence the Latin *mors* and *morior*, and the Greek word *μῆρτος*, signifying *homo*, or *mortalis*, as in that passage of *Callimachus*, ἰδεμαμὲν ἄντα μῆρτοι. Now, the *μ* being changed into *β*, (which was the custom of the Eolians; for, in place of *μυρμηξ*, they said *βυρμαξ*, from whence the Latin *formica*), and the *ο* and *ρ* transposed, which is also very common, it becomes *βῆρτος*, which is the common Greek word for *homo*, or *mortalis*.

This



C. 13. all palatine consonants, are commonly changed into one another; particularly in the flexion of nouns and verbs; and the soft, middle, and aspirated mute consonants of the same order, are very often changed into one another in the different dialects. Thus *δ* is the middle consonant betwixt the *τ* and the *θ*; and therefore the Latins, in place of the Greek *θεός*, say *Deus*.

The last observation I shall make is, That they appear to me to be much mistaken, who think we ought to judge of the affinity of languages chiefly by the flexion or analogy, and not by the word itself, or by its termination: for these are the three things, as I observed, by which we determine the relation of languages to one another. But, on the contrary, I

This observation, I see, is made in one of the philological letters of Dr Baxter, published by the society of antiquarians in London. It shews how much words in the same language, spoken by the same people, will change. But how much greater must the change be in the passage of a language from one people to another? We ought not therefore rashly to reject those derivations which learned men have discovered of Greek and Latin words from Hebrew, Celtic, or Teutonic roots, though the words do not agree in their consonants any more than in their vowels.

maintain,



maintain, that it is the mark of likeness C. 13.  
which least of all is to be regarded: for,  
if we were to judge by that rule, we could  
not say that the French, Spanish, or Ita-  
lian, are derived from the Latin; because  
the flexion, as well as the termination,  
and in general the grammar, of those lan-  
guages, is very different from that of the  
Latin. But the case truly is, that if the  
one language be a corruption of the other,  
as the languages just now mentioned are  
of the Latin, the flexion, and very often  
the termination, will be different: or, if  
the one language be at a distance from  
the source, and be much more cultivated  
and improved than the parent-language,  
its flexions or analogy will be very dif-  
ferent; and if it be at a great distance,  
its terminations will also be different.  
Thus the Greek being further removed  
from the Oriental languages than the La-  
tin, has both its flexions and its termina-  
tions quite different: whereas the Latin,  
not being so far removed, though it have  
different flexions, has, as we have shewn,  
a great similarity to those languages in its  
terminations.



C. 13.

With these observations I conclude this book, and this first part of the work; in which I have endeavoured to shew, That no part of language, neither *matter* nor *form*, is natural to man, but the effect of acquired habit: — That this habit could not have been acquired, except by men living in political society; but that neither is the political life natural to man: — That the political life arose from the necessities of men, and that it may exist without the use of language: — That the first languages were without art, such as might be expected among people altogether barbarous: — and, lastly, That if language was at all invented, there is no reason to believe that it was invented only in one nation, and that all the languages of the earth are but dialects of that one original language; although there be good reason to believe, that language has not been the invention of many nations, and that all the languages presently spoken in Europe, Asia, and a part of Africa, are derived from one original language.

The End of PART I.



























Burnett, James,

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